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[=HWA'99=] Number 22 Volume 1 1999 June 26th 99
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[ 6C:64:20:62:72:65:61:6B:20:74:68:69:73: ]
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HWA.hax0r.news is sponsored by Cubesoft communications www.csoft.net
and www.digitalgeeks.com thanks to p0lix for the digitalgeeks bandwidth
and airportman for the Cubesoft bandwidth. Also shouts out to all our
mirror sites! tnx guys.
http://www.csoft.net/~hwa
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HWA.hax0r.news Mirror Sites:
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* *
Note:
* *
This issue covers events from June 6th thru June 26th so don't be too
* rough on me, I know this is a weekly production but I had to do 3 wks *
in only a few days so forgive some of the bad formatting.
* *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
SYNOPSIS (READ THIS)
--------------------
The purpose of this newsletter is to 'digest' current events of interest
that affect the online underground and netizens in general. This includes
coverage of general security issues, hacks, exploits, underground news
and anything else I think is worthy of a look see. (remember i'm doing
this for me, not you, the fact some people happen to get a kick/use
out of it is of secondary importance).
This list is NOT meant as a replacement for, nor to compete with, the
likes of publications such as CuD or PHRACK or with news sites such as
AntiOnline, the Hacker News Network (HNN) or mailing lists such as
BUGTRAQ or ISN nor could any other 'digest' of this type do so.
It *is* intended however, to compliment such material and provide a
reference to those who follow the culture by keeping tabs on as many
sources as possible and providing links to further info, its a labour
of love and will be continued for as long as I feel like it, i'm not
motivated by dollars or the illusion of fame, did you ever notice how
the most famous/infamous hackers are the ones that get caught? there's
a lot to be said for remaining just outside the circle...
SSL is a mechanism of encrypted communications between Web
browsers and servers. In Japan, 40-bit SSL encryption is normally used. The 128-bit SSL encryption
is far more secure at 10 to the 26th power.
Due to export restrictions imposed by the United
States, the use of 128-bit encryption in Japan was not permitted until December 1998, when the
United States partially deregulated 128-bit encryption exports and allowed their use in financial
institutions and the health care industry.
Responding to this export deregulation of the
U.S. government, VeriSign Inc. of the United States began to offer the service to provide Digital
Authentication IDs for 128-bit SSL encryption for overseas countries, including Japan. This service
is called www.verisign.com and it began in April 1999 in Japan. The recent export deregulation
covered "online merchants," or electronic shops, but VeriSign Japan KK did not intend to provide
such general shops with digital IDs for 128-bit encryption because of safety considerations.
Its was found, however, that if a user goes directly to VeriSign in the United States, it is possible
to obtain a digital ID for 128-bit encryption at electronic shops in Japan. Therefore, a highly secure
SSL can be used in Japan as well as in the United States, unless these electronic shops sell drugs and
materials considered to be used as weapons.
(Nikkei Multimedia)
@HWA
43.0 Terroist About to Cause Electronic Chaos
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 15th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Weld Pond
Massive FUD (Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt) in this
article. We might as well just give up because the world
will end tomorrow. Terrorists roaming the internet about
to cause massive chaos around the globe. The threat of
electronic terrorism is looming larger and larger each
day.
The Jerusalem Post
Monday, June 14, 1999 30 Sivan 5759 Updated Mon., Jun. 14 08:52
Computer terror can't be ignored
By YONAH ALEXANDER
(June 14) - The latest "Melissa" virus, which spreads via infected e-mail, and
the upsurge of computer intrusion by hackers into the Web sites of the White
House, Senate, and the FBI, have once again focused attention on
cyber-crime and its ominous international security implications.
It should be recalled that in February 1998, Ehud Tenenbaum, an Israeli
hacker also known as "The Analyzer," worked with two young collaborators
from California to mount cyber-attacks against the Pentagon's systems, a
nuclear weapons research lab and other significant targets.
The prevailing assessment of intelligence agencies, strategic thinkers, and
scientists is that not only hackers and "crackers" (criminal hackers) but also
terrorists - individuals, groups, and state sponsors - are likely to exploit the
vulnerability of the world's computer systems to conduct electronic warfare.
It is estimated, for instance, that hostile perpetrators, with a budget of
around $10 million and a team of some 30 computer experts strategically
placed around the globe, could bring the US to its knees.
The threat of electronic terrorist assaults grows with each passing day. There
are three reasons for this:
* The globalization of the Internet. Internet users currently number over 120
million; an estimated 1 billion people will be using it by the year 2005. This
makes efforts to control Internet attacks a daunting challenge to intelligence
services and law-enforcement agencies.
* There are now some 30,000 hacker-oriented sites on the Internet, making
the tools of disruption and destruction available to almost anyone. The easily
available recipes for these new weapons - worms, Trojan horses, and logic
bombs, among others - are making this form of warfare a permanent fixture
of international life.
* With the Cold War now behind us, terrorist organizations have cast off the
limitations and ideologies of the formerly bipolar world and have become
multidirectional. These new political realities, coupled with easily accessible
cyber-weapons, have enhanced the threats posed by terror groups to the
degree that they could alter life on our planet forever.
The Internet already serves as an arena for propaganda and psychological
warfare. Ideological extremists such as neo-Nazi groups have called for
ethnic, racial, and religious violence. Traditional terrorist organizations, like
Hizbullah, which is supported by Iran and Syria, maintains on its Web site a
daily record of "heroic" battles of its fighters in southern Lebanon. And
Afghanistan, the newest state sponsor of terrorism, pushes its radical brand
of Islam on-line.
Terrorists have also used their laptops to store operation plans. Ramzi
Ahmed Yusuf, who is serving a life sentence the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing in New York and other terrorist crimes, used his computer to
develop a plot to blow up some dozen American airliners over the Pacific.
And terror networks, such as the underground infrastructure of Osama bin
Laden, who has been implicated in the US embassy bombings in Kenya and
Tanzania last summer, are sustained via personal computers with satellite
uplinks and encrypted messages.
Is the worst yet to come?
Consider waking one morning to the news that a group of terrorists
employing electronic "sniffers" have sabotaged the global financial system by
disrupting international fund-transfer networks, causing an unprecedented
stocks plunge on the New York, London, and Tokyo exchanges.
Clearly, there are numerous other devastating scenarios, including altering
formulas for medication at pharmaceutical plants; "crashing" telephone
systems; misrouting passenger trains; changing pressure in gas pipelines to
cause valve failure; disrupting operations of air-traffic control towers;
triggering oil refinery explosions and fires; scrambling the software used by
emergency services; turning off power grids; and simultaneously detonating
hundreds of computerized bombs around the world.
In sum, this new medium of communication, command and control,
supplemented by the repeated destructive keyboard attacks on civilian and
military nerve centers that we have already seen, forces us to think the
unthinkable - and take action to prevent it.
If the expanding electronic perils are ignored by the international community,
it is likely that the 21st century could produce a global Waterloo for
civilization.
(The writer is a professor and the director of the Inter-University Center for
Terrorism Studies - Israel and the United States.)
@HWA
44.0 Major Remote Hole Found in IIS
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 16th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Marc
eEye Digital Security Team has found a major remotely
exploitable hole in Microsoft's Internet Information
Server. The buffer overflow of ISM.dll leaves
approximately 90% of 1.3 million Microsoft web servers
vulnerable to internet attack. The folks at eEye have
graciously developed an exploit script to demonstrate
this hole. Microsoft has provided a work around and is
working on a patch.
eEye Digital Security Team
http://www.eeye.com/database/advisories/ad06081999/ad06081999.html
Wired
http://www.wired.com/news/news/technology/story/20231.html
Microsoft
http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/ms99-019.asp
eEye;
Retina vs. IIS4, Round 2
Systems Affected:
Internet Information Server 4.0 (IIS4)
Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 SP3 Option Pack 4
Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 SP4 Option Pack 4
Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 SP5 Option Pack 4
Release Date:
June 8, 1999
Advisory Code:
AD06081999
Description:
We have been debating how to start out this advisory. How do
you explain that 90% or so of the Windows NT web servers on the
Internet are open to a hole that lets an attacker execute arbitrary
code on the remote web server? So the story starts...
The Goal:
Find a buffer overflow that will affect 90% of the Windows NT web
servers on the Internet. Exploit this buffer overflow.
The Theory:
There will be overflows in at least one of the default IIS filtered
extensions (i.e. .ASP, .IDC, .HTR). The way we think the exploit
will take place is that IIS will pass the full URL to the DLL that
handles the extension. Therefore if the ISAPI DLL does not do
proper bounds checking it will overflow a buffer taking IIS
(inetinfo.exe) with it and allow us to execute arbitrary code on the
remote server.
Entrance Retina:
At the same time of working on this advisory we have been
working on the AI mining logic for Retina's HTTP module. What
better test scenario than this? We gave Retina a list of 10 or so
extensions common to IIS and instructed it to find any possible
holes relating to these extensions.
The Grind:
After about an hour Retina found what appeared to be a hole. It
displayed that after sending "GET /[overflow].htr HTTP/1.0" it had
crashed the server. We all crossed our fingers, started up the
good ol' debugger and had Retina hit the server again.
Note: [overflow] is 3k or so characters... but we will not get into
the string lengths and such here. View the debug info and have a
look for yourself.
The Registers:
EAX = 00F7FCC8 EBX = 00F41130
ECX = 41414141 EDX = 77F9485A
ESI = 00F7FCC0 EDI = 00F7FCC0
EIP = 41414141 ESP = 00F4106C
EBP = 00F4108C EFL = 00000246
Note: Retina was using "A" (0x41 in hex) for the character to
overflow with. If you're not familiar with buffer overflows a quick
note would be that getting our bytes into any of the registers
is a good sign, and directly into EIP makes it even easier :)
Explain This:
The overflow is in relation to the .HTR extensions. IIS includes the
capability to allow Windows NT users to change their password
via the web directory /iisadmpwd/. This feature is implemented as
a set of .HTR files and the ISAPI extension file ISM.DLL. So
somewhere along the line when the URL is passed through to
ISM.DLL, proper bounds checking is not done and our
overflow takes place. The .HTR/ISM.DLL ISAPI filter is installed
by default on IIS4 servers. Looks like we got our 90% of the
Windows NT web servers part down. However can we exploit this?
The Exploit:
Yes. We can definitely exploit this and we have. We will not go
into much detail here about how the buffer is exploited and such.
However, one nice thing to note is that the exploit has been
crafted in such a way to work on SP4 and SP5 machines,
therefore there is no guessing of offsets and possible accidental
crashing of the remote server.
Click here for more details about the exploit and the code.
The Fallout:
Almost 90% of the Windows NT web servers on the Internet are
affected by this hole. Even a server that's locked in a guarded
room behind a Cisco Pix can be broken into with this hole. This is
a reminder to all software vendors that testing for common
security holes in your software is a must. Demand more from
your software vendors.
The Request. (Well one anyway.)
Dear Microsoft,
One of the things that we found out is that IIS did not log any
trace of our attempted hack. We recommend that you pass all
server requests to the logging service before passing it to any
ISAPI filters etc...The logging service should be, as named, an
actual service running in a separate memory space so that when
inetinfo goes down intrusion signatures are still logged.
Retina vs. IIS4, Round 2. KO.
Fixes:
1.Remove the extension .HTR from the ISAPI DLL list.
Microsoft has just updated their checklist to include this
interim fix.
2.Apply the patch supplied by Microsoft when available.
Vendor Status:
We contacted Microsoft on June 8th 1999, eEye Digital Security
Team provided all information needed to reproduce the exploit.
and how to fix it. Microsoft security team did confirm the exploit
and are releasing a patch for IIS.
Related Links
Retina - The Network Security Scanner
http://www.eEye.com/retina/
Retina - Brain File used to uncover the hole
http://www.eEye.com/database/advisories/ad06081999/ad06081999-brain.html
Exploit - How we did it and the code.
http://www.eEye.com/database/advisories/ad06081999/ad06081999-exploit.html
NetCat - TCP/IP "Swiss Army knife"
http://www.l0pht.com/~weld/netcat/
Greetings go out to:
The former Secure Networks Inc., L0pht, Phrack, ADM, Rhino9,
Attrition, HNN and any other security company or organization
that believes in full disclosure.
Copyright (c) 1999 eEye Digital Security Team
Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It is not to be edited in any way without express
consent of eEye. If you wish to reprint the whole or any part of
this alert in any other medium excluding electronic medium,
please e-mail alert@eEye.com for permission.
Disclaimer:
The information within this paper may change without notice. Use
of this information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS
condition. There are NO warranties with regard to this information.
In no event shall the author be liable for any damages whatsoever
arising out of or in connection with the use or spread of this
information. Any use of this information is at the user's own risk.
Please send suggestions, updates, and comments to:
eEye Digital Security Team
info@eEye.com
www.eEye.com
-=-
Wired;
E-Commerce Sites: Open Sesame?
by Niall McKay
11:40 a.m. 15.Jun.99.PDT
A major security flaw in a Microsoft Web
server could allow crackers to take
complete control of e-commerce Web
sites, security experts warned Tuesday.
The flaw in Microsoft's Internet
Information Server 4.0 allows
unauthorized remote users to gain
system-level access to the server,
according to Firas Bushnaq, CEO of eEye,
the Internet security firm that discovered
it.
"This hole is so serious it's scary," said
Jim Blake, a network administrator for
Irvine, a city in southern California.
"With other [Windows NT] security holes,
crackers have needed to gain some level
of user access before executing code on
the server. This is different.... Anybody
off the Web can crack IIS," he said.
More than 1.3 million Microsoft IIS servers
are up and running on the Web. Nasdaq,
Walt Disney, and Compaq are among the
larger e-commerce operations run off the
server, according to NetCraft Internet
surveys.
Microsoft confirmed that the problem
exists and said that it is working on a fix.
Customers, however, have not been
notified.
"Normally we will post the problem and
the bug fix at the same time," said
Microsoft spokeswoman Jennifer Todd.
"We take these security issues very
seriously, and the patch will be available
[soon]."
The fix will be posted to Microsoft's
security Web site, "probably in the next
couple of days," Todd said.
The exploit is just one of a long list of
security flaws affecting IIS 4.0. In May,
security experts found an exploit that
enabled crackers to gain read access to
files held on IIS when they requested
certain text files.
Last summer, an exploit known as the
$DATA Bug granted any non-technical
Web users access to sensitive information
within the source code used in Microsoft's
Active Server Page, which is used on IIS.
And in January, a similar IIS security hole
was discovered, one that exposed the
source code and certain system settings
of files on Windows NT-based Web
servers.
But the latest problem appears to be the
most serious because of the level of
access it reportedly allows.
"The exploit gives crackers access to any
database or software residing on the Web
server machine," said Bushnaq. "So they
could steal credit-card information or
even post counterfeit Web pages."
For instance, crackers could exploit the
bug to modify stock prices at one of the
many news and stock information sites
running IIS.
The hole allows remote users to gain
control of an IIS 4.0 server by creating
what is known as a "buffer overflow" on
.htr Web pages -- an IIS feature
designed to enable users to remotely
change their passwords.
A buffer overflow can occur when a
system is fed a value much larger than
expected. In the case of the bug, the
Dynamic Link Library (DLL) governing the
.htr file extension, called ISM.DLL, can be
overloaded by running a utility that loads
too many characters into the library.
Once overloaded, the DLL is disabled and
the content of the overflow "bleeds" into
the system.
"Normally, this would just crash the
system," said Space Rogue, a member of
L0pht Heavy Industries, an independent
security consulting firm that last year
testified before the United States Senate
on government information security.
"But a good cracker can write an exploit
where the data that overflows will
actually be a executable program that will
run as machine code," said Space Rogue.
Such a move could give a cracker
complete control of the target system.
The overflow executable program can be
used to run a system-level program that
will deliver the equivalent of a DOS
command window to an attacker's PC.
To demonstrate the hole, eEye wrote a
program called IIS Hack that will enable
users to crack and execute code on any
IIS 4.0 Web Server.
However, disabling or removing the .htr
password utility will not fix the problem,
according to Bushnaq. "You have got to
go through a series of steps to remove
the faulty [code]."
Eeye discovered the problem while beta
testing a network security auditing tool.
"Remote exploits are about the most
serious problems you can have with a
Web server," said Space Rogue. "It gives
the attacker root privileges, so the
cracker not only has access to the IIS
server but [to] software running on that
machine."
"In many corporate sites today, this will
give the cracker access to the entire
network."
Eeye is a software development firm
specializing in security audit tools. Chief
executive Bushnaq previously founded the
electronic commerce site ECompany.com.
-=-
@HWA
45.0 Outlook Express 4.5 Email Bug
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 16th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by deepquest
Maccentral.com is reporting on a bug in Outlook Express
4.5. Basically what it comes down to is if your machine
has more than one email account, and you know the
password for one account then you can gain access to
all the accounts. Pretty damaging hole for multi users
machines.
MacCentral Online
http://www.maccentral.com/news/9906/15.sonata.shtml
Email encryption problems should be solved in Sonata
by Dennis Sellers, dsellers@maccentral.com
June 15, 1999, 9:45 am ET
If you're using a free Mac email application, you inherently have a lack of secure
encryption as Andrew Jung, a computer science student at Camosun College
(Victoria BC, Canada), recently discovered. Jung was using Outlook Express 4.5
on the family iMac when he came upon what he described a "disturbing bug."
Jung attempted to use the "Change Current User" menu item of Outlook Express
to access his personal email account (three separate email accounts were on the
family Mac) when he realized he'd forgotten his password. He clicked "Cancel"
was returned to the account selection dialog.
"I selected my step father's account, typed in his password, and got a message
saying that his password was incorrect," Jung says. "I try again and again. No go.
Then for the heck of it I looked up my password for my account, tried it, and got
it. I did the procedure again over and over, and I can reproduce it every time.
Whatever account I click and then cancel, that is the password for all the
accounts."
The situation can be reproduced this way:
- Open Outlook Express and at the user account dialog select "New User."
In the settings type in any password you want.
- Select change user from File.
- Select the newly created account, then click "OK."
- Click cancel at the password prompt.
- Select the user's account you would like to break into, and click "OK."
- Type in YOUR password for the new account and you're in.
DON'T try this at work or to access anyone's email account without permission.
This was for "demonstration purposes" only.
MacCentral contacted the Microsoft Macintosh Business Unit at Microsoft, and
Product Manager Irving Kwong confirmed the problem. He says Outlook Express
doesn't encrypt mail data stored in the application - but that the problem isn't
unique to Microsoft's free email application.
"Encryption functionality of mail data does not exist in any free Macintosh email
application, as this level of security is best executed at the operating system level,"
Kwong says. "Outlook Express' password protection between multiple users on
the same computer is not secure. The password merely acts as a padlock on
users' personal preferences."
So what is a secure solution? Kwong says it's coming with the next ramp of the
Mac OS, codenamed Sonata.
"You may remember Sonata's new multiple user environment being demonstrated
at the WWDC," Kwong says (check out our story at
http://www.maccentral.com/news/9905/10.sherlock.shtml). "We have been
working on support for Sonata's multi-user functionality for Outlook Express and
demonstrated this technology at the WWDC. This is the first offering of
system-level security for multiple users sharing a Macintosh and is the best solution
for true support, as it ensures password and data security. For Outlook Express
customers and Macintosh users looking for a password secure solution for multiple
users sharing a computer, we suggest using the upcoming version of Outlook
Express with Sonata. The combination of Outlook Express and Sonata is a secure
solution for Macintosh users doing email from the same computer. "
Sonata is due in the second half of the year.
@HWA
46.0 Major Pirates Convicted
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 16th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Warez Dude
Texan Convicted of Pirating $63mil, in Germany.
A German State court has sentenced a Texas man to
four years in prison for three counts of counterfeiting
Microsoft programs. Microsoft said that this case was
the "biggest in terms of the operation's sophistication
and the magnitude of damage."
Nando Times
http://www.techserver.com/story/body/0,1634,60053-95659-682086-0,00.html
Wired
http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/20239.html
ZD Net
http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2276234,00.html
Father and Son, Busted.
Father and son where convicted in Massachusetts of
conspiring to sell $20 million in stolen Microsoft
Software. The father was fined over $1 Million and
sentenced to almost six years in jail, the son was fined
$100,000 and got ten months in jail.
Nando Times
http://www.techserver.com/story/body/0,1634,60069-95685-682199-0,00.html
Nando Times;
Texan convicted of software piracy in Germany
Copyright © 1999 Nando Media
Copyright © 1999 Associated Press
AACHEN, Germany (June 15, 1999 3:33 p.m. EDT http://www.nandotimes.com) - A German state court convicted John-Joseph Staud, a
Texas man, on Tuesday of counterfeiting more than $63 million worth of Microsoft computer programs.
Staud, 39, was sentenced to four years in prison for three counts of counterfeiting patented programs and smuggling them into
Germany for commercial purposes.
Microsoft Corp. greeted the court's decision as "a meaningful signal" toward thwarting computer piracy. The software giant, based in
Washington state, said the counterfeit case was its biggest in terms of the operation's sophistication and the magnitude of damage.
The court denied Microsoft's request for damages, saying that should be handled by a court in England, where Staud allegedly ran a counterfeit
compact disc production plant and printing operation. He also faces charges in England.
Charges against Staud stemmed from a German customs office investigation last August that uncovered 300,000 counterfeited CD-ROMs with
programs such as MS Office, Windows 95, and Windows NT, along with 400,000 installation handbooks.
The materials, which had been smuggled into Germany, were found in a rented container and a warehouse in the town of Kreuzau, about 20
miles east of Aachen, which is located on the border with Belgium.
-=-
Wired;
Germany Jails Software Pirate
Reuters
4:30 p.m. 15.Jun.99.PDT
A German court sentenced an American
man to four years in prison without
probation Tuesday for importing illegally
copied Microsoft computer software.
It was the first time Germany has issued
a prison sentence in a crime involving
software piracy, Microsoft (MSFT) said.
"The 39-year-old Texan was sentenced
today for four years without probation," a
spokesman for the German regional court
of Aachen said.
The sentencing of the man, identified
only as John S., follows the seizure by
German customs officials of thousands of
illegal copies of Microsoft software
programs and manuals last August.
Microsoft said fraud was proved in several
instances in the case, with total damages
amounting to about 120 million marks
(US$64 million).
"This sentence is a breakthrough in
Germany and shows that counterfeiting
software is really a serious crime," Rudolf
Gallist, general manager of Microsoft
GmbH, said in a statement.
- - -
More MS Software Pirates Jailed: Three
more defendants in the "Crazy Bob's"
stolen software ring were sentenced this
week, federal prosecutors said Thursday.
The three are the latest to be sentenced
for their part in a conspiracy to sell
US$20 million in Microsoft Corp. software
stolen from a Massachusetts disc
manufacturer.
Marc Rosengard, an employee of Crazy
Bob's discount computer shop in
Wakefield, Mass., was sentenced on
Thursday to 33 months in prison and
three years supervised release, and must
pay $20,000 in restitution to Microsoft,
prosecutors said. Another defendant,
Maxine Simons, 59, was sentenced on
Wednesday by US District Court Judge
George O'Toole to two years and nine
months in prison and ordered to pay
restitution of $908,000, prosecutors said.
Her husband Robert Simons, who ran
Crazy Bob's, was given a 70-month prison
sentence on Tuesday. Their son, William
Simons, was sentenced to one year and
10 months on Tuesday. Also sentenced
on Wednesday was Gerald Coviello, 62, to
two years and six months in prison.
Maxine Simons and Coviello were
convicted of conspiracy to transport
stolen property following a three-week
jury trial in March. Among other misdeeds,
Crazy Bob's was accused of buying and
reselling 32,000 stolen copies of Microsoft
Office 97 Professional Edition. Worth $599
apiece, they were acquired from rogue
former employees of KAO Infosystems of
Plymouth, Massachusetts, which
manufactured the discs.
Copyright© 1999 Reuters Limited.
-=-
Nando Times #2
Sellers of $20 million of stolen software sentenced to prison
Copyright © 1999 Nando Media
Copyright © 1999 Reuters News Service
BOSTON (June 15, 1999 4:04 p.m. EDT http://www.nandotimes.com) - A father and son pair accused of conspiring to sell more than $20
million in Microsoft Corp. software stolen from a Massachusetts manufacturer were sentenced to prison, prosecutors said
Tuesday.
Robert Simons, 62, who ran Crazy Bob's discount software store in Wakefield, Massachusetts, was sentenced to five years and 10 months
imprisonment by U.S. District Judge George O'Toole Monday. Simons was also ordered to pay $908,000 in restitution to Microsoft and to forfeit
$440,000 to the federal government.
His son, William Simons, 35, a Crazy Bob's salesman, was sentenced to one year and 10 months in prison, and must pay $100,000 to
Microsoft, prosecutors said.
Crazy Bob's was accused of buying millions of dollars worth of computer discs stolen from KAO Infosystems, a disc manufacturer in Plymouth,
Massachusetts, by two ex-KAO workers.
The two former KAO employees pleaded guilty to related charges and were awaiting sentencing, prosecutors said.
Among other misdeeds, the Simons were accused of buying 32,000 stolen copies of Microsoft Office 97 Professional Edition, worth $599
apiece, and reselling them to CD-ROM outlets in California and Great Britain, prosecutors said.
@HWA
47.0 Fear of Y2K Raises Security Concerns
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 16th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by roach
Australia Concerned Over Y2K and Security
Fear that the Y2K bug will cause weaknesses in
computer security are being raised. Some companies are
spending money on Y2K issues and are ignoring
important security issues. The fear is that cyber attacks
may be misinterpreted as run of the mill Y2K problems.
Australia News
http://technology.news.com.au/techno/4297150.htm
Australian Financial Review
http://www.afr.com.au/content/990615/update/update38.html
DOD Plans for Possible Y2K Attack
The US DOD has started evaluating possible scenarios
for cyber attacks that may be masquerading as Y2K
computer glitches. While not saying how possible such
an attack may be DOD said it is just being prepared for
any contingency.
Federal Computer Week
http://www.fcw.com:80/pubs/fcw/1999/0614/web-cybery2k-6-15-99.html
Australian News;
Bug scare aids cyber terror
By STEFANIE BALOGH
16jun99
THE Y2K bug has left computer systems around the world vulnerable to
cyber terrorist attacks when the new millennium dawns, an international
computing expert warned yesterday.
Constance Fortune, vice-president of Canada's Science Applications
International Corporation, said because companies had focused
resources on Y2K compliance, they had left their operations open to
other security risks.
Speaking at the 11th FIRST (Forum for Incident Response Security
Team) computer security conference in Brisbane, Ms Fortune said
amateur hackers and cyber criminals were poised to wreak havoc on
New Year's Day and beyond. She predicted the problems could be more
disastrous than any virus because multinational and government
computer systems would be at their weakest.
"Those who create viruses, worms and other destructive computer
phenomena have found ways to take advantage of the Y2K problem,"
she warned.
Ms Fortune said it was crucial for computer emergency response teams
to be able to determine whether system failure was the result of Y2K
problems or camouflaged security attacks.
Ms Fortune also said northern hemisphere firms would closely watch as
Australia embraced the millennium, hours before the US, Europe and
Britain.
"What happens in Australia as 2000 rolls in will provide us with a
much-appreciated early warning of what we can expect only hours
later," she said.
Her warnings were echoed by information technology security expert Bill
Caelli, who predicted the security problems caused by companies
focusing on Y2K compliance could continue for 12-18 months.
Professor Caelli, from the Queensland University of Technology, also
said business and government had "lost 20 years" of work on computer
security because they were more interested in cost-cutting.
He also called for the Australian Government to introduce tougher
legislation to force companies to upgrade information security and for
the Government to end the practice of outsourcing its IT capabilities.
-=-
Federal Computer Week;
JUNE 15, 1999 . . . 16:33 EDT
DOD preps for possible cyberattacks brought on
by Y2K
BY BOB BREWIN (antenna@fcw.com)
The Pentagon has started to develop plans that would shut back doors that
hook its global networks to the Internet in case cyberfoes try to use any Year
2000 computer date code snafus to mount a cyberattack.
Marvin Langston, deputy assistant secretary of Defense for command, control
communications and intelligence, declined to estimate the possibility of such a
cyberassault. He said the Pentagon has started to develop contingency plans
to protect its networks at the end of the year in case "cyberattackers try to
mask themselves in the confusion."
"We want to be able to close down our back doors," said Langston, speaking
at GovTechNet, a Washington, D.C., conference sponsored by FCW and the
Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association.
Langston said hacker Web sites and discussion groups have mentioned seizing
the opportunity to launch cyberattacks against DOD by using any computer or
network that may be malfunctioning because of Year 2000 problems.
DOD "has to be prepared to deal with it," Langston said.
-=-
@HWA
48.0 Israeli Banks Thwart Attempted Cyber Break-In
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 16th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by LirA
Buried down in the fifth paragraph is a statement by
Bank of Israel Supervisor of Banks Dr. Yitzhak Tal, who
claims that the Israeli banking system has been the
target of "primitive and insignificant" cyber attacks.
Israel's Business Arena
http://www.globes.co.il/cgi-bin/Serve_Archive_Arena/pages/English/1.2.1.20/19990614/1
Tuesday , Jun 15, 1999 Sun-Thu at 18:00 (GMT+2)
Headlines
Tal: Hackers Tried to Break Into
Internet Banking Services
By Zeev Klein
Bank of Israel Supervisor of Banks Dr. Yitzhak
Tal is opposed to mergers between large banks,
because the Israeli banking system is still too
centralist. Briefing economic correspondents
yesterday upon the publication of the annual
banking system report for 1998, Tal said, "It’s
impossible to draw comparisons between Israel
and the US or Europe. There, too, it’s still not
clear what’s the cause for bank mergers. We’re
different from them, and we must be more
careful."
According to Tal, mergers between small banks
are not really beneficial. "I’m in favor of mergers
between small banks, and against mergers
between big banks. But a small bank plus a
small bank gives yet another small bank," Tal
said.
As for mergers between medium-size banks, Tal
said that the issue is under examination by the
Bank of Israel. He stressed, however, that "at
the moment we’re not faced with any specific
request on which we must take a decision. We
are rather seeking to work out our position in
principle on the issue. There are arguments both
ways. On the one hand, mergers between
medium-size banks will increase the centralism
of the system, which is very considerable as it
is. On the other hand, it may well be that a new
banking player that would compete with the
large banks will enhance competitiveness. Our
key consideration is improving competition,
rather than stability," Tal said.
Referring to the expansion of Internet banking
services, Tal said, "We don’t have to be the trail
blazers on Internet worldwide. We must be
cautious, and see how this area develops
throughout the world."
Tal disclosed that hackers had recently
attempted to break into the Internet banking
system, but added that the efforts were primitive
and insignificant, and did not result in any real
damage to customers or to the banks.
Tal did not expect any Y2K-related massive
malfunction that might wipe out public deposits.
According to him, "Public deposits aren’t going
to be virtually wiped out.." Tal added that the
banks are taking the proper measures to cope
with Y2K.
Published by Israel's Business Arena June 14,
1999
@HWA
49.0 Navy Wants Tighter Network Security
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 16th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Lif3r
The US Navy is looking into adding real-time intrusion
detection capabilities into its network defenses.
Federal Computer Week
http://www.fcw.com:80/pubs/fcw/1999/0614/web-navy-6-15-99.html
JUNE 15, 1999 . . . 12:55 EDT
Navy looks to upgrade network security
BY DIANE FRANK (diane_frank@fcw.com)
As part of its overall security strategy, the Navy is looking at several new
auditing products that can offer real-time intrusion detection.
The Navy is using the auditing and other security features that are part of
Microsoft Corp.'s Windows NT and variations of the Unix operating system.
But the Navy can only use that technology to find out about intrusions into a
network after the fact, Cmdr. Larry Downs, director of operations for the
Navy Fleet Information Warfare Center, said today at the GovTechNet
conference in Washington, D.C.
Companies recently have released several products that will enable Navy
network administrators to learn about intrusions and attacks as the attacks
occur. The Navy is interested in incorporating the products into its network
security, Downs said.
"The Navy is looking closely at this and will probably look to buy in the very
near future," he said.
@HWA
50.0 IIS Hole Continues to Make News/Fix Available
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 17th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Marc
The major hole publicly announced yesterday by eEye
Digital Security Team in Microsofts Internet Information
Server is continuing to make news.
Internet News
http://www.internetnews.com/prod-news/article/0,1087,9_139231,00.html
ZD Net
http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2277295,00.html
eEye Releases Fix
Microsoft has issued a workaround for this bug however
it does break functionality such as /iisadmpwd/. eEye
Digital Security Team has released their own fix that
resolves the problem and preserves functionality. It
limits .htr requests to 200 characters, and logs the IP
address of the person trying the overflow. This is a
great deal better then the current recommendation from
Microsoft which is to just remove the .htr ISAPI filter.
eEye Digital Security Team
http://www.eeye.com/database/advisories/ad06081999/ad06081999-ogle.html
Microsft
http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/ms99-019.asp
CERT Advisory Released
A day late and a dollar short CERT (Computer
Emergancy Responce Team) has released an advisory
concerning this major problem. Unfortunatly they forgot
to credit who found the problem.
CERT
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-07-IIS-Buffer-Overflow.html
Irresponsible Security Companies
This article on C|Net questions whether eEye did the
right thing by releasing their advisory before Microsoft
was ready with their patch. A quote in the article from a
Microsoft representative called this "contrary to all of
the normal rules of responsible security professionals."
[rant on] Bullshit. The company that has shown the
public how irresponsible they are is Microsoft. Microsoft
knew about this problem for a week but did nothing until
it was released to the public. It is extremely likely that
someone else found this hole and did not tell anyone.
They could have used this problem to install back doors
on most of the servers in the world without anyone
knowing. Microsoft could have stopped this action a
week earlier and didn't. Microsoft is the one who is not
acting like a 'responsible security professional'.[/rant
off]
C|Net
http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,37949,00.html?st.ne.fd.mdh.ni
C|Net;
Microsoft server bug wrongly publicized?
By Stephanie Miles, Stephen Shankland, and Wylie Wong
Staff, CNET News.com
June 16, 1999, 6:50 p.m. PT
Microsoft offered a temporary fix for a problem with its Web server software that lets attackers "inject" a program that
can run on a Windows NT-based system.
In the meantime, the manner in which the bug was reported and publicized is generating controversy.
The bug attacks Internet Information Server, Microsoft's software for serving up Web pages. Putting the right type of malicious
code into a page request can cause IIS to crash, or worse, let an attacker run whatever
programming code he wants.
Firas Bushnaq, CEO of Eeye, today accused Microsoft of dragging its feet to solving the problem.
His company alerted Microsoft on June 8, he said, but Microsoft told him to keep quiet about it.
Bushnaq said he went public yesterday because he felt Microsoft wasn't doing anything to resolve
the issue.
But Bushnaq didn't stop at just publicizing the bug, and that's where the controversy comes in:
EEye posted a program that will exploit the weakness, a move Microsoft says runs contrary to
established procedures for reporting and patching bugs.
Not surprisingly, Microsoft disputes Bushnaq's version of the story.
"You can send a 'malformed' or very long request to a Web server. It could cause a buffer overflow,
which means you can embed application code that will execute on the server," Bushnaq explained
of the bug.
"Anything that is residing on the Web server and everything connected to that--back-end databases, e-commerce information,
credit card information--could be accessible," he continued. "It is extremely important for people to fix it."
"We've got a security response process that we set up a year ago so that customers would have a place to report bugs and so
that we could respond to it quickly," countered Scott Culp, a security product manager for Microsoft. No confirmed problems
occurring as a result of the bug have been reported, he said.
"For reasons we don't understand, at the beginning of this week they [Eeye] suddenly went public with the bug. It's contrary to all
of the normal rules of responsible security professionals," he said. "You don't provide tools that malicious users can use to hurt
innocent people."
Microsoft rushed to post a workaround to the problem, but a true fix to patch the bug is not yet available. The workaround will
protect users from malicious or arbitrary code, Culp said.
"We're completing the patch right now, but we need to make sure that we've fully tested it. In the meantime, nobody needs to be
vulnerable because of the workaround," he said.
@HWA
51.0 World Braces for International Day of Action
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 17th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by barbie
Officials in Australia and around the world are bracing
for International Day of Action on June 18th known as
J18. June 18 is also the same day as the G8 meeting in
Cologne, Germany. J18 organizers are calling for
disruption of financial centers, banking districts and
multinational corporate power bases. Examples of
possible activities include picketing, street parties,
leafleting, rallies, marches, strikes, carnivals, and of
course 'hacking'.
Australian Financial Review
http://www.afr.com.au/content/990616/update/update37.html
Australian Financial Review - Yes, there are two stories
J18 hackers 'could target Australia'
on Friday
Australian companies could be targeted by computer
hackers this Friday as part of an international day of
action against big business, a computer security
conference was told today.
But for those companies without adequate computer
security, it may be too late to bolster defences, Byron
Collie, from Australian Federal Police's national
computer crime team said.
Mr Collie told the conference the international day of
action on Friday, known as J18, could include
cyberattacks on business and banking computer
networks.
The J18 action coincides with the G8 meeting in
Cologne, Germany.
The official J18 site on the Internet calls for people to
plan individual "actions" focusing on disrupting "financial
centres, banking districts and multinational corporate
power bases".
"It is up to the groups themselves to decide what to do
on the day," it says.
"Examples could include picketing, street parties,
leafleting, rallies, marches, strikes, carnivals, hacking,
blockades, whatever."
Mr Collie said there was a growing trend for computer
hacking to be politically motivated and for a number of
hackers to work in cooperation.
"Motivation for these (hacking) activities have changed
slightly from the usual teenage intruder-type activity," he
told the Computer Security Incident Handling and
Response conference.
"There's a lot more political and issue motivated
activities."
Mr Collie said one example of "hackdivism" occurred
during the Kosovo conflict when a Serbian computer
expert distributed an e-mail calling for all Serbs
throughout the world to launch a concentrated
cyberattack on the computer systems of NATO
countries.
Late last year, as Indonesia was preparing for its
elections, hackers shut down an East Timorese website
based in Ireland, he said.
"I would hope that you have every measure already in
place," he told the conference delegates.
AAP
@HWA
52.0 ECD Targets Mexican Government
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 17th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by stealth
The people at Electronic Civil Disobedience are planning
a virtual 'sit-in' in protest of the treatment of the
Zapatistas by the Mexican government. The sit-in will
basically be a DoS attack against several Mexican
government internet sites. This demonstration is
planned to take place on June 18 from 10:00am to
4:00pm Mexico City time.
Electronic Civil Disobedience
http://www.thing.net/~rdom/ecd/ecd.html
The June 18th Sit-in report from ECD
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
JUNE 18: THE VIRTUAL AND THE REAL
ACTION ON THE INTERNET AND IN AUSTIN, TEXAS
ZAPATISTA FLOODNET AND RECLAIM THE STREETS
by Stefan Wray, June 19, 1999, 6:00 CDT
"The resistance will be as transnational as capital."
On June 18, 1999, simultaneous with the G8 meeting in Koln, Germany, people all over the world
participated in actions and events under the banner "Reclaim The Streets." Email reports coming in today
indicate that 10,000 people gathered in Nigeria and that San Francisco drew crowds of around 500. More
news and reports of events will surely be posted in the coming days. What follows is a contribution to this
emerging body of material.
Reclaim the Streets European Headquarters http://www.gn.apc.org/rts/ Below are two separate and very
different reports. The first describes the results of the virtual sit-in called by the Electronic Disturbance
Theater opposing the Mexican government that involved thousands of people from 46 countries. The
second is a longer narrative account describing events as they unfolded in Austin, Texas, an action that
involved about 50 people and resulted in three arrests. It ends with some comments on hybridity, meshing
the virtual and the real.
THE VIRTUAL
On June 15, the Electronic Disturbance Theater began sending out email announcements urging people
to join in an act of Electronic Civil Disobedience to stop the war in Mexico. The call made in conjunction
with the Reclaim The Streets day of action was intended to introduce a virtual component to the
numerous off-line actions happening all over the world. But a strong motivation for the action was also
due to the fact that in recent weeks there has been a significantly higher level of government and military
harassment of Zapatista communities in Chiapas, with reports indicating as many as 5,000 Zapatistas
have fled their communities.
The suggested action was for people using computers to point their Internet browser to a specific URL
during the hours of 4:00 and 10:00 p.m. GMT. By directing Internet browsers toward the Zapatista
FloodNet URL, during this time period, people joined a virtual sit-in. What this meant was that their
individual computer began sending re-load commands over and over again for the duration of the time
they were connected to FloodNet. In a similar way that people were out in the streets, clogging up the
streets, the repeated re-load command of the individual user - multiplied by the thousand engaged -
clogged the Internet pathways leading to the targeted web site. In this case on June 18, FloodNet was
directing these multiple re-load browser commands to the Mexican Embassy in the UK.
(http://www.demon.co.uk/mexuk)
The results of the June 18 Electronic Disturbance Theater virtual sit-in were that the Zapatista FloodNet
URL received a total of 18,615 unique requests from people's computers in 46 different countries. Of that
total, 5,373 hits on the FloodNet URL - 28.8 percent - came from people using commercial servers in the
United States - the .com addresses. People using computers in the United Kingdom accounted for the
second largest number of participants, 3,633 or 19.5 percent. People with university accounts in the U.S.,
1,677 of them, made up the third largest category of participants at 9.0 percent. Interestingly, the fourth
largest category of participants came from .mil addresses, from the U.S. military, for which there were
1,377 hits on the FloodNet URL, at 7.4 percent. Included among the military visitors were people using
computers at DISA, the Defense Information Systems Agency. [In the same way that police help to block
the streets when they show up at a demonstration, the military and government computer visitors to the
FloodNet URL inadvertently join the action.] And the fifth largest group of participants were from
Switzerland with 1,276 or 6.8 percent.
The remaining 5,329, or 28.6 percent, of global participants in the June 18 virtual sit-in came from all
continents including 21 countries in Europe (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Macedonia, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Yugoslavia), 7 countries in Latin American (Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay), 6 countries in Asia (Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South
Korea and Taiwan), 5 in the Middle East (Bahrain, Israel, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey), Australia and
New Zealand, Canada, Georgia (former Soviet Union), and South Africa.
The global Zapatista FloodNet action on June 18 is the first that the Electronic Disturbance Theater
called for in 1999. The group began in the spring of 1998 and launched a series of FloodNet actions
directed primarily against web sites of the Mexican government, but action targets also included the White
House, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, the Pentagon. The highlight was in September when the group
showcased FloodNet at the Ars Electronica festival on Information Warfare in Linz, Austria. At that time
one of the targets of FloodNet was a U.S. Department of Defense web site. This action is noteworthy
because a Pentagon countermeasure since it may be one of the first known instances in which the DOD
has engaged in an offensive act of information warfare against a domestic U.S. target - an act some say
could have been illegal.
More details on the Electronic Disturbance Theater can be found at:
http://www.thing.net/~rdom/ecd/ecd.html
THE BEGINNING OF THE REAL
I turned off my computer, moved away from the screen, and left work at 5:00. My girlfriend picked me up
in the car and we passed by the bank so I could cash my paycheck. Good thing too. My balance had
literally been 99 cents. Then we drove to the radio station, KOOP, where we do a half-hour news
program every Friday.
It was hot inside the station, as it was outside. But the studio was nice and cool, so we sat there and
waited for the Working Stiff show to end and the news to begin. We listened to John do a phone interview
with someone from the pipe-fitters union. They were talking about a strike.
We started off the news with a long piece from A-Infos about the World Trade Organization. It was a
decent article but a bit too long to read on the air. The piece ended with a call for people to travel to
Seattle later in the year to oppose the third WTO ministerial conference.
After the news we walked over to join a handful of IWW folks who put out the Working Stiff Journal. They
were at Lovejoys, a bar with a decent selection of beer just off 6th Street.
I started talking to a few friends about the war in Yugoslavia and an idea I'd had that it might good to form
a focus group on the history, present, and future of war. The idea being that the left doesn't really
understand war anymore, or rather, that the left is using the same techniques to oppose war that it used
30 years ago, but that the way wars are fought has changed. The few who I talked to supported the idea
and had some good suggestions.
RUTA MAYA
After swilling down a few pints, at around 7:30, my girlfriend and I left Lovejoys and drove over to Ruta
Maya. All I knew was that the Critical Mass bike ride was to end up there. And the ride was Austin's effort
to be part of the global Reclaim The Street actions that were happening all over the world.
Ruta Maya is a coffee shop in downtown Austin's warehouse district. They import coffee from Chiapas.
Local activist groups often stage benefits and events there.
When we got to Ruta Maya people from the bike ride were already filtering in. They had started the ride
up by the university. I wasn't on the ride so I only heard snapshots of what had happened. But I learned
that a few had spent the previous night working on some stickers that said, "Closed" and "Out of Order."
These were to put on ATM machines and other relevant symbols of capital. The ride passed by the Gap.
For a moment Gap workers were harassed for selling clothes manufactured in sweatshops.
The crowd inside and outside on the elevated sidewalk was a mix of Ruta Maya regulars, people who
came to hear an acoustic guitarist playing inside, customers of Ruta Maya's cigar shop, anyone who
happened to be walking by, and of course the cyclists from the Critical Mass/RTS ride.
First I talked to some people involved in Free Radio Austin, a local micropower radio station shut down by
the FCC a few weeks ago - which is incidentally scheduled to go back on the air today. We didn't talk
about that, but about some of the problems with a new space here called Pueblos Unidos. A long story,
but basically there is a power struggle among the original tenets of this allegedly collective warehouse
space on the eastside of Austin. Too complicated to go into here. Conversations about Pueblos Unidos,
the Grassroots News Network, and Point A threaded through the evening.
The riders included people I've know from Earth First!, from the local bicycle activist scene, and a whole
new set of folks from Point A who I don’t really know. I just thought that Ruta Maya was a gathering point
after the ride was finished. But it turned out to be something else.
THE STREET After not long, some people started talking about how to encourage others to start
standing out in the street in front of Ruta Maya. People had just finished the ride and were all charged up
with energy. A moment later, two young riders were moving a construction barricade and a few orange
cones into the lane of traffic coming from the west. While at the other end of the block a group took similar
barricades and placed them to stop traffic coming from the east.
And then, one at a time, people started leaving the sidewalk or leaving the edges of the street to stand
out in the middle. For a little while there were just about 10 people. A few standing near the barricade. A
few more down at the other end of the street. And more starting to filter out right in front of Ruta Maya. I
actually hadn't anticipated this. I wanted to sit down so I asked someone to pass me down a chair from
the elevated sidewalk.
I sat on the chair in the middle of one lane. Someone else picked up another chair and sat down near me.
With barricades on both ends of the block, people sitting in chairs, cars lurching forward slowly and trying
to get out, others in Ruta Maya started to take notice, and those less inclined to be the first ones to
venture out into the street, followed. A Ruta Maya worker came out and said that needed his chair back. I
didn't argue. Ruta Maya is a cool place. And by sitting there momentarily it had served to encourage a few
more to join.
Soon there were people in both lanes of traffic out in front of Ruta Maya. At its peak maybe there were as
many as 50. Not a huge crowd. Enough to reclaim the street - temporarily. But not enough to remain once
the police started to arrive. And of course they did.
But before the police showed up, a few of the people whose idea it was to reclaim this particular section
of street spoke loudly and explained what Reclaim The Streets was all about. Small flyers titled "Whose
City Is This Anyway?" were passed out. And people started doing a "cheer" of sorts. Lacking were drums
or other instruments that are always good for stirring up a crowd.
THE POLICE
I first noticed a brown shirted Sheriff's deputy get out of a sports utility vehicle. But he simply walked by,
seemingly oblivious to what was happening. Soon thereafter the bike cops showed up. Like a number of
urban police forces in the U.S., Austin has its police-on-bicycle contingent, mostly used for patrolling the
busy downtown area.
The bike cops started to move around the crowd and address people whom they thought might be
leaders. I was actually standing with my back turned, talking to a friend, when one bike cop came up to
us. Maybe because I was smoking a cigar he thought I was a 'revolutionary leader'. (Just kidding.)
Anyway, the bike cop said to us, "I'm contacting my supervisor and if you aren't out of the street in ten
minutes, we are going to start making arrests."
I told the bike cop that I wasn't in charge. But anyway, my friend and I passed on this warning to a few
others. So when the three police vans and the handful of marked and unmarked cars showed up - to
inadvertently block the streets themselves - we were not surprised.
The three vans barreled down the road from the east and the marked and unmarked cars from the west,
stopping right at the intersection of 4th and Lavaca. Obviously, given that there were not many of us and
given that we had neither anticipated nor were we prepared to take a stand, we mostly filtered back off
the street and onto the side.
But there were a few who - for whatever reason - were not so content to give up the street that quickly.
Bike cops and regular police officers stood in the street in between the three vans and the rest of us on
the side of the road. People were jeering at the cops. I didn't see exactly what happened - or what
precipitated it - but in a flash a group of cops lunged forward and pulled someone from out of the crowd
on the side, not even someone who was standing closer to the police, but someone behind another. And
then another was arrested. And then a third.
People were yelling and screaming and the cops: "You fucking pigs!"; "Don't you have any real criminals
to arrest"; "Whose street? Our street!" They remained for awhile longer. Tensions quieted down. And the
vans and the marked and unmarked cars drove off.
All through this, my girlfriend had been trying to call a few local media outlets. She was at the payphone in
front of Ruta Maya. At one point she told me she had got through to KXAN. But no media ever showed up.
With the police gone, three of us on the way to jail, a number of the riders - who had only wanted to ride
their bikes and not get involved with this mess - on their way out, the ones who had planned this Austin
Reclaim The Street action bewilderedly consulted about how next to proceed. My girlfriend and I had both
been arrested before and were quite familiar with the process. She knew the inside of Austin's jail and
something about the procedure for getting out. She offered her advice to the younger activists and was
ready to leave them to it. But I suggested maybe we ought to also go down to the police station to help
sort things out. So we did.
THE POLICE STATION
By the time we parked the car and got inside the police station, there was already a crowd of perhaps 20
people, mostly sitting on the floor, inside the area where you ask about new arrestees. It looked like we
were now reclaiming the police station, rather than the street!
We weren't sure if the two young women and one young man were taken to this station. And there was
speculation that they could have taken them to any number of substations throughout the city, as they are
sometimes apt to do.
None of the people whose idea it was to reclaim the section the street in front of Ruta Maya were
prepared for arrests, and in Austin there aren't really known activist lawyers - like in some U.S. cities -
readily available to help in moments like this. Although a few of the people who ended up being in the
Austin RTS action were seasoned activists, most seemed to be people who had never actually had to
deal with police arrests before. Or if they had, they certainly hadn't made any arrangements in advance.
So everything was handled on the spot.
My girlfriend has a friend who is a lawyer who has helped her out in the past. While she was on the
phone to her, others were over at the main desk waiting to hear if in fact the three were at this station and
what they were being held for. Finally, at some point between 9:30 and 10:00 we learned that yes in fact
the three had been brought to this station, and what the charges were.
One was charged with a Class C misdemeanor for refusing to obey the order of a police officer. Another
was charged with a Class C misdemeanor for disorderly conduct. But the third was charged with a Class
B misdemeanor, a more severe level, for "inciting a riot."
First of all, there was no riot, by any stretch of the imagination. But more importantly, the young woman
charged with inciting a riot - as I later learned - had merely begun to yell out a cheer. She had said, "Give
me a 'P'," - and was probably going to spell "PIG" - at which point the cops lurched forward to grab her
from out of the crowd.
My girlfriend's friend who is a lawyer advised us that it would be best if a boisterous crowd did not linger
in the police station waiting area as it might only antagonize them and encourage them to hold the three
longer. So a group drifted off and went to Lovejoys - the bar where we had started the evening off earlier.
My girlfriend and I, and a couple of friends of the people being detained, remained at the police station.
We learned that the two with Class C misdemeanors would be able to be released for $200 bond,
although it wouldn't be until much later in the night, actually the wee hours of the morning, but that the
young woman charged with inciting a riot would have to wait until a judge came at 10:30 in the morning.
When we saw that it was senseless to wait at the police station any longer, the rest of us left as well,
joining others back at Lovejoys where we drank from pitchers of beer, mulled over what had just
transpired, and continued an earlier thread about some of the internal dynamic of the new warehouse
space in Austin called Pueblos Unidos.
THE NEXT MORNING In the middle of the night the two with Class C misdemeanors were bailed out. And
at 10:30 or so on June 19, my girlfriend's lawyer friend - a bit begrudgingly - had to go down to the station
to deal with the magistrate and help the one with the inciting riot charge get released. My girlfriend went
back to the police station in the morning as well - in part to console her lawyer friend who had had to be
bothered on a Friday evening she was spending with her husband who works out of town all during the
week. She was able to help get the one with the inciting riot charge out of jail, by being able to visit her
while in custody and explain the procedure for getting a personal release - but did not agree to be the
lawyer for these cases.
Compounding factors were that two of the people arrested, including the one with the inciting a riot
charge, had just returned to the country - literally on the afternoon of June 18 - after having been in
Guatemala and Mexico.
Now, a criminal lawyer will need to be found. People will have to spend precious and limited resources on
the entire legal process. Those who must return to court will have added stress and worry. And what
started out as evening or revelry ends up in the onerous world of the courts.
AFTERTHOUGHTS ON THE REAL
Several things are clear. While a degree of planning for this action was undertaken - in that minimally a
date, time, and place were chosen and the action was given some form and content - there definitely
were important elements in the planning process that were overlooked. The first, obviously being that it
should have been known by the people whose intent it was to reclaim the street to realize that this sort of
activity generally falls outside the boundary of the law, that the police were likely to show up, and that
arrests were possible. And that given the possibility of arrest, contingency plans should have been made:
i.e. there should have been a lawyer on stand by and even some sort of legal observer.
The second oversight was that there was no attention given to drawing in media, nor were any of the
participants using any audio or video recording devices. No photographs nor any videotape of the above
arrests were made to supply concrete evidence demonstrating that in fact the Class B misdemeanor
inciting to riot charge is ludicrous. And finally it seems that the nature and purpose of the action was not
made clearly manifest to passersby or to unconnected people sitting inside or outside of Ruta Maya.
All of these things - legal preparation, media work, and public relations - are aspects of street actions that
are fairly important. And there are clearly people in Austin who have strong skills in all of these areas and
whose services could have been called upon. I'm not sure, but I think the Austin RTS action was a last
minute one, pulled off by just a few people who didn't have time to do everything needed.
I don't want to sound too critical. During the moment - albeit a short one - there was a temporary
autonmous zone. People did in fact reclaim a portion of a street. But the cost of doing this is that several
people now unwittingly must face the hassle and expense of the court system.
HYBRIDITY: THE VIRTUAL AND THE REAL One year ago I wrote a few short pieces with the theme of
hybridity, talking about the goal of developing actions that combined on-line (virtual) and off-line (real)
elements. In part this was a reaction to criticism the Electronic Disturbance Theater received which
claimed that by acting purely in the virtual realm we were isolating ourselves from people who focused
more or all of their attention on doing things in the street or in the flesh. We tried to introduce this idea of
Electronic Civil Disobedience to the community of activists who every year, for the past few anyway, have
gone to the School of the Americas to participate in the more traditional civil disobedience style of action.
And at a national conference on civil disobedience held in Washington, DC, this past January, two from
the EDT were part of a panel discussion on Electronic Civil Disobedience. Even so, this notion of joint
computer-based and street-based actions has a long way to go. There is still a disjuncture, a gap,
between what's happening now on the Net and what people are doing on the street. Many people
engaged in yesterday's street action in Austin, for example, probably had no idea that the virtual
component was even taking place.
EDT's participation in the global RTS actions is another step in developing both the theory and practice of
this sort of joint engagement. The Internet is inherently global and so Internet-based actions seem to be a
logical match with global street actions. But this is not to say that the particular example of FloodNet is the
most ideal way of meshing the street and Net together. The FloodNet action is something that individuals
may join from their computers at home, work, or in an educational environment. Even though acting
simultaneously, jointly, the participants in the on-line and off-line actions in this case may have been
completely different sets of people. What can be done differently?
Some examples from Amsterdam and London over the course of the last few years are instructive. During
demonstrations against a meeting of the EU in Amsterdam - which involved massive police presence in
the streets - people created web pages in which they mapped out the location of the police. The pages
were constantly updated with relevant information to demonstrators from people sending in email
messages or calling in from pay phones or cell phones. In another example, in London during an
occupation/takeover of a Shell office, activists used a portable laptop connected to a cell phone to send
out announcements to the media and others once they were inside. They were also able to directly
update a web site during the occupation.
Austin's Reclaim The Street action was about as low tech as you can go. The most sophisticated
technology were probably the bicycles used for the first part of the action. Clearly there was no digital
technology. No interface with the Net. The closest to this was probably when my girlfriend used the
payphone right in front of Ruta Maya to unsuccessfully call media as the police were making arrests. For
a moment she tapped in to the telephone infrastructure - which is basically what the Internet is.
What would have happened or what could happen in the future if we are able to enhance these sorts of
street actions with a real-time audio and video presence? Imagine if on the elevated sidewalk in front of
Ruta Maya and out on the street several people had had video cameras and they were taping the entire
action. Further imagine that there were cables running from the cameras to the interior of the café where
people were sitting with laptop computers capable of handling video input and these laptops were
connected to a phone line in the café - a live stream of audio and video being netcast about the RTS
action to a global audience.
Video recording and netcasting the street action may not have prevented people from being arrested, but
it certainly would have captured a public record and people other than the participants and the observers
at Ruta Maya would have known about it. As it stands there is no recorded imagery or audio of the Austin
RTS action. Nor have there been any reports about it in the local media. Nor does anyone on the Net -
apart from those reading this - know about it.
One would think that in a town such as Austin - one credited as having one of the fastest growing
economies in the U.S. largely linked to the high tech computer industry - that activists here would have
the wherewithal to develop these sorts of uses of seemingly readily available digital technology. But there
are obstacles. Some of the obstacles are ideological, perhaps. A lingering anti-technology critique. Some
of the obstacles are economic. A genuine lack of access. Some obstacles may simply be that the ideas
are still new.
To conclude - well at least to stop, concluding may be too premature right now - in addition to an obvious
need for more attention to some basic legal, media, and publicity training, there is a need to think about
and to experiment more with ways of bringing the street and the Net closer together. We should address
this question: how do we bring what is happening on the street onto the Net?
The Zapatista FloodNet action in conjunction with the global Reclaim The Street actions is an example of
real-virtual hybridity at a world-wide level. But it is only one form and it lies within the area of Internet as
site for resistance and direct action. Finally, then, it seems there are at least two important areas where
further exploration is needed: the first, greater experimentation with other forms of on-line action and
electronic civil disobedience to be used jointly with actions on the street; the second, greater
experimentation with bringing the street and the Net closer together so that what happens on the street is
netcast in real-time onto the Net to a global audience.
END
@HWA
53.0 Cyber Attacks in Australia Double
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 17th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Code Kid
The Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
(AusCERT) is claiming that cyber attacks in Australia
have doubled over the last year. They claim that there
has been a sharp rise in DoS attacks and recommend
that companies have strong security and policies in
place.
Sydney Morning Herald
http://www.smh.com.au/news/9906/16/text/business4.html
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
http://www.auscert.org.au/
Sydney Morning Herald'
On guard against hacker attacks
Date: 16/06/99
By KIRSTY NEEDHAM
The average hacker is no longer a clever but disgruntled techno-geek. Security experts warned yesterday that dangerous programs, ready for download and use
against corporate Web sites, were being uncovered by simple keyword searches on the Internet.
Hacker attacks in Australia have doubled this year, according to the Australian Computer Emergency Response Team (AusCERT), which has seen around 1,500
incidents. AusCERT is part of an international organisation, CERT, that co-ordinates efforts against Internet security breaches.
One of the latest security problems has been a rise in "denial of service" attacks, where a Web site is crippled by a flood of requests for information.
"This can be easy to do and there are tools available to would-be hackers," said Mr Eric Halil, AusCERT operations manager. "You don't have to be an expert to
use them."
Mr Halil said many Web sites were also being "probed" by automated scanning tools. "It is difficult to determine what the motives are. Some people are joy riders -
they like to break and enter systems.
"Others like breaking into well-known systems like financial institutions. They earn kudos with their peers," he said.
A Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) conference in Brisbane this week is being attended by members from the military, business, government
and academia in 22 countries.
"Incidents tend to be international in nature. Even the local hacker around the corner breaking into a university will break in overseas first to cover the trail," said Mr
Byron Collie, an agent with the Australian Federal Police who is on secondment to the Australian defence forces' directorate of information warfare.
The FBI estimates that 80 per cent of attacks are made by disgruntled employees, with 20 per cent coming from outside the organisation.
However, Mr Collie said this was shifting towards 50 per cent as companies failed to take adequate security measures.
"Organisations need to have a security policy in place, including incident response procedures, if they want to conduct e-commerce or have any connectivity to the
Internet," said Mr Collie.
"Early law enforcement contact and protocols in handling evidence will ensure it is admissible in court. If it is left until the last minute or files have been bandied
around in e-mail, it jeopardises prosecutions."
Mr Mowgli Assor, a computer security specialist with Ohio State University, said there had been an increase in both hacking incidents and the tools available to
attack computer networks.
Infoguard, an incident response team set up by the FBI in March, was part of a move by the US Government to raise awareness of computer attacks, Mr Assor
said.
A reluctance by embarrassed companies to report attacks to the police or FBI had been seen as a problem, he said.
"Disgruntled teenagers are growing up and not shedding their ways. Hackers have been becoming smarter and taking more careful approaches. Break-ins are harder
to detect and protect against," Mr Assor said.
@HWA
54.0 SmartCards Next Stop for Internet Crime
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
(Next stop? its already happening, see section 20.0 ... -Ed)
June 17th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by chippy
The Australian Institute of Criminology has released a
report that claims that SmartCards will be the next stop
for high-tech criminals. These new crimes will force
officials to develop new forensic processes and tool to
be able to extract data from such small storage devices.
Australian Financial Review
http://www.afr.com.au/content/990616/inform/inform2.html
Australian Institute of Criminology
http://www.aic.gov.au/
Australian Financial Review;
Smartcards may be set
to revolutionise crime
By Helen Meredith
Cyber crimebusters warn that smartcards will be the next
target for digital law breakers, with the technology
lending itself to concealment of data from law
enforcement agencies.
According to a report released yesterday by the Institute
of Criminology, smartcards may have the single greatest
impact on the conduct of crime in our society with their
ability to store, process and secure significant quantities
of data.
They are expected to make the job of policing and
bringing cyber criminals to book complicated, with
experts forced to develop new forensic processes and
tools that will enable them to analyse and extract data
from digital storage devices such as smartcards.
Entitled What is Forensic Computing? the AIC report
was released to coincide with the opening of an
international conference in Brisbane on the handling of
computer security incidents.
The Federal Minister for Justice, Senator Amanda
Vanstone, speaking during the plenary session of the
FIRST Conference, said: "We are used to seeing
computer hackers portrayed in the media as youthful
idealists who are simply engaging in a bit of mischievous
fun."
This did not match up with the reality of computer crime,
she said. Damaging digital data and communications had
the potential to ruin businesses and seriously affect
national economic interests, with criminals using digital
technology both to commit crimes and hide their
activities.
Senator Vanstone said a survey of businesses carried out
by the Office of Strategic Crime Assessment in the
Attorney-General's Department, in conjunction with the
Victorian Police and consultant Deloitte Touche
Tohmatsu, had shown that about a third of firms in the
banking, technology, communications and computer
sectors had suffered unauthorised use of their systems in
the previous 12 months.
The proportion of these attacks originating externally had
increased, a trend that was expected to continue. Until
recently, most assaults on computer systems had been
identified as internal, usually involving disgruntled
employees. Authorities were also concerned that about
42 per cent of businesses had not reported such external
cyber intrusions.
"I doubt very much that two in five businesses would fail
to call in the police should the intrusion involve a physical
breach of their security, such as a break and enter, even
if nothing was taken," she said.
The use of high-grade encryption, the loss of the human
interface in financial transactions and the lack of a paper
trail were serious impediments to law enforcement.
AIC director Dr Adam Graycar said investigating
sophisticated crimes and assembling the necessary
evidence for presentation in a court of law had become a
significant issue for police.
A new specialist law enforcement field, forensic
computing, had arisen as a result. This involved
identifying digital evidence and preserving it through the
investigation process.
@HWA
55.0 Internet Was Designed without Security
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 17th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Weld Pond
Why are viruses and 'evil hackers' seemingly running
rampant all over the internet? Because in the beginning
it was designed that way. Take a romp through the
early formative years of the net, all in six or seven
paragraphs.
Washington Post
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPlate/1999-06/15/150l-061599-idx.html
Vipers In the Sandbox
Used to Be, the Internet Was a Safe Place to Play
By John Schwartz
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, June 15, 1999; Page C01
Why are the newspapers full of reports of hackers defacing government
Web sites and nasty viruses wreaking havoc on computers around the
world?
In no small part it is a cultural problem that goes back to the '60s origins of
personal computing and the Internet. Many of the Internet pioneers were
bearded longhairs, academics and engineers whose techno-hippie ethos
suffused their new world. They knew each other, were part of a
community. Trust was the rule. The early Internet was much more about
openness and communication than walls and locks. The faults it was
supposed to correct were in the machines, not in us: corrupted packets,
not corrupted morals.
"Once upon a time there was the time of innocence," says Clifford Stoll,
whose work tracking down European hackers became a popular book,
"The Cuckoo's Egg." "Once upon a time computers were not used except
in academia, where there really is nothing that's mission-critical. Once upon
a time computers were mainly play toys for the techno-weirds--techie play
toys."
In that environment, hacking was part of the fun of what Stoll has called the
early Internet "sandbox."
"In that environment, there seems to be a cachet of 'Hey! I wrote a virus!
Hee-ho!' In that environment, it seems funny to break into somebody else's
computer. . . . It seems somewhat innocent to read somebody else's
e-mail."
It started with hacking telephone systems. The founders of Apple
Computer--Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak--got their start in business
peddling "blue boxes"--little devices that allowed users to hack the
telephone network and make long-distance calls for free. These "phone
phreaks" were seen by some as cultural heroes--free spirits striking a blow
against the suits, the evil corporations seen as the enemies of spontaneity
and creativity.
Once computer systems were connected by networks, "remote hacking
was an attractive challenge," Internet pioneer Vinton Cerf recalls via
e-mail. "Surreptitiously making your way into the operating system from
your secret hideout. . . . Much of the motivation was like picking locks or
scaling walls--just to see if you could do it. Harm was not the objective,
most of the time."
Katie Hafner, who has written books about the history of the Internet and
about the lives of hackers, says that this metaphor of nerds at play is
compelling--and accurate. "It was a big open playscape for these guys,"
she says. "The Net was built as a completely open community. People
would actually be offended if files were protected." To be sure, there were
some early nods to security issues--the fledgling ARPANET, the precursor
to today's Internet, required passwords. It was funded by the military, after
all. However, "the subtext was this was an open community because this
was an experiment," Hafner says.
It was built by guys like Jon Postel, the Internet pioneer who died last year.
Postel had a vision of an Internet that didn't need a center to survive, a
network that could be governed by standards and consensus without ever
putting anybody in charge. Utopian? Sure. Vulnerable? Uh-huh.
That culture rejected attempts to create computer operating systems that
incorporated security from the ground up, but were complex and
cumbersome. Computer security expert Peter Neumann says: "Viruses
exist only because of the shortsightedness of subsequent developers who
almost completely ignored the security problems" that some designers had
effectively solved.
The problem is that the Net caught on, and in the biggest possible way.
The anarchic, antiauthoritarian, don't-tell-us-how-to-run-our-lives ethic
that defined the burgeoning network--and is still held out by most of the
experts as the source of its vitality and strength--has retained that early
vulnerability. Broader penetration of the Internet into society meant
broader penetration of society into the Internet; it became more like the
real world, and the real world is a tough place.
In '60s terms, the idea of free spirits being outside the control of central
authority was the best of all possible worlds. But with no one in charge, it
was damnedly hard to plug security holes.
A big wake-up call came in 1988 when Robert T. Morris Jr., then a
student at Cornell University, released a computer program that
single-handedly crashed systems across the Internet. His father, a famous
programmer and security expert, was of the generation that had hacked for
fun. Morris Jr. didn't mean to bring down the Net. "His mischief was kind
of in the spirit of the Net," says Hafner. But by then the Internet was no
longer a playscape, and the damage was real.
Of course if the Net's problem is anarchy, the problem with personal
computers is monarchy: Bill Gates. Microsoft "is indeed the evil empire
when it comes to robust infrastructures," says Neumann.
Two viruses that recently swept through the world's computers, Melissa
and Explore.zip, took advantage of the fact that so many millions of PCs
run on a suite of Microsoft's programs. The company's latest offerings
include security options--but the options are turned off at the factory. The
security measures make computing a little clunkier, and cut users off from
some of the bells and whistles that Microsoft writes into its programs. Says
computer security expert Eugene Spafford of Purdue University, it's as if
consumers "said they wanted faster cars," and so the vendors maximize
speed by providing "faster cars, but with no brakes and no air bags!"
Release a virus that attacks that company's software specifically, and "it's
analogous to the Spaniards bringing smallpox to the Incas," he says. "There
was no immunity--they just wiped everybody out. . . . We've really set up
our environment in an unsafe way."
Of course today's Internet is a mirror of society. It may have been
conceived in a spirit of trust and information wanting to be free and good
practical jokes. But today it's about--money. The frontier is getting settled
by corporations worth billions, all of which are promising to sell us our
future.
They have to deliver, so anti-virus programmers and network security
consultants have a market opportunity.
It's a tough time for a system that was created in an age of innocence. It
will be interesting to see if a network strong enough to survive nuclear
attack can survive its own success.
© Copyright 1999 The Washington Post Company
@HWA
56.0 Original Apple I On the Auction Block
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 17th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Cuda
What is being called the first Apple I ever sold will soon
be sold via auction. The Auctioneers are expecting bids
to go well over $40,000. One of of approximately 200
that where ever built this one includes original
documentation including the original 8-page manual. The
auction company will accept absentee bids online.
Better hurry. The live bidding starts on Tuesday June
29, at 11 a.m
La Salle Auctions
http://www.lasallegallery.com/framemac.htm
@HWA
57.0 Microsoft Calls eEye Irresponsible
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 18th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Weld Pond
A week after notifying Microsoft of a major hole in its
Internet Information Server 4.0 eEye Digital Security
Team went public with the information and published an
exploit for the hole. The Microsoft spin machine labeled
this action as 'Irresponsible'. The finger here should not
be pointed at eEye who did the honorable thing by
alerting the public and posting a real fix before
Microsoft, but should instead be pointed at Microsoft for
creating bad software, and even worse, concealing the
information for up to a week. Unfortunately these
articles don't seem understand that.
LA Times
http://www.latimes.com/HOME/BUSINESS/t000054445.html
Nando Times
http://www.techserver.com/story/body/0,1634,61071-97188-693078-0,00.html
The UK Register
http://www.theregister.co.uk/990618-000010.html
Associated Press - Via San Jose Mecury News
http://www.mercurycenter.com/breaking/docs/078774.htm
InfoWorld
http://www.infoworld.com/cgi-bin/displayStory.pl?990617.hneeye.htm
eEye Digital Security Team
http://www.eeye.com/
Microsoft
http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/ms99-019.asp
Late Update
Well, at least Forbes gets it.
Forbes
http://www.forbes.com/tool/html/99/Jun/0618/mu5.htm
Forbes;
Microsoft's security secret
By Benjamin Polen
EW YORK. 12:45PM EDT—Microsoft’s
(nasdaq: MSFT) failure to immediately alert
customers of a serious security flaw in its
Internet Information Server (IIS) could hurt the
company’s image and cost it customers as the
software giant tries to establish a position within the
competitive marketplace of mission-critical server
applications.
Microsoft knew about the vulnerability for a week but
tried to delay telling customers until it could prepare
a software patch.
But Microsoft’s efforts to suppress notification of the
IIS bug ultimately backfired and proved embarrassing
when eEye, a privately held network security
company, took the information to the public on
Tuesday.
eEye detected the bug during a beta test of a
security program and alerted Microsoft of the
problem on June 8. The vulnerability is so severe that
anyone with modest programming skills and an
Internet connection can gain complete control over a
web server running IIS, which runs on 22.3% of the
web servers on the Internet, according to research
firm Netcraft.
Despite the severity of the problem, Microsoft
stopped responding to eEye's E-mails after June 11,
according to Firas Bushnaq, CEO of eEye. After
several days, eEye decided to post an advisory on
its web site on Tuesday. The CERT Coordination
Center, a federally funded computer security
research institute at Carnegie-Mellon University,
posted an advisory on the following day, lending
credence to eEye's concerns.
Firas Bushnaq said his company acted because
Microsoft was "not taking the vulnerability seriously."
When Microsoft still had not publicly acknowledged
the vulnerability six hours after eEye posted the
advisory, the security company went a step further
and published source code that could be used
against the IIS bug. "When it was at that level, we
decided we had to release the exploit, we would
definitely get more attention," said Bushnaq.
For its part, Microsoft was not pleased with eEye’s
decision to issue an advisory, much less any source
code that could be used against their product.
Microsoft deems eEye’s full disclosure decision as
"irresponsible" and "beyond comprehension,"
according to Jason Garms, Microsoft’s lead product
manager for Windows NT security.
The disagreement between Microsoft and eEye
highlights a burgeoning culture clash in the computer
world where traditional corporate secrecy collides
with the free-information ethos of the Net.
On its web site, eEye explained why it felt justified in
posting the advisory and the source code. "Our
responsibility to our clients and the whole network
community is to disclose as many details as
possible.… This is the way we can contribute to the
security community and keep software vendors
working hard at producing more robust products."
For its part, Microsoft hoped that by keeping
knowledge of the vulnerability secret, it could protect
its customers until a patch had been developed and
tested. "Frankly, the feedback from customers is
that they don’t want us to go and publicize our bugs
before we have fixes for our problems," Garns said.
But at least one industry analyst questions
Microsoft’s handling of the situation. "If you want
your customers to depend on your products for
mission-critical applications, then you have to avoid
at all costs any kind of behavior that suggests you’re
not to be trusted and you’re not dependable," said
Eric Hemmendinger, a senior analyst at the
Aberdeen Group. "Having a problem occur is one
thing. But not acknowledging it is another issue
altogether. For that people should hold them
accountable."
Hemmendinger compared Microsoft’s attitude toward
corporate information technology managers with that
of a rude guest. "It’s like an immature person being
invited to the party and not behaving responsibly.
This is not the kind of behavior that gets you invited
back to the party," he said.
The situation could come back to haunt Microsoft as
it tries to attract new corporate customers. "If you
are considering using IIS and you become aware of
things like this in Microsoft's behavior you got to
take this into consideration," Hemmendinger said. "If
they really want to be accepted in the data center
this is not the right behavior."
-=-
UK register;
Posted 18/06/99 12:33pm by John Lettice
Major MS Web Server security hole exposed,
plugged
Security outfit eEye has roused Microsoft's ire and garnered itself some cheap
publicity by going public with information on what it says is a serious security flaw in
Microsoft's Internet Information Server (IIS) 4.0. The move hasn't helped the company's
relationship with Microsoft any, but it seems to have triggered the appearance of a
swift patch, full fix to follow.
According to eEye the flaw allows arbitrary code to be run on any web server running
IIS 4.0, and by using a buffer overflow bug in the software attackers can remotely
execute code to enable access to all data on the server." So it's a serious one,
although Microsoft says it hasn't had any reports of the security hole being used so far.
eEye accuses Microsoft of failing to give the problem the attention it deserved. The
company claims to have hassled MS for days, but "after the fifth day of reporting the
bug to Microsoft, they stopped responding to our emails." So the company went public
with the problem three days later, as an attempt to force Microsoft's hand.
Microsoft swiftly posted a patch, but accuses eEye of irresponsibility in publicising a
problem before a fix had been found. There's some justification in that, but there's also
some in the view that being able to announce "we've found a hole, but we fixed it" is
better than having to confirm "Yike, there's a huge security hole in our product." ®
@HWA
58.0 Has the FBI Overreacted?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 18th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Weld Pond
Scott Peterson has some interesting commentary about
the recent crackdown of the FBI on web graffiti artists.
The government has compared recent cracks to the use
of terrorist weapons such as chemical and biological
weapons. Mr. Peterson says it is nothing of the sort and
that the recent crackdown fosters images of
McCarthyism. Definitely some interesting viewpoints
here and worth the time to read.
PC Week
http://www.zdnet.com/pcweek/stories/news/0,4153,406619,00.html
** Sorry the ZDNet nazis have cut and paste prevention in their html code so I
couldn't reprint the article here.(And you can't either for personal record
wtf kind of lame action is that?). the reason I do reprint the articles is
because often times (see previous section links for examples) the stories are
unavailable or pay only for archives, if anyone knows how to thwart ZDNet's
(or anyone elses) anti cut and paste tactics email me hwa@press.usmc.net! and
no view source doesn't work either ...
59.0 Printer at Spa War Compromised
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 18th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Silicosis
Ron Broersma, from the Space and Naval Systems
Warfare Center, has claimed that Russians where able
to redirect print jobs destined for a local printer back to
Russia. While such a hack is possible in theory the
difficulties of doing so would make it seem unlikely. DNS
cache corruption seems like the most likely scenario. It
is too bad that Mr. Broersma did not respond to the
authors of this article with confirmation.
CMP Net
http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/TWB19990617S0007
Russians Hack U.S. Printer
(06/17/99, 10:56 a.m. ET)
By Lee Bruno and Robin Gareiss, Data Communications
Welcome back, Cold War. It looks as though
the Russians might be up to their old tricks,
if the infiltration of the network at the Space
and Naval Systems Warfare Center (Spa
War) in San Diego, Calif., is any indication.
The incursion was discovered by Ron Broersma, a Spa
War networkoperations engineer, when a local network
print job took an unusually long time. Monitoring tools
revealed a file had been hijacked from the printing
queue, sent to a server in Russia, and finally back to the
Spa War printer. Broersma concluded the network
intruder had hacked into the printer, and reconfigured
routing tables on equipment elsewhere on the Spa War
network to ship the file to Russia.
Broersma relayed his account of the network printer
hack at a recent meeting of the North American
Network Operators' Group. He said he secured Spa
War's printers after the attack by resetting router filters,
and by eliminating older printers that, he said, are
especially vulnerable.
"It turned out to be a real tough problem for us," he
said.
Broersma has not returned subsequent phone calls for
further comment, however. It's also not known who the
Russian server belonged to, or what information was
compromised.
Networked printers are known to be especially
vulnerable to hacking attacks. They have their own IP
addresses, and they run various standard protocols that
can be exploited. To make matters worse, printer
vendors haven't added any strong security features to
their products that would protect them against
break-ins.
@HWA
60.0 Popular Singapore Sites Defaced
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 18th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by lamer
Two high profile sites in Singapore where recently
defaced. MediaCity and Television Corporation Of
Singapore. Unfortunately no mirrors of either site are
available.
The Electric New Paper
http://newpaper.asia1.com.sg/spore/nplo05.html
(link dead)
@HWA
61.0 DOD Says its CRAP! (Mustn't be Scottish)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 18th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
DOD Labels Software as 'Crap'
contributed by Code Kid
Art Money, senior civilian IT official for the Defense
Department, while speaking at at the GovTechNet
International Conference in Washington, D.C, said "The
quality of software we're getting from vendors today is
crap, vendors are not building quality in."
Federal Computer Week
http://www.fcw.com:80/pubs/fcw/1999/0614/web-crap-6-17-99.html
JUNE 17, 1999 . . . 15:17 EDT
Contractors' software 'crap,' says top DOD IT
official
BY BOB BREWIN (antenna@fcw.com)
The Pentagon's top information technology official sharply criticized, in the
plainest possible language, the quality of software that IT contractors currently
supply to the Defense Department.
"The quality of software we're getting from vendors today is crap," said Art
Money, senior civilian official, who is acting as assistant secretary of Defense
for command, control, communications and intelligence.
"Vendors are not building quality in," Money said today at the GovTechNet
International Conference in Washington, D.C. "We're finding holes in it."
DOD buys hundreds of millions of dollars worth of software each year,
including everything from shrink-wrapped packages designed to run on the
desktop to customized systems running millions of lines of code.
The quality of much of the software that DOD is receiving is so poor, Money
said, that he is worried about the future of the U.S. software industry. Money
predicted that if the U.S. software industry does not get its act together, it
could suffer the same fate as the U.S. automobile manufacturing industry, with
software sales moving offshore to Japan, for example.
@HWA
62.0 DOE Still Unsecure
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 18th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Space Rogue
Even after one of the worst cases of spying in US
history a special investigative report has found that the
Department of Energy is not taking computer security
seriously. The report labels computer security practices
at DOE as "naive at best and dangerously irresponsible
at worst."
Federal Computer Week
http://www.fcw.com:80/pubs/fcw/1999/0614/web-report-6-16-99.html
Science at its Best, Security at its Worst - DOE Security Report
http://jya.com/pfiab-doe.htm
Federal Computer Week;
JUNE 16, 1999 . . . 17:24 EDT
Cybersecurity holes persist at DOE labs, study
finds
BY DANIEL VERTON (dan_verton@fcw.com)
Despite what may be the worst spy case in U.S. history involving nuclear
weapon design data, the computer networks at the nation's five weapons
laboratories continue to be "riddled with vulnerabilities," according to a report
by a special investigative panel of intelligence and security officials.
According to the report, "Science at its Best, Security at its Worst," issued this
month by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, midlevel
managers throughout the Energy Department have responded to the recent
Chinese spy scandal with a "business as usual" attitude, while foreign nationals
residing in "sensitive countries" continue to have unmonitored remote dial-up
access to lab networks.
The three-month study uncovered recurring problems with DOE's computer
security program, including poor labeling and tracking of computer media,
problems with lax password enforcement on laboratory computer
workstations and a significant failure to control access to sensitive and
classified networks.
Computer security methods throughout DOE over the last two decades have
been "naive at best and dangerously irresponsible at worst," the report said. In
fact, "computer systems at some DOE facilities were so easy to access that
even department analysts likened them to 'automatic teller machines,'
[allowing] unauthorized withdrawals at our nation's expense," the report said.
Security audits also uncovered what the report calls "remarkable" lapses in
addressing security problems and procedural gaps at many DOE labs.
According to the report, it took DOE 31 months to write and approve a
network security plan, 24 months to order security labels for mislabeled
software, 20 months to ensure that improperly stored classified computer
media had been safeguarded and 51 months to properly safeguard
cryptographic material used to secure telephones. It even took 11 months to
remove a deceased employee from classified document access lists, according
to the report.
The report also outlined instances of classified information being placed on
unclassified networks well after the department had developed a corrective
action plan in July 1998. "The predominant attitude toward security and
counterintelligence among many DOE and lab managers has ranged from
half-hearted, grudging accommodation to smug disregard," the report
concluded.
-=-
** A few diagrams were omitted from this report go to the url at jya
fo see the report with diagrams (they're most useful NOT)... - Ed
24 June 1999: Revise links to PFIAB report at the White House.
23 June 1999: Link to DOE Secretary Richardson's June 22 Senate testimony.
22 June 1999: Add notice on Senate joint hearings.
[Congressional Record: June 21, 1999 (Digest)]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
Monday, June 21, 1999
Daily Digest
Senate
COMMITTEE MEETINGS FOR TUESDAY,
JUNE 22, 1999
(Committee meetings are open unless otherwise indicated)
Senate
Committee on Armed Services: with the Select Committee on Intelligence,
and with the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and with the
Committee on Governmental Affairs, to hold joint hearings on the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board's report to the
President: Science at its Best; Security at its Worst: A Report on
Security Problems at the U.S. Department of Energy, 9:30 a.m., SD-106.
18 June 1999: Add balance of HTML conversion.
15 June 1999. Thanks to the White House Office of the PFIAB (202) 456-2352.
From: Jane_E._Baker@pfiab.eop.gov
To: jya@jya.com, dellaratta@exchangemonitor.com, jhorowitz@tribune.com,
bullfrog@enteract.com, catpano@nytimes.com, jpcarson@mindspring.com
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 1999 15:34:33 -0400
Subject: PFIAB RPT
See attached file: Report of Presidents Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, "Science At Its Best, Security At Its Worst: A Report on Security Problems at
the U.S. Department of Energy," June, 1999:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/pfiab/pfiab_report.pdf (72 pages; 420K)
See attached file: Unclassified Appendix to PFIAB Report:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/pfiab/appendix.pdf (34 pages; 191K)
Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/pfiab/pfiab_report.pdf
SCIENCE AT ITS BEST
__________________________
SECURITY AT ITS WORST
A Report on Security Problems at the
U.S. Department of Energy
[Presidential Seal]
____________________________
A Special Investigative Panel
President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
JUNE 1999
ABSTRACT
On March 18, 1999, President William J. Clinton requested that the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) undertake an inquiry and issue a
report on “the security threat at the Department of Energy’s weapons labs and the adequacy of the measures that have been taken to address it.”
Specifically, the President asked the PFIAB to “address the nature of the present counterintelligence security threat, the way in which it has evolved over the last two
decades and the steps we have taken to counter it, as well as to recommend any additional steps that may be needed.” He also asked the PFIAB “to deliver its
completed report to the Congress, and to the fullest extent possible consistent with our national security, release an unclassified version to the public.”
In response, the Honorable Warren B. Rudman, Chairman of PFIAB, appointed board members Ms. Ann Z. Caracristi, Dr. Sidney Drell, and Mr. Stephen
Friedman to form the Special Investigative Panel and obtained detailees from several federal agencies (CIA, DOD, FBI) to augment the work of the PFIAB staff.
Over the past three months, the panel and staff interviewed more than 100 witnesses, reviewed more than 700 documents encompassing thousands of pages, and
conducted onsite research and interviews at five of the Department of Energy’s national laboratories and plants: Livermore, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, Pantex, and
Sandia.
The panel has produced a report and an appendix of supporting documents, both of which are unclassified to the fullest extent possible. A large volume of classified
material, which was also reviewed and distilled for this report, has been relegated to a second appendix that is available only to authorized recipients. This report
examines:
The 20–year history of security and counterintelligence issues at the DOE national laboratories, with an emphasis on the five labs that focus on
weapons–related research;
The inherent tension between security concerns and scientific freedom at the labs and its effect on the institutional culture and efficacy of the
Department;
The growth and evolution of the foreign intelligence threat to the national labs, particularly in connection with the Foreign Visitor’s Program of the labs;
The implementation and effectiveness of Presidential Decision Directive No. 61, the reforms instituted by Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson, and
other related initiatives; and,
Additional measures that should be taken to improve security and counterintelligence at the labs.
PANEL MEMBERS
The Honorable Warren B. Rudman, Chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Senator Rudman is a partner in the law firm of Paul,
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton, and Garrison. From 1980 to 1992, he served in the U.S. Senate, where he was a member of the Select Committee on Intelligence.
Previously, he was Attorney General of New Hampshire.
Ms. Ann Z. Caracristi, board member. Ms. Caracristi, of Washington, DC, is a former Deputy Director of the National Security Agency, where she served in a
variety of senior management positions over a 40–year career. She is currently a member of the DCI/Secretary of Defense Joint Security Commission and recently
chaired a DCI Task Force on intelligence training. She was a member of the Aspin/Brown Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the Intelligence Community.
Dr. Sidney D. Drell, board member. Dr. Drell, of Stanford, California is an Emeritus Professor of Theoretical Physics and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover
Institution. He has served as a scientific consultant and advisor to several congressional committees, The White House, DOE, DOD, and the CIA. He is a member
of the National Academy of Sciences and a past President of the American Physical Society.
Mr. Stephen Friedman, board member. Mr. Friedman is Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Columbia University and a former Chairman of Goldman, Sachs,
& Co. He was a member of the Aspin/Brown Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the Intelligence Community and the Jeremiah Panel on the National
Reconnaissance Office.
PFIAB STAFF
Randy W. Deitering, Executive Director
Mark F. Moynihan, Assistant Director
Roosevelt A. Roy, Administrative Officer
Frank W. Fountain, Assistant Director and Counsel
Brendan G. Melley, Assistant Director
Jane E. Baker, Research/Administrative Officer
PFIAB ADJUNCT STAFF
Roy B., Defense Intelligence Agency
Karen DeSpiegelaere, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Jerry L., Central Intelligence Agency
Christine V., Central Intelligence Agency
David W. Swindle, Department of Defense, Naval Criminal Investigative Service
Joseph S. O’Keefe, Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense
TABEL OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD I-IV
FINDINGS 1
ROOT CAUSES 7
An International Enterprise 7
Big, Byzantine, and Bewildering Bureaucracy 8
Lack of Accountability 10
Culture and Attitudes 11
Changing Times, Changing Missions 12
RECURRING VULNERABILITIES 13
Management and Planning 13
Physical Security 18
Screening and Monitoring Personnel 20
Protection of Classified and Sensitive Information 21
Tracking Nuclear Materials 22
Foreign Visitors’ Program 23
ASSESSMENTS 29
Responsibility 29
Record of the Clinton Team 30
The 1995 “Walk-In” Document 30
W-88 Investigation 31
Damage Assessment 35
PDD-61: Birth and Intent 36
Timeliness of PDD-61 37
Secretary Richardson’s Initiatives 38
Prospects for Reforms 39
Trouble Ahead 40
Back to the Future 41
REORGANIZATION 43
Leadership 43
Restructuring 46
RECOMMENDATIONS 53
ENDNOTES
APPENDIX
Map of DOE Installations
Chronology of Events
Chronology of Reports on DOE
Damage Assessment of China’s Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Information
Presidential Decision Directive 61
Bibliography
FOREWORD FROM THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE PANEL
For the past two decades, the Department of Energy has embodied science at its best and security of secrets at its worst.
Within DOE are a number of the crown jewels of the world’s government–sponsored scientific research and development organizations. With its record as the
incubator for the work of many talented scientists and engineers—including many Nobel prize winners—DOE has provided the nation with far–reaching advantages.
Its discoveries not only helped the United States to prevail in the Cold War, they undoubtedly will continue to provide both technological benefits and inspiration for
the progress of generations to come. The vitality of its national laboratories is derived to a great extent from their ability to attract talent from the widest possible
pool, and they should continue to capitalize on the expertise of immigrant scientists and engineers. However, we believe that the dysfunctional structure at the heart of
the Department has too often resulted in the mismanagement of security in weapons–related activities and a lack of emphasis on counterintelligence.
DOE was created in 1977 and heralded as the centerpiece of the federal solution to the energy crisis that had stunned the American economy. A vital part of this
new initiative was the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), the legacy agency of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and inheritor of the
national programs to develop safe and reliable nuclear weapons. The concept, at least, was straightforward: take the diverse and dispersed energy research centers
of the nation, bring them under an umbrella organization with other energy–related enterprises, and spark their scientific progress through closer contacts and
centralized management.
__________________________________
At the birth of DOE, the brilliant
scientific breakthroughs of the nuclear
weapons laboratories came with a troubling
record of security administration.
Twenty years later, virtually every one
of its original problems persists.
However, the brilliant scientific breakthroughs at the nuclear weapons laboratories came with a very troubling record of security administration. For example,
classified documents detailing the designs of the most advanced nuclear weapons were found on library shelves accessible to the public at the Los Alamos
laboratory. Employees and researchers were receiving little, if any, training or instruction regarding espionage threats. Multiple chains of command and standards of
performance negated accountability, resulting in pervasive inefficiency, confusion, and mistrust. Competition among laboratories for contracts, and among researchers
for talent, resources, and support distracted management from security issues. Fiscal management was bedeviled by sloppy accounting. Inexact tracking of the
quantities and flows of nuclear materials was a persistent worry. Geographic decentralization fractured policy implementation and changes in leadership regularly
depleted the small reservoirs of institutional memory. Permeating all of these issues was a prevailing cultural attitude among some in the DOE scientific community
that regarded the protection of nuclear know–how with either fatalism or naiveté.
Twenty years later, every one of these problems still existed. Most still exist today.
__________________________________
The panel found a department saturated
with cynicism, an arrogant disregard
for authority, and a staggering pattern
of denial.
In response to these problems, the Department has been the subject of a nearly unbroken history of dire warnings and attempted but aborted reforms. A cursory
review of the open-source literature on the DOE record of management presents an abysmal picture. Second only to its world–class intellectual feats has been its
ability to fend off systemic change. Over the last dozen years, DOE has averaged some kind of major departmental shake–up every two to three years. No
President, Energy Secretary, or Congress has been able to stem the recurrence of fundamental problems. All have been thwarted time after time by the intransigence
of this institution. The Special Investigative Panel found a large organization saturated with cynicism, an arrogant disregard for authority, and a staggering pattern of
denial. For instance, even after President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 61 ordering that the Department make fundamental changes in security
procedures, compliance by Department bureaucrats was grudging and belated.
Time after time over the past few decades, officials at DOE headquarters and the weapons labs themselves have been presented with overwhelming evidence that
their lackadaisical oversight could lead to an increase in the nuclear threat against the United States. Throughout its history, the Department has been the subject of
scores of critical reports from the General Accounting Office (GAO), the intelligence community, independent commissions, private management consultants, its
Inspector General, and its own security experts. It has repeatedly attempted reforms. Yet the Department’s ingrained behavior and values have caused it to continue
to falter and fail.
PROSPECTS FOR REFORMS
We believe that Secretary of Energy Richardson, in attempting to deal with many critical security matters facing the Department, is on the right track in some, though
not all, of his changes. We concur with and encourage many of his recent initiatives, and we are heartened by his aggressive approach and command of the issues.
But we believe that he has overstated the case when he asserts, as he did several weeks ago, that “Americans can be reassured: our nation’s nuclear secrets are,
today, safe and secure.”
After a review of more than 700 reports and studies, thousands of pages of classified and unclassified source documents, interviews with scores of senior federal
officials, and visits to several of the DOE laboratories at the heart of this inquiry, the Special Investigative Panel has concluded the Department of Energy is incapable
of reforming itself—bureaucratically and culturally—in a lasting way, even under an activist Secretary.
The panel has found that DOE and the weapons laboratories have a deeply rooted culture of low regard for and, at times, hostility to security issues, which has
continually frustrated the efforts of its internal and external critics, notably the GAO and the House Energy and Commerce Committee. Therefore, a reshuffling of
offices and lines of accountability may be a necessary step toward meaningful reform, but it almost certainly will not be sufficient.
Even if every aspect of the ongoing structural reforms is fully implemented, the most powerful guarantor of security at the nation’s weapons laboratories will not be
laws, regulations, or management charts. It will be the attitudes and behavior of the men and women who are responsible for the operation of the labs each day.
These will not change overnight, and they are likely to change only in a different cultural environment—one that values security as a vital and integral part of
day–to–day activities and believes it can coexist with great science.
We are convinced that when Secretary Richardson vacates the office his successor is not likely to have a comparable appreciation of the gravity of the Department’s
past problems, nor a comparable interest in resolving them. The next Secretary of Energy will not have spent months at the tip of the sword created by the recent
public outcry over DOE mismanagement of national secrets. Indeed, the core of the Department’s bureaucracy is quite capable of undoing Secretary Richardson’s
reforms, and may well be inclined to do so if given the opportunity.
Ultimately, the nature of the institution and the structure of the incentives under a culture of scientific research require great attention if they are to be made compatible
with the levels of security and the degree of command–and–control warranted where the research and stewardship of nuclear weaponry is concerned. Yet it must be
done.
THE PFIAB INQUIRY
The PFIAB panel is fully aware of the many recent allegations of management failures surrounding the Department of Energy and questions about the subsequent
roles of entities such as the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Much of the research we conducted has
relevance to these allegations. However, the depth and the complexity of the issues call for examinations by institutions with greater resources and a wider charter:
namely, Congress and standing executive agencies of the federal government.
In the 90 days of our inquiry, the PFIAB panel conducted numerous interviews with senior federal officials who agreed to speak candidly—with the understanding
that they would not be identified by name—about DOE’s problems and recent events. On balance, the panel finds that some very damaging security compromises
may have occurred, as alleged by some in recent weeks. But we believe that in matters of intelligence and counterintelligence, one cannot brush off the reality that
conclusions are often intrinsically based on probabilities, rather than certainties.
Leaders, of course, are often obliged to act, and should act, based on the probability of impending danger, not only its certainty. And those entrusted with the public
weal are indisputably served better by having more information about risks than less. So the panel would like to note the contributions of those who have helped to
raise the public’s awareness of the risks to national security posed by problems at DOE. Although we do not concur with all of their conclusions, we believe that
both intelligence officials at the Department of Energy and the members of the Cox Committee made substantial and constructive contributions to understanding and
resolving security problems at DOE. As we note later in this report, we concur on balance with the damage assessment of espionage losses conducted by the
Director of Central Intelligence. We also concur with the findings of the independent review of that assessment by Admiral David Jeremiah and his panel.
Our mandate from President Clinton was restricted to an analysis of the structural and management problems in the Department’s security and counterintelligence
operations. We abided by that. We also recognize the unique nature of the assignment given to us by the President. Never before in its history of more than 35 years
has the PFIAB prepared a report for release to the general public. As a result, we have taken pains to ensure that the language of this report is “plain English,” not
bureaucratese, and that the findings of the report are stated directly and candidly, not with the indirection and euphemisms often employed by policy insiders.
SOLUTIONS
Our panel has concluded that the Department of Energy, when faced with a profound public responsibility, has failed. Therefore, this report suggests two alternative
organizational solutions, both of which we believe would substantially insulate the weapons laboratories from many of DOE’s historical problems and promote the
building of a responsible culture over time. We also offer recommendations for improving various aspects of security and counterintelligence at DOE, such as
personnel assurance, cyber–security, program management, and interdepartmental cooperation under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
The weapons research and stockpile management functions should be placed wholly within a new semi–autonomous agency within DOE that has a clear mission,
streamlined bureaucracy, and drastically simplified lines of authority and accountability. Useful lessons along these lines can be taken from the National Security
Agency (NSA) or Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) within the Department of Defense or the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) within the Department of Commerce. The other alternative is a wholly independent agency, such as the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). There was substantial debate among the members of the panel about these two alternatives. Both have strengths and weaknesses. In the
final analysis, the decision rests in the hands of the President and the Congress, and we trust that they will give serious deliberation to the merits and shortcomings of
the alternatives before enacting major reforms. We all agree, nonetheless, that the labs should never be subordinated to the Department of Defense.
With either proposal it will be important for the weapons labs to maintain effective scientific contact on nonclassified scientific research with the other DOE labs and
the wider scientific community. To do otherwise would work to the detriment of the nation’s scientific progress and security over the long run. This argument draws
on history: nations that honor and advance freedom of inquiry have fared better than those who have sought to arbitrarily suppress and control the community of
science.
__________________________________
The nuclear weapons and research
functions of DOE need more autonomy,
a clearer mission, a streamlined bureaucracy,
and increased accountability.
However, we would submit that we do not face an either/or proposition. The past 20 years have provided a controlled experiment of a sort, the results of which
point to institutional models that hold promise. Organizations such as NASA and DARPA have advanced scientific and technological progress while maintaining a
respectable record of security. Meanwhile, the Department of Energy, with its decentralized structure, confusing matrix of cross–cutting and overlapping
management, and shoddy record of accountability has advanced scientific and technological progress, but at the cost of an abominable record of security with deeply
troubling threats to American national security.
Thomas Paine once said that “government, even in its best state, is but a necessary evil; in its worst state, an intolerable one.” This report finds that DOE’s
performance, throughout its history, should have been regarded as intolerable.
We believe the results and implications of this experiment are clear. It is time for the nation’s leaders to act decisively in the defense of America’s national security.
Warren Rudman
Chairman of the President’s Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board
Ms. Ann Caracristi
Board Member
Dr. Sidney Drell
Board Member
Mr. Stephen Friedman
Board Member
FINDINGS
On March 18, 1999, President Clinton tasked the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to review the history of the security and counterintelligence threats to the
nation’s weapons labs and the effectiveness of the responses by the U.S. government. He also asked the Board to propose further improvements.
This report, based on reviews of hundreds of source documents and studies, analysis of intelligence reports, and scores of interviews with senior level officials from
several administrations, was prepared over the past 90 days in fulfillment of the President’s request.
BOTTOM LINE
Our bottom line: DOE represents the best of America’s scientific talent and achievement, but it has also been responsible for the worst security record on secrecy
that the members of this panel have ever encountered.
The national labs of the Department of Energy are among the crown jewels of the world’s government–sponsored scientific research and development organizations.
With its record as the incubator for the work of many talented scientists and engineers—including many Nobel prize winners—it has provided the nation with
far–reaching advantages. Its discoveries not only helped the United States to prevail in the Cold War, they will undoubtedly provide both technological benefits and
inspiration for the progress of generations to come. Its vibrancy is derived to a great extent from its ability to attract talent from the widest possible pool, and it
should continue to capitalize on the expertise of immigrant scientists and engineers. However, the Department has devoted far too little time, attention, and resources
to the prosaic but grave responsibilities of security and counterintelligence in managing its weapons and other national security programs.
FINDINGS
The preponderance of evidence accumulated by the Special Investigative Panel, spanning the past 25 years, has compelled the members to reach many definite
conclusions—some very disturbing—about the security and well–being of the nation’s weapons laboratories.
As the repository of America’s most advanced know-how in nuclear and related armaments and the home of some of America’s finest scientific
minds, these labs have been and will continue to be a major target of foreign intelligence services, friendly as well as hostile. Two landmark events, the
end of the Cold War and the overwhelming victory of the United States and its allies in the Persian Gulf War, markedly altered the security equations and outlooks of
nations throughout the world. Friends and foes of the United States intensified their efforts to close the technological gap between their forces and those of America,
and some redoubled their efforts in the race for weapons of mass destruction. Under the restraints imposed by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, powerful
computers have replaced detonations as the best available means of testing the viability and performance capabilities of new nuclear weapons. So research done by
U.S. weapons laboratories with high performance computers stands particularly high on the espionage hit list of other nations, many of which have used increasingly
more sophisticated and diverse means to obtain the secrets necessary to join the nuclear club.
______________________________________
Snapshot: DOE Weapons Operations
Percentage of Budget: Roughly $6 billion, a
third of the Department’s $18 billion FY99 budget.
Allocation of Weapons-Related Budget:
Defense Programs $4.4 billion
Nonproliferation/Nat. Sec. 0.7
Fissile Material Disposal 0.2
Naval Reactors 0.7
Number of Contract Employees: 34,190
Number of Contract Employees Per Lab
Los Alamos 6,900
Sandia 7,500
L. Livermore 6,400
Pantex 2,860
Oak Ridge (Y-12) 5,500
Kansas City 3,150
Nevada Test Site 1,880
SOURCE: DEPT. OF ENERGY FIELD FACTBOOK, MAY 1998
More than 25 years worth of reports, studies and formal inquiries—by executive branch agencies, Congress, independent panels, and even DOE
itself—have identified a multitude of chronic security and counterintelligence problems at all of the weapons labs (See Appendix). These reviews
produced scores of stern, almost pleading, entreaties for change. Critical security flaws—in management and planning, personnel assurance, some physical security
areas, control of nuclear materials, protection of documents and computerized information, and counterintelligence—have been cited for immediate attention and
resolution … over and over and over … ad nauseam.
The open–source information alone on the weapons laboratories overwhelmingly supports a troubling conclusion: their security and
counterintelligence operations have been seriously hobbled and relegated to low-priority status for decades. The candid, closed–door testimony of
current and former federal officials as well as the content of voluminous classified materials received by this panel in recent weeks reinforce this conclusion. When it
comes to a genuine understanding of and appreciation for the value of security and counterintelligence programs, especially in the context of America’s nuclear
arsenal and secrets, the DOE and its weapons labs have been Pollyannaish. The predominant attitude toward security and counterintelligence among many DOE and
lab managers has ranged from half–hearted, grudging accommodation to smug disregard. Thus the panel is convinced that the potential for major leaks and thefts of
sensitive information and material has been substantial. Moreover, such security lapses would have occurred in bureaucratic environments that would have allowed
them to go undetected with relative ease.
Organizational disarray, managerial neglect, and a culture of arrogance—both at DOE headquarters and the labs themselves—conspired to create
an espionage scandal waiting to happen. The physical security efforts of the weapons labs (often called the “guns, guards, and gates”) have had some isolated
shortcomings, but on balance they have developed some of the most advanced security technology in the world. However, perpetually weak systems of personnel
assurance, information security, and counterintelligence have invited attack by foreign intelligence services. Among the defects this panel found:
Inefficient personnel clearance programs, wherein haphazard background investigations could take years to complete and the backlogs numbered in the
tens of thousands.
Loosely controlled and casually monitored programs for thousands of unauthorized foreign scientists and assignees—despite more than a decade of
critical reports from the General Accounting Office, the DOE Inspector General, and the intelligence community.
This practice occasionally created bizarre circumstances in which regular lab employees with security clearances were supervised by foreign nationals
on temporary assignment.
Feckless systems for control of classified documents, which periodically resulted in thousands of documents being declared lost.
Counterintelligence programs with part–time CI officers, who often operated with little experience, minimal budgets, and employed little more than
crude “awareness” briefings of foreign threats and perfunctory and sporadic debriefings of scientists travelling to foreign countries.
A lab security management reporting system that led everywhere but to responsible authority.
Computer security methods that were naive at best and dangerously irresponsible at worst.
Why were these problems so blatantly and repeatedly ignored? DOE has had a dysfunctional management structure and culture that only occasionally gave proper
credence to the need for rigorous security and counterintelligence programs at the weapons labs. For starters, there has been a persisting lack of real leadership and
effective management at DOE.
The nature of the intelligence–gathering methods used by the People’s Republic of China poses a special challenge to the U.S. in general and the
weapons labs in particular. More sophisticated than some of the blatant methods employed by the former Soviet bloc espionage services, PRC intelligence
operatives know their strong suits and play them extremely well. Increasingly more nimble, discreet and transparent in their spying methods, the Chinese services
have become very proficient in the art of seemingly innocuous elicitations of information. This modus operandi has proved very effective against unwitting and
ill–prepared DOE personnel.
Despite widely publicized assertions of wholesale losses of nuclear weapons technology from specific laboratories to particular nations, the factual
record in the majority of cases regarding the DOE weapons laboratories supports plausible inferences—but not irrefutable proof—about the source
and scope of espionage and the channels through which recipient nations received information. The panel was not charged, nor was it empowered, to
conduct a technical assessment regarding the extent to which alleged losses at the national weapons laboratories may have directly advanced the weapons
development programs of other nations. However, the panel did find these allegations to be germane to issues regarding the structure and effectiveness of DOE
security programs, particularly the counterintelligence functions.
The classified and unclassified evidence available to the panel, while pointing out systemic security vulnerabilities, falls short of being conclusive. The actual damage
done to U.S. security interests is, at the least, currently unknown; at worst, it may be unknowable. Numerous variables are inescapable. Analysis of indigenous
technology development in foreign research laboratories is fraught with uncertainty. Moreover, a nation that is a recipient of classified information is not always the
sponsor of the espionage by which it was obtained. However, the panel does concur, on balance, with the findings of the recent DCI–sponsored damage
assessment. We also concur with the findings of the subsequent independent review, led by retired Admiral David Jeremiah, of that damage assessment.
The Department of Energy is a dysfunctional bureaucracy that has proven it is incapable of reforming itself. Accountability at DOE has been spread so
thinly and erratically that it is now almost impossible to find. The long traditional and effective method of entrenched DOE and lab bureaucrats is to defeat security
reform initiatives by waiting them out. They have been helped in this regard by the frequent changes in leadership at the highest levels of DOE—nine Secretaries of
Energy in 22 years. Eventually, the reform–minded management transitions out, either due to a change in administrations or as a result of the traditional “revolving
door” management practices at DOE. Then the bureaucracy reverts to old priorities and predilections. Such was the case in December 1990 with the reform
recommendations carefully crafted by a special task force commissioned by then–Energy Secretary Watkins. The report skewered DOE for unacceptable
“direction, coordination, conduct, and oversight” of safeguards and security. Two years later, the new administration rolled in, redefined priorities, and the initiatives
all but evaporated. Deputy Secretary Charles Curtis in late 1996 investigated clear indications of serious security and CI problems and drew up a list of initiatives in
response. Those initiatives also were dropped after he left office.
Reorganization is clearly warranted to resolve the many specific problems with security and counterintelligence in the weapons laboratories, but
also to address the lack of accountability that has become endemic throughout the entire Department. Layer upon layer of bureaucracy, accumulated
over the years, has diffused responsibility to the point where scores claim it, no one has enough to make a difference, and all fight for more. Convoluted, confusing,
and often contradictory reporting channels make the relationship between DOE headquarters and the labs, in particular, tense, internecine, and chaotic. In between
the headquarters and the laboratories are field offices, which the panel found to be a locus of much confusion. In background briefings of the panel, senior DOE
officials often described them as redundant operations that function as a shadow headquarters, often using their political clout and large payrolls to push their own
agendas and budget priorities in Congress. Even with the latest DOE restructuring, the weapons labs are reporting to far too many DOE masters.
The criteria for the selection of Energy Secretaries have been inconsistent in the past. Regardless of the outcome of ongoing or contemplated
reforms, the minimum qualifications for an Energy Secretary should include experience in not only energy and scientific issues, but national
security and intelligence issues as well. The list of former Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, and Under Secretaries meeting all of these criteria is very short.
Despite having a large proportion of its budget (roughly 30 percent) devoted to functions related to nuclear weapons, the Department of Energy has often been led
by men and women with little expertise and background in national security. The result has been predictable: security issues have been a low priority, and leaders
unfamiliar with these issues have delegated decisionmaking to lesser–ranking officials who lacked the incentives and authority to address problems with dispatch and
forcefulness. For a Department in desperate need of strong leadership on security issues, this has been a disastrous trend. The bar for future nominees at the upper
levels of the Department needs to be raised significantly.
DOE cannot be fixed with a single legislative act: management must follow mandate. The research functions of the labs are vital to the nation’s
long term interest, and instituting effective gates between weapons and nonweapons research functions will require both disinterested scientific
expertise, judicious decisionmaking, and considerable political finesse. Thus both Congress and the executive branch—whether along the lines suggested by
the Special Investigative Panel or others—should be prepared to monitor the progress of the Department’s reforms for years to come. This panel has no illusions
about the future of security and counterintelligence at DOE. There is little reason to believe future DOE Secretaries will necessarily share the resolve of Secretary
Richardson, or even his interest. When the next Secretary of Energy is sworn in, perhaps in the spring of 2001, the DOE and lab bureaucracies will still have
advantages that could give them the upper hand: time and proven skills at artful dodging and passive intransigence.
The Foreign Visitors’ and Assignments Program has been and should continue to be a valuable contribution to the scientific and technological
progress of the nation. Foreign nationals working under the auspices of U.S. weapons labs have achieved remarkable scientific advances and contributed
immensely to a wide array of America’s national security interests, including nonproliferation. Some have made contributions so unique that they are all but
irreplaceable. The value of these contacts to the nation should not be lost amid the attempt to address deep, well–founded concerns about security lapses. That said,
DOE clearly requires measures to ensure that legitimate use of the research laboratories for scientific collaboration is not an open door to foreign espionage agents.
Losing national security secrets should never be accepted as an inevitable cost of obtaining scientific knowledge.
In commenting on security issues at DOE, we believe that both Congressional and Executive Branch leaders have resorted to simplification and
hyperbole in the past few months. The panel found neither the dramatic damage assessments nor the categorical reassurances of the Department’s
advocates to be wholly substantiated. We concur with and encourage many of Secretary Richardson’s recent initiatives to address the security problems at the
Department, and we are heartened by his aggressive approach and command of the issues. He has recognized the organizational dysfunction and cultural vagaries at
DOE and taken strong, positive steps to try to reverse the legacy of more than 20 years of security mismanagement. However, the Board is extremely skeptical that
any reform effort, no matter how well–intentioned, well–designed, and effectively applied, will gain more than a toehold at DOE, given its labyrinthine management
structure, fractious and arrogant culture, and the fast–approaching reality of another transition in DOE leadership. Thus we believe that he has overstated the case
when he asserts, as he did several weeks ago, that “Americans can be reassured: our nation’s nuclear secrets are, today, safe and secure.”
Similarly, the evidence indicating widespread security vulnerabilities at the weapons laboratories has been ignored for far too long, and the work of the Cox
Committee and intelligence officials at the Department has been invaluable in gaining the attention of the American public and in helping focus the political will
necessary to resolve these problems. Nonetheless, there have been many attempts to take the valuable coin of damaging new information and decrease its value by
manufacturing its counterfeit, innuendo; possible damage has been minted as probable disaster; workaday delay and bureaucratic confusion have been cast as
diabolical conspiracies. Enough is enough.
Fundamental change in DOE’s institutional culture—including the ingrained attitudes toward security among personnel of the weapons
laboratories—will be just as important as organizational redesign. Never have the members of the Special Investigative Panel witnessed a bureaucratic
culture so thoroughly saturated with cynicism and disregard for authority. Never before has this panel found such a cavalier attitude toward one of the most serious
responsibilities in the federal government—control of the design information relating to nuclear weapons. Particularly egregious have been the failures to enforce
cyber–security measures to protect and control important nuclear weapons design information. Never before has the panel found an agency with the bureaucratic
insolence to dispute, delay, and resist implementation of a Presidential directive on security, as DOE’s bureaucracy tried to do to the Presidential Decision Directive
No. 61 in February 1998.
The best nuclear weapons expertise in the U.S. government resides at the national weapons labs, and this asset should be better used by the
intelligence community. For years, the PFIAB has been keen on honing the intelligence community’s analytic effectiveness on a wide array of nonproliferation
areas, including nuclear weapons. We believe that the DOE Office of Intelligence, particularly its analytic component, has historically been an impediment to this goal
because of its ineffective attempts to manage the labs’ analysis. The office’s mission and size (about 70 people) is totally out of step with the Department’s
intelligence needs. A streamlined intelligence liaison body, much like Department of Treasury’s Office of Intelligence Support—which numbers about 20 people,
including a 24–hour watch team—would be far more appropriate. It should concentrate on making the intelligence community, which has the preponderance of
overall analytic experience, more effective in fulfilling the DOE’s analysis and collection requirements.
ROOT CAUSES
The sources of DOE’s difficulties in both overseeing scientific research and maintaining security are numerous and deep. The Special Investigative Panel primarily
focused its inquiry on the areas within DOE where the tension between science and security is most critical: the nuclear weapons laboratories.1 To a lesser extent, the
panel examined security issues in other areas of DOE and broad organizational issues that have had a bearing on the functioning of the laboratories.
Inherent in the work of the weapons laboratories, of course, is the basic tension between scientific inquiry, which thrives on freewheeling searches for and wide
dissemination of information, and governmental secrecy, which requires just the opposite. But the historical context in which the labs were created and thrived has
also figured into their subsequent problems with security.
AN INTERNATIONAL ENTERPRISE
U.S. research laboratories have always had a tradition of drawing on immigrant talent. Perhaps the first foreign–born contributor to our nation’s nuclear program was
Albert Einstein. In his letter to President Roosevelt on August 2, 1939, Einstein advised the President of the possibility of the atomic bomb and the urgent need for
government action. By 1943, the ranks of the Manhattan project at Los Alamos, New Mexico were filled with scientists and engineers from Italy (Fermi), Germany
(Bethe), Poland (Ulam), Hungary (Wigner, Szilard, Von Neumann, and Teller), Russia (Kistiakovsy) and Austria (Rabi). Indeed, it is possible that the atomic bomb
would never have been completed but for immigrant talent, and the diversity of talent applied to the project was hailed at the time as a model of international
cooperation. Eleanor Roosevelt, in a 1945 radio address, declared that the development of the atomic bomb by “many minds belonging to different races and
different religions sets the pattern for the way in which in the future we may be able to work out our difficulties.”2
The role of and reliance on immigrant talent in the United States—particularly at the graduate school and doctoral levels where much of the nation’s research is
performed—has increased over the years. From 1975 to 1992, the aging of America’s baby boomers resulted in a decline in the overall size of the college–age
population and, unlike other industrialized nations, the U.S. saw a decline in the number of American students receiving science and engineering degrees.3
From the 1950s until 1995, the number of non–U.S. citizens who earned doctorates in scientific and engineering fields from American universities steadily climbed,
reaching 27 percent by 1985 and 40 percent by 1995. Two–thirds of those receiving those doctorates in 1995 held temporary residency visas, and Chinese
doctoral recipients outnumbered recipients from all other regions combined.4
But the willingness to draw on foreign talent also has meant a greater risk of falling prey to those with foreign allegiances. One of the earliest and most infamous
espionage scandals at the nation’s nuclear laboratories was centered on the physicist Klaus Fuchs, a German native and naturalized British citizen who spied on
researchers at Los Alamos for the Soviet Union. More recent instances of actual and alleged foreign espionage at the nuclear weapons laboratories are detailed in
the Classified Appendix to this report.
As growth of the U.S. talent pool in science and engineering stagnated, and the amount of available talent abroad grew rapidly, the U.S. has had to rely on more
foreign–born talent in national scientific research and development programs in order to maintain the best research facilities in the world. At the same time, since the
end of the Cold War, DOE has entered into more extensive cooperative programs with foreign nations in efforts to reduce the threats of proliferation and diversion
of nuclear weapons material. By June 1990, DOE had entered into 157 bilateral research and development agreements for scientific exchange purposes. Among
others, parties to the agreements were the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, Soviet bloc nations and countries that posed nuclear proliferation threats.5
In December 1990, a report to the DOE Secretary noted “a high probability of greatly increasing numbers of foreign visits and assignments to DOE facilities in future
years.”6 The widening of foreign contacts concurrent with a greater influx of foreign–born talent has raised concerns about security compromises by scientists with
foreign allegiances and highlighted the need for special care in implementing formal clearance procedures for involvement in classified work.
BIG, BYZANTINE, AND BEWILDERING BUREAUCRACY
DOE is not one of the federal government’s largest agencies in absolute terms, but its organizational structure is widely regarded as one of the most confusing. That is
another legacy of its origins, and it has made the creation, implementation, coordination, and enforcement of consistent policies very difficult over the years.
The effort to develop the atomic bomb was managed through an unlikely collaboration of the Manhattan Engineering District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(hence the name, “the Manhattan Project”) and the University of California—two vastly dissimilar organizations in both culture and mission. The current form of the
Department took shape in the first year of the Carter Administration through the merging of more than 40 different government agencies and organizations, an event
from which it has arguably never recovered.
The newly created DOE subsumed the Federal Energy Administration, the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), the Federal Power
Commission, and components and programs of several other government agencies. Included were the nuclear weapons research laboratories that were part of the
ERDA and, formerly, of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Many of these agencies and organizations have continued to operate under the DOE umbrella with the same organizational structure that they had prior to joining the
Department.
Even before the new Department was created, concerns were raised about how high the nuclear weapons–related operations would rank among the competing
priorities of such a large bureaucracy. A study of the issue completed in the last year of the Ford Administration considered three alternatives: shifting the weapons
operations to the Department of Defense, creating a new freestanding agency, or keeping the program within ERDA—the options still being discussed more than 20
years later. As one critic of the DOE plan told The Washington Post, “Under the AEC, weapons was half the program. Under ERDA, it was one–sixth. Under
DOE, it will be one–tenth. It isn’t getting the attention it deserves.” Although the proportions cited by that critic would prove to be inaccurate, he accurately spotted
the direction of the trend.
_____________________________________
The DOE Management Challenge
MISSION
· Lead agency for development of national
energy resources and technologies.
· Responsible for the largest environmental
cleanup effort in history.
· Nuclear energy and weapons research and
development.
· Management of special nuclear materials
stockpiles.
· Protection of highly sensitive classified and
proprietary information against foreign and
corporate espionage.
SIZE
· If included among the Nation’s Fortune 500
firms, would rank in the top 50.
· The fourth largest landowner in the United
States.
· Budget of roughly $18 billion comprises close to
3 percent of total discretionary spending at the
federal level.
· Employs more than 11,000 Federal employees
and more than 100,000 contract employees.
· Owns and manages more than 50 major
installations spread across 2.4 million acres and
35 states.
COMPLEXITY
· A diverse workforce of military and civilian per-sonnel;
U.S. citizens and foreign nationals;
career federal officials and part-time
researchers; white collar bureaucrats as well as
scientists and engineers specializing in narrow
esoteric fields.
· Constituencies include the White House,
Congress, the power industry, multinational
defense and aerospace corporations, major
universities, states and municipalities seeking or
monitoring environmental cleanups.
During 1978, its first year of operation within the new structure, DOE already had in place more than 9,500 prime contracts and more than 1,800 financial assistance
awards, which together were spread among 188 universities and more than 3,200 contractors. And the Department was growing: from 1977 to 1978, grants and
contracts with university researchers posted an increase of 22 percent.7
LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY
Depending on the issue at hand, a line worker in a DOE facility might be responsible to DOE headquarters in Washington, a manager in a field office in another state,
a private contractor assigned to a DOE project, a research team leader from academia, or a lab director on another floor of the worker’s building. For example,
prior to Secretary Richardson’s restructuring initiative earlier this year, a single laboratory, Sandia, was managed or accountable to nine different DOE security
organizations.
Last year, after years of reports highlighting the problem of confused lines of authority, DOE was still unable to ensure the effectiveness of security measures because
of its inability to hold personnel accountable. A 1998 report lamented that “short of wholesale contract termination, there did not appear to be adequate
penalty/reward systems to ensure effective day–to–day security oversight at the contractor level.”8
The problem is not only the diffuse nature of authority and accountability in the Department. It is the dynamic and often informal character of the authority that does
exist. The inherently unpredictable outcomes of major experiments, the fluid missions of research teams, the mobility of individual researchers, the internal
competition among laboratories, the ebb and flow of the academic community, the setting and onset of project deadlines, the cyclical nature of the federal budgeting
process, and the shifting imperatives of energy and security policies dictated from the White House and Congress—all of these dynamic variables contribute to
volatility in the Department’s workforce and an inability to give the weapons–related functions the priority they deserved. Newcomers, as a result, have an
exceedingly hard time when they are assimilated; incumbents have a hard time in trying to administer consistent policies; and outsiders have a hard time divining
departmental performance and which leaders and factions are credible. Such problems are not new to government organizations, but DOE’s accountability vacuum
has only exacerbated them.
Management and security problems have recurred so frequently that they have resulted in nonstop reform initiatives, external reviews, and changes in policy
direction. As one observer noted in Science magazine in 1994: “Every administration sets up a panel to review the national labs. The problem is that nothing is done.”
The constant managerial turnover over the years has generated nearly continuous structural reorganizations and repeated security policy reversals. Over the last
dozen years, DOE has averaged some kind of major departmental shake–up every two to three years. During that time, security and counterintelligence
responsibilities have been “punted” from one office to the next.
CULTURE AND ATTITUDES
In the course of this inquiry, many officials interviewed by the PFIAB panel cited the scientific culture of the weapons laboratories as a factor that complicates,
perhaps even undermines, the ability of the Department to consistently implement its security procedures. Although there seemed to be no universally accepted
definition of the culture, nearly everyone agreed that it is distinct and pervasive.
One facet of the culture mentioned more than others is an arrogance borne of the simple fact that nuclear researchers specialize in one of the world’s most advanced,
challenging, and esoteric fields of knowledge. Nuclear physicists, by definition, are required to think in literally other dimensions not accessible to laymen. Thus it is
not surprising that they might bridle under the restraints and regulations of administrators and bureaucrats who do not entirely comprehend the precise nature of the
operation being managed.
Operating within a large, complex bureaucracy with transient leaders would only tend to accentuate a scientist’s sense of intellectual superiority: if administrators have
little more than a vague sense of the contours of a research project, they are likely to have little basis to know which rules and regulations constitute unreasonable
burdens on the researchers’ activities.
With respect to at least some security issues, the potential for conflicts over priorities is obvious. For example, how are security officials to weigh the risks of
unauthorized disclosures during international exchanges if they have only a general familiarity with the cryptic jargon used by the scientists who might participate?
The prevailing culture of the weapons labs is widely perceived as contributing to security and counterintelligence problems. At the very least, restoring public
confidence in the ability of the labs to protect nuclear secrets will require a thorough reappraisal of the culture within them.
CHANGING TIMES, CHANGING MISSIONS
The external pressures placed on the Department of Energy in general, and the weapons labs in particular, are also worth noting. For more than 50 years, America’s
nuclear researchers have operated in a maelstrom of shifting and often contradictory attitudes. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, nuclear discoveries were
simultaneously hailed as a destructive scourge and a panacea for a wide array of mankind’s problems. The production of nuclear arms was regarded during the
1950s and 1960s as one of the best indices of international power and the strength of the nation’s military deterrent.
During the 1970s, the nation’s leadership turned to nuclear researchers for solutions to the energy crisis at the same time that the general public was becoming more
alarmed about the nuclear buildup and the environmental implications of nuclear facilities.
Over the past 20 years, some in Congress have repeatedly called for the dissolution of the Department of Energy, which has undoubtedly been a distraction to those
trying to make long–term decisions affecting the scope and direction of the research at the labs. And in the aftermath of the Cold War, the Congress has looked to
the nation’s nuclear weapons labs to help in stabilizing or dismantling nuclear stockpiles in other nations.
Each time that the nation’s leadership has made a major change in the Department’s priorities or added another mission, it has placed additional pressure on a
government agency already struggling to preserve and expand one of its most challenging historical roles: guarantor of the safety, security, and reliability of the
nation’s nuclear weapons.
RECURRING VULNERABILITIES
Over the past 20 years, six DOE security issues have received the most scrutiny and criticism from both internal and external reviewers: long–term security planning
and policy implementation; physical security over facilities and property; screening and monitoring of personnel; protection of classified and sensitive information,
particularly information that is stored electronically in the Department’s computers; accounting for nuclear materials; and the foreign visitors’ programs.
MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING
Management of security and counterintelligence has suffered from chronic problems since the creation of the Department of Energy in 1977.
During the past decade, the mismatch between DOE’s security programs and the severity of the threats faced by the Department grew more pronounced. While the
number of nations possessing, developing, or seeking weapons of mass destruction continued to rise, America’s reliance on foreign scientists and engineers
dramatically increased, and warnings mounted about the espionage goals of other nations, DOE spending on safe-guards and security decreased by roughly
one–third.1
The widening gap between the level of security and the severity of the threat resulted in cases where sensitive nuclear weapons information was certainly lost to
espionage. In countless other instances, such information was left vulnerable to theft or duplication for long periods, and the extent to which these serious lapses may
have damaged American security is incalculable. DOE’s failure to respond to warnings from its own analysts, much less independent sources, underscores the depth
of its managerial weakness and inability to implement legitimate policies regarding well–founded threats.
_________________________________________
A Sample of Security Issues
MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING
Decentralized decisionmaking undermines
consistency of policies.
Lack of control for security budget has allowed
diversion of funds to other priorities.
Department leaders with little experience in
security and intelligence.
Lack of accountability.
PHYSICAL SECURITY
Training insufficient for some security personnel.
Nuclear materials stored in aging buildings not
designed for containment purposes.
Recurring problems involving lost or stolen
property.
Poor management results in unnecessary training
and purchasing costs.
PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCES
Extended lags in obtaining clearances, reinvestigating
backgrounds, and terminating clearance
privileges for former employees.
Some contractors not adequately investigated
or subject to drug & substance abuse policies.
Lack of uniform procedures and accurate data.
Inadequate pre–employment screening.
More clearances granted than necessary.
PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
Poor labeling and tracking of computer media
containing classified information.
Problems with lax enforcement of password
policies.
Network, email, and Internet connections make
transfer of large amounts of data easier.
ACCOUNTING FOR NUCLEAR MATERIALS
Chronic problems in devising and operating an
accurate accounting system of tracking stocks
and flows of nuclear materials.
FOREIGN VISITORS
Weak systems for tracking visits and screening
backgrounds of visiting scientists.
Decentralization makes monitoring of discussions
on sensitive topics difficult.
During the mid–1980s, the predominant concern of DOE officials was improving the physical security of the nuclear weapons laboratories and plants. Following a
January 1983 report2 that outlined vulnerabilities of the weapons labs to terrorism, the Department embarked on a five–year program of construction and purchases
that would see its overall safeguards and security budget roughly double and its spending on upgrades nearly triple. Included was money for additional guards,
security training, helicopters, fortified guard towers, vehicle barriers, emergency planning, and advanced alarm systems.3
Improving physical security in a wide array of nuclear weapons facilities whose replacement value was an estimated $100 billion4 , proved to be difficult. Reports
through the late 1980s and early 1990s continued to highlight deficiencies in the management of physical security. In the late 1980s, priorities began to shift
somewhat. Listening devices were discovered in weapons–related facilities,5 and a 1990 study advised the Department leadership of an intensifying threat from
foreign espionage. Less and less able to rely on the former Soviet Union to supply technology and resources, an increasing number of states embarked on campaigns
to bridge the economic and technological gap with the United States by developing indigenous capabilities in high technology areas. The study noted that the freer
movement of goods, services and information in a less hostile world “intensified the prospects and opportunities for espionage as missing pieces of critically needed
information became more easily identified.”6
An intelligence report further highlighted the changing foreign threat to the labs by noting that “new threats are emerging from nontraditional adversaries who target
issues key to U.S. national security. DOE facilities and personnel remain priority targets for hostile intelligence collection.”7 Anecdotal evidence corroborates, and
intelligence assessments agree, that foreign powers stepped up targeting of DOE during the early 1990s. (See Classified Appendix) While this threat may have been
taken seriously at the highest levels of the DOE, it was not uniform throughout the Department.
A former FBI senior official noted in discussions with the PFIAB investigative panel that DOE lab scientists during these years appeared naive about the level of
sophistication of the nontraditional threat posed by Chinese intelligence collection. The trend in openness to foreign visitors and visits does not indicate any sense of
heightened wariness. A 1997 GAO report concluded that from mid–1988 to the mid–1990s, the number of foreign visitors to key weapons labs increased from
3,800 to 5,900 annually and sensitive country visitors increased from 500 to more than 1,600.8 Meanwhile, the DOE budget for counterintelligence was in
near–constant decline.
How Long Does It Take?
Each year DOE security officials compile audits to identify security lapses and vulnerabilities in the facilities and procedures of the nuclear weapons laboratories
and plants. The following year, they report on whether the problems have been addressed. Given the sensitivity of what was being protected—information
about how to build, miniaturize, store, and maximize the destructiveness of nuclear weapons—the numbers logged in the audits are remarkable:
11
No. of months a DOE employee was dead before Department officials realized four documents with CLASSIFIED and RESTRICTED DATA were
still assigned to him.
20
No. of months before DOE officials could ensure that improperly stored classified computer media had been properly safeguarded.
24
No. of months it took to order security labels (SECRET, TOP SECRET, etc.) for mislabeled software.
31
No. of months that 2,750 out of 3,000 non-classified computer terminals were connected and being used on a classified network.
31
No. of months to write and approve a network security plan.
35
No. of months it took DOE officials to write a work order to replace a lock at a weapons lab facility containing sensitive nuclear information.
45
No. of months taken to correct a broken doorknob that was sticking in an open position and allowing access to sensitive areas.
51
No. of months to correct mistake that allowed secure telephone cryptographic materials to go improperly safeguarded.
?
No. of months before security audit team discovered that the main telephone frame room door at a weapons lab had been forced open and the lock
destroyed.
SOURCE: DEPT. OF ENERGY
As noted in the previous chapter, federal officials in charge of oversight of nuclear weapons laboratories have historically allowed decisionmaking on basic aspects of
security to be decentralized and diffuse. With their budget spread piecemeal throughout a number of offices, security and counterintelligence officials often found
themselves with a weak voice in internal bureaucratic battles and an inability to muster the authority to accomplish its goals. Indeed, an excerpt from a history of the
early years of the Atomic Energy Commission, reads much like recent studies:
Admiral Gingrich, who had just resigned as director of security [in 1949], had expressed to the Joint Committee [on Atomic Energy] a lack of
confidence in the Commission’s security program. Gingrich complained that decentralization of administrative functions to the field offices had left him
with little more than a staff function at headquarters; even there, he said, he did not control all the activities that seemed properly to belong to the
director of security.9
More than 30 years later, decentralization still posed a problem for security managers. An internal DOE report in 1990 found that the Department lacked a
comprehensive approach to management of threats and dissemination of information about them.10 A DOE annual report in 1992 found that security “has suffered
from a lack of management focus and inconsistent procedural execution throughout the DOE complex. The result is that personnel are seldom held responsible for
their disregard, either intentional or unintentional, of security requirements.”11
The counterintelligence effort at DOE in the late 1980s and mid–1990s was in its infancy and grossly underfunded. Although the Department could have filled its gap
in some areas, such as counterintelligence information, through cooperation with the broader intelligence community, PFIAB research and interviews indicate that
DOE headquarters’ relationship with the FBI—the United States’ primary domestic CI organization—was strained at best.
DOE requested an FBI agent detailee in 1988 to assist in developing a CI program, but the agent found that DOE failed to provide management support or access
to senior DOE decisionmakers. A formal relationship with the FBI was apparently not established until 1992: a Memorandum of Understanding between the FBI
and DOE on respective responsibilities concerning the coordination and conduct of CI activities in the United States. However, in 1994 two FBI detailees assigned
to DOE complained about their limited access and were pulled back to FBI because of a “lack of control of the CI program by DOE headquarters which resulted in
futile attempts to better manage the issue of foreign visitors at the laboratories.”12
________________________________
We asked a number of DOE officials to
whom they report, to whom they were
responsible. Invariably, their answer
was: “It depends.”
The haphazard assortment of agencies and missions folded into DOE has become so confusing as to become a running joke within the institution. In the course of the
panel’s research and interviews, rare were the senior officials who expressed any sort of confidence in their understanding of the extent of the agency’s operations,
facilities, or procedures. Time and again, PFIAB panel members posed the elementary questions to senior DOE officials. To whom do you report? To whom are
you accountable? The answer, invariably, was: “It depends.”
DOE’s relationship with the broader intelligence community was not well–defined until the mid–1990s. Coordination between DOE CI elements and the broader
intelligence community, according to a 1992 intelligence report, was hampered from the 1980s through the early 1990s by DOE managers’ inadequate
understanding of the intelligence community.13 The Department did not become a core member of the National Counterintelligence Policy Board (established in
1994 under PDD-24) until 1997.
Over much of the past decade, rather than a heightened sensitivity to espionage threats recognized widely throughout the intelligence community, DOE lab officials
have operated in an environment that allowed them to be sanguine, if not skeptical. Numerous DOE officials interviewed by the PFIAB panel stated that they
believed that the threat perception was weakened further during the administration of Secretary O’Leary, who advanced the labs openness policies and downgraded
security as an issue by terminating some security programs instituted by her predecessor.
Even when the CI budget was expanded in the late–1990s, the expenditures fell short of the projected increases. In Fiscal Year 1997, for example, DOE’s CI
budget was $3.7 million but the actual expenditures on CI were only two–thirds of that level, $2.3 million. Shortly before the 1997 GAO and FBI reports on DOE’s
counterintelligence posture were issued, DOE began instituting changes to beef up its counterintelligence and foreign intelligence analytic capabilities.14
When DOE did devote its considerable resources to security, it too often faltered in implementation. A report to the Secretary in January 1994 noted “growing
confusion within the Department with respect to Headquarters’ guidance for safeguards and security. At this time, there is no single office at Headquarters
responsible for the safeguards and security program. Most recently, a number of program offices have substantially expanded their safeguards and security staff to
office–size organizations. These multiple safeguards and security offices have resulted in duplication of guidance, unnecessary requests for information and
clarification, and inefficient program execution. Unchecked, this counterproductive tendency threatens the success of the overall safeguards and security effort.”15
A 1996 DOE Inspector General report found that security personnel at the weapons programs had purchased and stockpiled far more firepower—ranging from
handguns and rifles to submachine guns and grenade launchers—than could ever be used in an actual emergency. The Oak Ridge facilities had more than three
weapons per armed security officer—on and off duty. Los Alamos National Laboratory had more than four.16
____________________________________
Foreign agents could probably not
shoot their way into U.S. weapons laboratories.
But they could apply for an
access pass to walk in and strike up a
conversation.
Around the same time, GAO security audits of the research laboratories at these sites found lax procedures for issuing access passes to secure areas, inadequate
prescreening of the more than 1,500 visitors from sensitive countries that visited the weapons laboratories annually, and poor tracking of the content of discussions
with foreign visitors. The implication: foreign agents could probably not shoot their way past the concertina wires and bolted doors to seize secrets from U.S.
weapons laboratories, but they would not need to do so. They could probably apply for an access pass, walk in the front door, and strike up a conversation.
PHYSICAL SECURITY
The physical security of the Department of Energy’s weapons–related programs is roughly divided into two essential functions: tracking and control over the property
and equipment within the weapons-related laboratories, and keeping unwarranted intruders out, often referred to as the realm of “guns, guards, and gates.”
The general approach to security, of course, was defined by the emphasis on secrecy associated with nuclear weapons program during World War II. Los Alamos
National Laboratory was created as a “closed city”—a community with a high degree of self-sufficiency, clearly defined and protected boundaries, and a minimum of
ingress from and egress to the outer world. Although the community is no longer “closed,” the weapons laboratories at Los Alamos, like those at the other national
laboratories, still retain formidable physical protections and barriers. In examining the history of the laboratories, the panel found only a few instances where an
outsider could successfully penetrate the grounds of an operation by destruction of a physical safeguard or direct violent assault.
__________________________________
Clearances to secure DOE areas have
been granted simply for convenience,
such as to reduce the length of an
employee’s walk from the car to the
office each morning.
In visits to several of the weapons laboratories, the members of the Special Investigative Panel were impressed by the great amount of attention and investment
devoted to perimeter control, weaponry, and security of building entrances and exits. Indeed, one cannot help but be struck by the forbidding and formidable
garrison–type atmosphere that is prevalent at many of the facilities: barbed wire, chain–link fences, electronic sensors, and surveillance cameras. Further, the panel
recognizes that the labs themselves have developed and produced some of the most sophisticated technical security devices in the world. Nonetheless, DOE reports
and external reviews since at least 1984 have continued to raise concerns about aging security systems.17
Management of the secure environments at the laboratories has posed more serious problems. As noted earlier, DOE may be spending too much money in some
areas, buying more weapons than could conceivably be used in an emergency situation. In other cases, it may be spending too little. Budget cuts in the early and
mid-1990s led to 40 to 50 percent declines in officer strength and over-reliance on local law enforcement. Resources became so low that normal protective force
operations required “the use of overtime scheduling to accomplish routine site protection.”18 GAO has found an assortment of problems at Los Alamos over the past
decade: security personnel failed basic tests in such tasks as firing weapons, using a baton, or handcuffing a suspect, and inaccurate and incomplete records were
kept on security training.19 Other DOE facilities have had substantial problems in man-agement of physical property.
In 1990, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory could not account for 16 percent of its inventory of government equipment, acquired at a cost $18.6
million.20
In 1993, DOE sold 57 components of nuclear reprocessing equipment and associated documents, including blueprints, to an Idaho salvage dealer.
Much of what was sold was subsequently found to be potentially useful to any nation attempting to develop or advance its own reprocessing
operation.21
Following a GAO report in 1994, which found that the Rocky Flats facility was unable to account for large pieces of equipment such as forklifts and a
semitrailer, some $21 million in inventory was written off.22
DOE had begun to consolidate its growing stockpile of sensitive nuclear material by 1992, but a 1997 DOE report to the Secretary found that significant quantities
of the material “remain in aging buildings and structures, ranging in age from 12 to 50 years, that were never intended for use as storage facilities for extended
periods.”23
SCREENING AND MONITORING OF PERSONNEL
Insider threats to security have been a chronic problem at the nation’s weapons laboratories. From the earliest years, the importance of the labs’ missions and their
decentralized structure have had an uneasy coexistence with the need for thorough background investigations of researchers and personnel needing access to
sensitive areas and information.
In 1947, the incoming director of security for the AEC was greeted with a backlog of more than 13,000 background investigations and a process where clearances
had been dispersed to field offices that operated with few formal guidelines.24
Forty years later, GAO found that the backlog of personnel security investigations had increased more than nine-fold, to more than 120,000. Moreover, many
clearances recorded as valid in the Department’s records should have been terminated years before.25
____________________________________
Even after DOE discovered listening
devices in some of its weapons
laboratories, security audits found that
thousands of “Q” clearances were being
given to inappropriate personnel.26
The research of the PFIAB panel found that problems with personnel security clearances, while mitigated in some aspects, have persisted to an alarming degree.
From the mid–1980s through the mid–1990s, the DOE Inspector General repeatedly warned Department officials that personnel were receiving clearances that
were much higher than warranted and that out-dated clearances were not being withdrawn on a timely basis. The issue became more urgent with the discovery of a
clandestine surveillance device at a nuclear facility.27
But problems persisted. DOE Inspector General reports in 1990 and 1991 found that one of the weapons laboratories had granted “Q” clearances (which provide
access to U.S. government nuclear weapons data) to more than 2,000 employees who did not need access to classified information.28 A 1992 report to the
Secretary of Energy noted that “DOE grants clearances requested by its three major defense program sponsored labs based on lab policies to clear all employees
regardless of whether actual access to classified interests is required for job performance.”29
Three years later, a review of personnel security informed the Secretary there were “individuals who held security clearances for convenience only and limited
security clearances to those individuals requiring direct access to classified matter or [special nuclear materials] to perform official duties.”30
More recent evidence is no more reassuring. A counterintelligence investigation at a nuclear facility discovered that the subject of an inquiry had been granted a “Q”
clearance simply to avoid the delay caused by the normal processing of a visit.31 That same year, an illegal telephone wiretap was discovered at the same lab. The
employee who installed it confessed, but was not prosecuted by the government.32
PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED AND SENSITIVE INFORMATION
Two vulnerabilities regarding classified and sensitive information at DOE have recurred repeatedly throughout the past 20 years: inappropriate release of classified
information, either directly through inadvertence or indirectly through improper declassification; and the increasing mobility of classified and sensitive information
through electronic media, such as computers.
As computers have progressed from the large mainframes of the 1950s and 1960s to desktop models in the 1980s and decentralized networks in the 1990s, it has
become progressively easier for individuals to retrieve and transport large amounts of data from one location to another. This has presented an obvious problem for
secure environments. GAO found in 1991 that DOE inspections revealed more than 220 security weaknesses in computer systems across 16 facilities. Examples
included a lack of management plans, inadequate access controls, and failures to test for compliance with security procedures.33
As a 1996 DOE report to the President said, “adversaries no longer have to scale a fence, defeat sensors, or bypass armed guards to steal nuclear or leading–edge
‘know-how’ or to shut down our critical infrastructure. They merely have to defeat the less ominous obstacles of cyber–defense.”34
_____________________________________
Computer systems at some DOE
facilities were so easy to access that
even Department analysts likened them
to “automatic teller machines, [allowing]
unauthorized withdrawals at our
nation’s expense.”
DOE’s cyber–defenses were, in fact, found to be “less ominous obstacles.” In 1994, an internal DOE review found that despite security improvement “users of
unclassified computers continue to compromise classified information due to ongoing inadequacies in user awareness training, adherence to procedures, enforcement
of security policies, and DOE and [lab] line management oversight.”35 Also in 1994, a report to the Energy Secretary cited five areas of concern: “failure to properly
accredit systems processing classified information, lack of controls to provide access authorities and proper password management; no configuration management;
improper labeling of magnetic media; and failure to perform management reviews.”36
Apparently, the warnings were to no avail. A year later, the annual report to the Secretary noted: “Overall, findings and surveys, much like last year, continue to
reflect deficiencies in self–inspections and procedural requirements or inappropriate or inadequate site guidance … In the area of classified matter protection and
control, like last year, marking, accountability, protection, and storage deficiencies are most numerous.”37
Some reports made extra efforts to puncture through the fog of bureaucratic language. A 1995 report to the President said: “By placing sensitive information on
information systems, we increase the likelihood that inimicable interests, external and internal, will treat those systems as virtual automatic teller machines, making
unauthorized withdrawals at our nation’s expenses.” Indeed, a report found security breaches at one of the major weapons facility in which documents with
unclassified but sensitive information “were found to be stored on systems that were readily accessible to anyone with Internet access.”38 In other instances,
personnel were found to be sending classified information to outsiders via an unclassified email system.39
Ahead of its Time
In 1986, the DOE Office of Safeguards and Quality Assessment issued an inspection report on a weapons lab that warned of shortcomings in computer
security and noted that the “ability of [a] user to deliberately declassify a classified file without detection and move classified information from the secure
partition to the open partition can be made available to any authorized user either on or off site.”40
The warning turned out to be on the mark. In April of this year, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson issued a statement: “While I cannot comment on the specifics,
I can confirm that classified nuclear weapons computer codes at Los Alamos were transferred to an unclassified computer system. This kind of egregious
security breach is absolutely unacceptable ... .”
Even though the hard evidence points to only sporadic penetrations of the labs by foreign intelligence services (see classified appendix), volumes of sensitive and
classified information may have been lost over the years—via discarded or purloined documents; uninformed and often improperly vetted employees, and a maze of
uncontrolled computer links. In one recent case discovered by PFIAB, lab officials initially refused to rectify a security vulnerability because “no probability is
assigned to [a loss of sensitive information], just the allegation that it is possible.”41
As recent as last year’s annual DOE report to the President, security analysts were finding “numerous incidents of classified information being placed on unclassified
systems, including several since the development of a corrective action plan in July 1998.”42
TRACKING OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS: HOW MUCH MUF?
MUF stands for “materials unaccounted for,” the official term used until the late 1970s for discrepancies in the amount of nuclear materials that can be physically
located in inventory versus the amount noted in Department records. MUF (now termed with the more politic phrase “inventory differences”) has been a recurring
concern—and debate—in the nuclear research field since the beginning. The question at the center of the debate: if large quantities of nuclear material are impossible
to measure with absolute precision, what constitutes a significant loss?
As in many questions, the answer depends on whom you ask. Officials of nuclear research facilities have argued that the scale and complexity of the processing and
handling of nuclear material inevitably result in losses that are detectable but inconsequential. Outside observers have tended to be less sanguine about what
constitutes a significant loss from a security standpoint.
In 1976, the General Accounting Office reported that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Energy Research and Development Administration (DOE’s
predecessor) could not account for 8,000 pounds of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. Officials of the two agencies responded that part of the accounting
discrepancy could be ascribed to the statistical margin of error in their measuring equipment, the rest was probably dregs created during processing and left in
machinery parts, wiping cloths, and scrap items.43
Critics of the agencies have pointed out that thieves could easily use the variance in statistical measures to cover their tracks, stealing an increment during each
measuring period that falls just within the margin of error. They have also pointed out that if Department records are not accurate, it is impossible for anyone to
estimate the stock of nuclear material at any given point, much less the difference between two levels as it proceeds from one stage of the nuclear cycle to the next.
In December 1994, the Department released updated figures for the cumulative amount of MUF or inventory difference for the 50-year period beginning in 1944.
The cumulative figure: 6,174 pounds. Of that amount, a cumulative total of about 10 pounds was ascribed to “accidental losses” and “approved write-offs.”44
GAO has continued to highlight the issue since DOE has become the steward of the nation’s nuclear weapons laboratories. GAO published a report in 1991
criticizing the insufficiency of the Department’s measuring systems and handling procedures45 ; in 1994, criticizing its methods of tracking exported nuclear material;46
and in 1995, for installing a new system that was allegedly faulty.47
Even if accurate systems of measurement and accounting had been in place, it is not clear whether DOE officials would have been qualified to manage them
effectively. A 1995 report to the President warned that “severe budget reductions, diminished technical resources, increased responsibilities, and reduced mission
training ... have undermined protection of special nuclear material and restricted data.”48
Last year, a report by an external review panel found “a lack of nuclear physical security expertise at all levels in the oversight process; ad hoc structuring of
safeguards and security functions throughout the Department, and placement of oversight functions in positions which constrain their effectiveness.”49
The dispute over the accuracy of nuclear measurements, of course, is beyond the technical capabilities of this panel to resolve. But the panel members do believe that
its persistence and the low priority given to the issue relative to other DOE scientific goals is indicative of the insti-tutional attitude that DOE has had toward security:
nonscientists have a poor understanding of all things nuclear, so their judgments about acceptable levels of risk are suspect prima facie.
FOREIGN VISITORS AND ASSIGNMENTS PROGRAM
True to the tradition of international partnership molded by the experiences of the Manhattan Project, the weapons labs have remained a reservoir of the best
international scientific talent. Recent examples abound: a supercomputing team from Oak Ridge National Lab, made up of three PRC citizens and a Hungarian,
recently won the Gordon Bell Prize; a Bulgarian and a Canadian, both world-class scientists, are helping Lawrence Livermore National Lab solve problems in fluid
dynamics; a Spanish scientist, also at Livermore, is collaborating with colleagues on laser propagation.
But for more than a decade, the increasing prominence of foreign visitors in the weapons labs has increased concern about security risks. The PFIAB panel found
that as early as 1985, the DCI raised concerns about the foreign visitors’ program with the Energy Secretary. A year later, researchers conducting internal DOE
review could find only scant data on the number and composition of foreign nationals at the weapons labs. Although intelligence officials drafted suggestions for
DOE’s foreign visitor control program, PFIAB found little evidence of reform efforts until the tenure of Secretary Watkins.
A 1988 GAO report cited DOE for failing “to obtain timely and adequate information on foreign visitors before allowing them access to the laboratories.” The GAO
found three cases where DOE allowed visitors with questionable backgrounds—possible foreign agents—access to the labs. In addition, the GAO found that about
10 percent of 637 visitors from sensitive countries were associated with foreign organizations suspected of conducting nuclear weapons activities but DOE did not
request background data on them prior to their visit. DOE also had not conducted its own review of the visit and assignment program at the weapons labs despite
the DOE requirement to conduct audits or reviews at a minimum of every five years. Moreover, GAO reported that few post–visit or host reports required by DOE
Order 12402 were submitted within 30 days of the visitors’ departure and some were never completed.50
The following year, DOE revised its foreign visitor policy and commissioned an external study on the extent and significance of the foreign visitor problem. DOE’s
effort to track and vet visitors, however, still lagged well behind the expansion of the visitor program, allowing foreigners with suspicious backgrounds to gain access
to weapons facilities. A study published in June 1990 indicated DOE had a “crippling lack of essential data, most notably no centralized, retrievable listing of foreign
national visitors to government facilities.”51
By September, 1992, DOE had instituted Visitor Assignment Management System (VAMS) databases, used to track visitors and assignees requesting to visit DOE.
The system, however, failed to provide links between the labs that could be used for CI analysis and cross-checking of prospective visitors. Moreover, labs
frequently did not even use the database and failed to enter visitor information. Instead, each lab developed its own computer program independently.
Reviews of security determined that, despite an increase of more than 50 percent in foreign visits to the labs from the mid–1980s to the mid–1990s, DOE controls
on foreign visitors actually weakened in two critical areas: screening for visitors that may pose security risks, and monitoring the content of discussions that might
touch on classified information.
In 1994, DOE headquarters delegated greater authority to approve nonsensitive country visitors to the laboratories, approving a partial exception for Los Alamos
and Sandia National Laboratories to forego background checks to help “reduce costs and processing backlogs.” This resulted in almost automatic approval of some
foreign visitors and fewer background checks. The FBI and GAO subsequently found that “questionable visitors, including suspected foreign intelligence agents, had
access to the laboratories without DOE and/or laboratory officials’ advance knowledge of the visitors’ backgrounds.”52
Changes in records checks over the past decade also made it easier for individuals from sensitive countries to gain access to the laboratories. In 1988, for example,
all visitors from Communist countries required records checks regardless of the purpose of the visit. By 1996, records checks were only required for visitors from
sensitive countries who visited secure areas or discussed sensitive subjects.
An internal DOE task force in 1996 determined that the Department’s definitions of sensitive topics were not specific enough to be useful. It directed the DOE office
of intelligence to develop a new methodology for defining sensitive topics, but did not set a due date. The 1996 group also called for a Deputy Secretary–level
review of foreign visits and assignments to be completed by June 1997.53 The PFIAB panel found no evidence to suggest that these tasks were accomplished.
In 1997, GAO found that DOE lacked clear criteria for identifying visits that involve sensitive subjects, U.S. scientists may have discussed sensitive subjects with
foreign nationals without DOE’s knowledge or approval; and the Department’s counterintelligence program had failed to produce comprehensive threat assessments
that would identify likely facilities, technologies, and programs targeted by foreign intelligence.54 The study found that records checks were still not being conducted
regularly on foreign visitors from sensitive countries.55 Last year, 7,600 foreign scientists paid visits to the weapons labs.56 Of that total, about 34 percent were from
countries that are designated “sensitive” by the Department of Energy—meaning they represent a hostile intelligence threat. The GAO reported last year that foreign
nationals had been allowed after-hours and unescorted access to buildings.57
Administration Track Records
CARTER
(Schlesinger: Aug '77-Aug '79; Duncan: Aug '79-Jan '81)
'77 DOE established … First visiting U.S. scientists to China in '79 and '80 face Chinese elicitation effort. …Late 1970s FBI investigates possible espionage
at a lab. …'80 GAO reports on problems safeguarding against the spread of nuclear weapons technology.
REAGAN I
(Edwards: Jan '81-Nov '82; Hodel: Nov '82-Feb '85; Herrington: Feb '85- )
'82 DOE's Inspection and Evaluation program formed …GAO reports safeguards and security of weapons labs not adequate, recommends independent
assessments program. …'83 DOE issues threat guidance to provide a “consistent basis" for identifying vulnerabilities. …Memo to DOE, DOD states President
has "decided to strengthen WH role … concerning the security of U.S. nuclear facilities."… President signs National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) on
DOE security. … DOE Safeguards and Security Steering Group formed at President's direction to oversee fulfillment of physical security improvements …
GAO reports security concerns at Rocky Flats facility. … DOE conducts eight internal security inspections at weapons facilities and DOE HQ; provides
criticisms and recommendations to DOE management. … '84 DOE's Central Training Academy established for protective force personnel.
REAGAN II
(Herrington: Feb '85-Jan '89)
'86 Rep. Dingell letter to President re: lab security vulnerabilities, management problems and lack of confidence in DOE. … Four GAO reports on DOE
security and CI problems … External report requested by DOE finds problems with management of foreign visitors and adequate security. …'87 Three GAO
reports on DOE highlight the transfer of technology to proliferating nations and inefficient security clearance program. …Seven internal DOE security
inspections criticize management and security practices in '87-'88. …DOE initiates the Personnel Security Assurance Program (PSAP) … DOE focuses on
insider protection and strengthens classified document controls. …Three DOE IG reports about security clearance problems from '86-'88. …'88 Intelligence
Community paper reflects concerns with international scientific exchanges at the DOE labs. … President signs NSDD on Nuclear Weapons Safety, Security,
and Control. … FBI detailee to DOE cites inaccessibility to senior DOE managers. …President states "Improved nuclear security is an important legacy for us
to leave the next administration;" DOE official opines that Energy has done "essentially all that can be done against the outsider threat." … Senate Intelligence
Committee staff briefed on CI activities at labs. … Four GAO reports address DOE security and counter-intelligence problems, including: major weaknesses in
foreign visitor controls at labs, and foreign agents possibly gaining access to labs.
BUSH
(Watkins: Mar '89-Jan '93)
'89 New Secretary concerned about 1988 GAO criticism of DOE CI/security, defers DOE annual report on security until he reviews issue; NSC concurs. …
GAO finds insufficient control over weapons-related information and technology. …'90 Four IG reports on security … Secretary of Energy Advisory Board
(SEAB) chartered … Interagency CI group prepares assessment of intelligence threat to government facilities from visiting foreign nationals. …GAO cites lack
of clear, concise physical security standards and inconsistent material measurements at labs. … Freeze Task Force critical of split management of classified and
unclassified computer security; finds direction, coordination, conduct and oversight of safeguards and security activities throughout DOE warrant structural
changes. …External CI review highlights DOE's inability to manage comprehensive approach to foreign threat; inadequate oversight, control over secret
document inventory; uncoordinated computer security responsibilities. …'91 Four IG reports criticize security…GAO reports property, classified document
control problems at LLNL; 10,000 documents unaccounted; inability of DOE to track, monitor, and correct security deficiencies … '87, '89, and '91 GAO
reports foreign countries routinely obtaining unclassified but sensitive information that could assist nuclear programs. …Memo to President highlights previous
security problems at DOE, Secretary's efforts to fix the deficiencies. …'92 Two IG reports on security…SSCI-requested CI assessment finds DOE
headquarters lacks authority to direct labs, CI resources, and current threat information. …GAO cites weak internal security oversight controls; incomplete
safeguards and security planning at DOE facilities. …DOE Order on CI issued. …DOE and FBI formalize relationship for conduct of CI activities. …Internal
security report to Secretary finds "personnel are seldom held responsible for their disregard, either intentional or unintentional, of security requirements." …
Another report finds "Problems in management and oversight represent the most significant weakness" for the Department…and "security systems continue to
be plagued with potential single point failures."
ASSESSMENTS
RESPONSIBILITY
While cultural, structural, and historical problems have all figured into the management and security and counterintelligence failures of DOE, they should not be
construed as an excuse for the deplorable irresponsibility within the agency, the pattern of inaction from those charged with implementation of policies, or the
inconsistency of those in leadership positions. The panel identified numerous instances in which individuals were presented with glaring problems yet responded with
foot–dragging, finger–pointing, bland reassurances, obfuscations, and even misrepresentations.
The record of inattention and “false start” reforms goes back to the beginning of DOE. There have been several Presidents; National Security Advisors, Energy
Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, and Lab Directors; scores of DOE Office Directors and Lab managers; and a multitude of Energy
Department bureaucrats and Lab scientists who all must shoulder the responsibility and accountability.
As noted above, severe lapses in the security of the nation’s most critical technology, data, and materials were manifest at the creation of the DOE more than 20
years ago. Many, if not most, of the problems were identified repeatedly. Still, reforms flagged amid a lack of discipline and accountability. The fact that virtually
every one of those problems persisted—indeed, many of the problems still exist—indicates a lack of sufficient attention by every President, Energy Secretary, and
Congress.
This determination is in no way a capitulation to the standard of “everyone is responsible, therefore no one is responsible.” Quite the contrary. Even a casual reading
of the open–source reports on the Department’s problems presents one with a compelling narrative of incompetency that should have merited the aggressive action
of the nation’s leadership. Few transgressions could violate the national trust more than inattention to one’s direct responsibility for controlling the technology of
weapons of mass destruction.
The PFIAB panel was not empowered, nor was it charged, to make determinations of whether specific acts of espionage or malfeasance occurred regarding alleged
security lapses at the weapons labs. Nor was it tasked to issue performance appraisals of the various Presidents, Energy Secretaries, or members of the
Congressional leadership during their respective terms in office. However, an inquiry into the extent to which the system of administrative accountability and
responsibility broke down at various times in history has been necessary to fulfill our charter. In fairness, we have tried to examine the nature of the security problems
at DOE’s weapons labs in many respects and at many levels, ranging from the circumstances of individuals and the dynamics of group behavior to the effectiveness
of mid–level management, the clarity of the laws and regulations affecting the Department, and the effectiveness of leadership initiatives.
THE RECORD OF THE CLINTON TEAM
To its credit, in the past two years the Clinton Administration has proposed and begun to implement some of the most far–reaching reforms in DOE’s history. The
1998 Presidential Decision Directive on DOE counterintelligence (PDD-61) and Secretary Richardson’s initiatives are both substantial and positive steps. We offer
an analysis of some of these initiatives, and their likelihood of success, elsewhere in this chapter and elsewhere in this report.
However, the speed and sweep of the Administration’s ongoing response does not absolve it of its responsibility in years past. At the outset of the Clinton
Administration—in 1993, when it inherited responsibility for DOE and the glaring record of mismanagement of the weapons laboratories—the incoming leadership
did not give the security and counterintelligence problems at the labs the priority and attention they warranted. It will be incumbent on the DOE transition team for the
incoming administration in 2001 to pay particular heed to these issues.
While the track record of previous administrations’ responses to DOE’s problems is mixed (see box on previous administrations, on pp. 26-27), the panel members
believe that the gravity of the security and counterintelligence mismanagement at the Department will, and should, overshadow post facto claims of due diligence by
any administration—including the current one. Asserting that the degree of failure or success with DOE from one administration to the next is relative is, one might
say, gilding a figleaf.
The fact is that each successive administration had more evidence of DOE’s systemic failures in hand: the Reagan Administration arrived to find several years’ worth
of troubling evidence from the Carter, Ford, and Nixon years; the evidence had mounted higher by the time that the Bush Administration took over; and higher still
when the Clinton Administration came in. The Clinton Administration has acted forcefully, but it took pressure from below and outside the Administration to get the
attention of the leadership, and there is some evidence to raise questions about whether its actions came later than they should have, given the course of events that
led the recent flurry of activity.
Clinton Administration Track Record
O’Leary: Jan ’93–Jan ’97
’93 New Secretary works to make labs more open…launches major declassification effort. … DOE ’92 Annual Report to President does not mention
security problems highlighted same year in reports to Secretary .… GAO criticizes DOE’s ineffective management of personnel security cases. …Four IG
reports on security…Internal report to Secretary on computer security uncovers lack of access controls; no configuration management; failure to perform
management reviews. …’94 Three IG reports on security…FBI detailees to DOE recalled because of “lack of control of the CI program by DOE HQ.”
…Internal report finds classified and unclassified information on lab computer network. …GAO reports computer security deficiencies found in 1985 at six
facilities still not fixed. …’95 Four IG reports on security…Congress considers numerous bills between ’95–’99 to abolish DOE. … “Galvin Task Force”
offers SEAB options for change within the labs. … “Walk-in” provides documents containing sensitive U.S. nuclear information. …DOE officials meet with
FBI regarding potential espionage involving nuclear weapons data. …Analysis group formed at DOE to review Chinese weapons program; senior DOE, CIA,
White House officials discuss options. … GAO reports on poor management of nuclear material tracking capabilities …Laboratory Operations (oversight)
Board created. …’96 First three lab-to-lab exchanges between U.S. and China. …Internal DOE report discovers required nuclear material physical
inventories not being performed. … Two IG reports on security…DOE Deputy Secretary directs six “initiatives” to lab directors and field office heads for the
foreign visitors and CI programs (most initiatives ignored after he leaves DOE in 1997.)
Pena: Mar ’97–Jun ’98
’97 Mar New Secretary confirmed. … FBI report to Congress and DOE critical of DOE CI capabilities; addresses CI program oversight, foreign visits and
assignments, CI analysis, professional training/CI awareness. … FBI Director personally delivers CI review to Secretary. …Two additional Lab–to–Lab
exchanges held in Beijing. … DOE staff briefs Congressional staff, and NSC, CIA, FBI senior officials on Chinese nuclear program, possible Chinese
espionage before Secretary informed…DOE increases budget for CI in FY 1997, hires more CI professionals. …Inter-agency Working Group reports that
systemic and serious CI and security problems at DOE have been well documented over at least a ten year period … few of the recommendations in the past
studies have been implemented, … A senior CI official states “There is every reason to believe the labs will resist” any outside assistance … National Security
Advisor requests independent assessment of China's nuclear program and the impact of U.S. nuclear information. …Two DOE internal reports cite confusing,
fragmented, dysfunctional security management structure. …External report finds multiple, uncoordinated internal and external oversight activities. …DCI and
FBI Director meet with Secretary to discuss DOE CI problem and reform plan; … meeting notes state “Despite all the studies conducted, experience over time
has shown that DOE’s structure and culture make reform difficult, if not impossible, from within.” … Internal DOE report states “in all candor, we have been
hampered in meeting [the safeguards and security] obligations by organizational obstacles and competing internal interests.” … PDD–61 drafted, coordinated in
inter-agency process. …DOE’s Laboratory Operations Board finds “inefficiencies due to the Department's complicated management structure.” …Peter Lee
(formerly of LLNL) pleads guilty, inter alia, to transmitting classified national defense information to representatives of the PRC in ’85. …GAO finds faulty
procedures for foreign visitor indices checks and controlling dissemination of sensitive information; lack of clear criteria for identifying visits that involve sensitive
subjects; indirect and inconsistent CI funding; DOE CI programs not based on comprehensive assessment of foreign espionage threat. …Institute of Defense
Analyses’ “120 Day Report” finds inadequate management of DOE workforce and confusing chains of com-mand. …’98 Feb. President signs PDD-61.
…External report says DOE management and oversight of security problematic …Security Management Board created by Congress, meets twice in next 18
months…CIA/FBI report provided to Congress on Chinese espionage activities. … Jun 30 Secretary resigns, Deputy designated as Acting Secretary. …
DOE’s 90-day report on CI reveals problems remain regarding separate management of classified and unclassified information. …Lab-to-lab exchange held in
Beijing.
Richardson: Aug ’98 –
’98 Aug 18 New Secretary sworn in …GAO again finds problems in DOE’s foreign visitor program; notes lack of clear procedures for identifying sensitive
subjects. …External report highlights lack of DOE oversight expertise and ad hoc security structure. … Per PDD–61, assessment of the foreign collection
threat against DOE published. …'99 DOE security review finds “unhealthy, adversarial environment of mistrust among DOE security organizations,”
recommends several management process changes …Cox Committee publishes report…Lab-to-Lab exchange held in Beijing. …President directs PFIAB to
review security, CI at labs; directs Intelligence Community to conduct damage assessment of possible security breaches at labs; directs CI community to review
security of nuclear weapons information in USG. …DOE CI Implementation Plan delivered to Secretary. …GAO reports inadequate separation of classified
and unclassified computer networks at same lab in 1988, 1992, 1994, and 1998. … “Chiles Report” describes management problems in nuclear weapons
program. …Internal DOE report highlights computer security problems at a lab. … DOE counterintelligence implementation plan (per PDD–61) issued to labs.
… DOE shuts down all classified computers at LANL, LLNL, and SNL. … DOE holds tri-lab computer security conference. … Secretary announces new
security organization at DOE, to be headed by a “security czar.”
THE 1995 ‘WALK-IN’ DOCUMENT
In 1995, a U.S. intelligence agency obtained information that has come to be called the “walk-in” document. A copy of a classified PRC report, it contains a
discussion of various U.S. nuclear warheads. The PFIAB has carefully reviewed this document, related information, and the circumstances surrounding its delivery.
Serious questions remain as to when it was written, why it was written, and why it was provided to the U.S. We need not resolve these questions.
The document unquestionably contains some information that is still highly sensitive, including descriptions, in varying degrees of specificity, of technical
characteristics of seven U.S. thermonuclear warheads. This information had been widely available within the U.S. nuclear weapons community, including the
weapons labs, other parts of DOE, the Department of Defense, and private contractors, for more than a decade. For example, key technical information concerning
the W–88 warhead had been available to numerous U.S. government and military entities since at least 1983 and could well have come from many organizations
other than the weapons labs.
W-88 INVESTIGATION
Despite the disclosure of information concerning seven warheads, despite the potential that the source or sources of these disclosures were other than the bomb
designers at the national weapons labs, and despite the potential that the disclosures occurred as early as 1982, only one investigation was initiated. That investigation
focused on only one warhead, the W–88, only one category of potential sources—bomb designers at the national labs—and on only a four-year window of
opportunity. It should have been pursued in a more comprehensive manner. The allegations raised in the investigation should still be pursued vigorously. And the
inquiry should be fully explored—regardless of the conclusions that may result.
The episode began as an administrative inquiry conducted by the DOE Office of Energy Intelligence, with limited assistance from the FBI. It developed into an FBI
investigation, which is still under way today. Allegations concerning this case and related activities high-lighted the need for improvements in the DOE’s
counterintelligence program, led along the way to the issuance of a Presidential Decision Directive revamping the DOE’s counterintelligence program, formed a
substantial part of the information underlying the Cox Committee’s conclusions on nuclear weapons information, and ultimately led, at least in part, to the President’s
decision to ask this Board to evaluate security and counterintelligence at the DOE’s weapons labs.
It is not within the mandate of our review to solve the W–88 case or any other potential compromises of nuclear weapons information. Further, it is not within our
mandate to conduct a comprehensive and conclusive evaluation of the handling of the W–88 investigation by the DOJ and FBI. In fact, as we understand it, that is
the purpose of a task force recently appointed by the Attorney General. We trust that among the issues that the task force will resolve are:
Whether the FBI committed sufficient resources, including agents with appropriate expertise, and demonstrated a sense of urgency commensurate with
an apparent compromise of classified U.S. nuclear weapons information;
Whether the DOJ Office of Intelligence Policy Review (OIPR) applied an inappropriately high standard to the FBI’s request for electronic surveillance
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA);
Whether the FBI provided to DOJ OIPR all U.S. government information relevant to an appropriate evaluation of the FBI’s FISA request;
Why the FBI’s FISA request did not include a request to monitor or search the subject’s workplace computer systems, particularly since an attorney in
the FBI’s General Counsel Office had provided an opinion in 1996 that such monitoring or searching in this case would require FISA authorization;
Why the FBI did not learn until recently that in 1995 the subject had executed a series of waivers authorizing monitoring of his workplace computer
systems;
Whether the FBI adequately raised to the Attorney General the FBI’s concerns over the declination of the FISA request;
Whether communications regarding the subject’s job tenure broke down between DOE, FBI, and Los Alamos;
Whether the DOJ OIPR maintained appropriate records concerning FISA requests that were declined;
Whether the FBI appropriately relied on technical opinions provided by the DOE;
Why DOE, rather than the FBI, conducted the first polygraph examination in this case when the case was an open FBI investigation; and, perhaps most
importantly,
Whether additional cases should be opened to investigate whether the apparent disclosures may have arisen out of organizations other than Los Alamos
lab.
Again, resolving these issues is not within our mandate. It is, however, explicitly within our mandate to identify additional steps that may need to be taken to address
the security and counterintelligence threats to the weapons labs. Also, it is within our standing PFIAB obligation under Executive Order 12863 to assess the
adequacy of counterintelligence activities beyond the labs. In this regard, what we have learned from our limited review of the W-88 case and other cases are
significant lessons that extend well beyond these particular cases. These lessons relate directly to additional steps we believe must be taken to strengthen our
safeguards against current security and foreign intelligence threats. Those steps are discussed further in the Classified Appendix to this report.
We have learned, for example, that under the current personnel security clearance system a person who is under FBI investigation for suspected counterintelligence
activities may sometimes be granted a new or renewed clearance. We also have learned that although the written standards for granting a first clearance and for
renewing an existing clearance may be identical, the actual practice that has developed—certainly within DOE and we strongly suspect elsewhere—is that clearance
renewals will be granted on a lower standard. We find such inconsistency unacceptable. We think it appropriate for the National Security Council to review and
resolve these issues.
We have also learned that the legal weapons designed to fight the counterintelligence battles of the 70s have not necessarily been rigorously adapted to fight the
counterintelligence battles of the 90s (and beyond). For example, with the passage of more than twenty years since the enactment of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, it may no longer be adequate to address the counterintelligence threats of the new millennium. We take no position on whether the
statute itself needs to be changed. It may well still be sufficient. However, based on all of the information we have reviewed and the interviews we have conducted,
and without expressing a view as to the appropriateness of the DOJ decision in the W–88 case, we do believe that the Department of Justice may be applying the
FISA in a manner that is too restrictive, particularly in light of the evolution of a very sophisticated counterintelligence threat and the ongoing revolution in information
systems. We also are concerned by the lack of uniform application across the government of various other investigative tools, such as employee waivers that grant
officials appropriate authority to monitor sensitive government computer systems.
Moreover, there does not exist today a systematic process to ensure that the competing interests of law enforcement and national security are appropriately
balanced. Law enforcement, rightly so, is committed to building prosecutable cases. This goal is often furthered by leaving an espionage suspect in place to facilitate
the gathering of more evidence. The national security interest, in contrast, is often furthered by immediately removing a suspect from access to sensitive information to
avoid additional compromises. Striking the proper balance is never easy. It is made all the more difficult when there is no regular process to ensure that balance is
struck. We have learned in our review that this difficult decision often is made by officials who either are too focused on the investigative details or are too unaware
of the details to make a balanced decision. This is another matter deserving National Security Council attention.
PFIAB EVALUATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
Following receipt of the “walk-in” document, CIA, DOE, Congress, and others conducted numerous analyses in an effort to determine the extent of the classified
nuclear weapons information the PRC has acquired and the resultant threat to U.S. national security. Opinions expressed in the media and elsewhere have ranged
from one extreme to the other. On one end of the spectrum is the view that the Chinese have acquired very little classified information and can do little with it. On the
other end is the view that the Chinese have nearly duplicated the W–88 warhead.
After reviewing the available intelligence and interviewing the major participants in many of these studies, we conclude that none of these extreme views holds water.
For us, the most accurate assessment of China’s acquisition of classified U.S. nuclear weapons information and the resultant threat to U.S. national security is
presented in the April 1999 Intelligence Community Damage Assessment. Written by a team of experts, this assessment was reviewed and endorsed by an
independent panel of national security and nuclear weapons specialists, chaired by Admiral David Jeremiah. We substantially agree with the assessment’s analysis
and endorse its key findings. The full text of the assessment’s unclassified summary appears in the unclassified appendix.
PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 61: BIRTH AND INTENT
In mid–1997, it became clear to an increasingly broader range of senior administration officials that DOE’s counterintelligence program was in serious trouble.1 In
late July, DOE officials briefed the President’s National Security Advisor, who concluded that, while the real magnitude and national security implications of the
suspected espionage needed closer scrutiny, there was nonetheless a solid basis for taking steps to strengthen counterintelligence measures at the labs. He requested
an independent CIA assessment of China’s nuclear program and the impact of U.S. nuclear information, and he directed that the National Counterintelligence Policy
Board (NACIPB)2 review the DOE counterintelligence program. That September, the National Security Advisor received the CIA assessment, and the NACIPB
reported back that it had found “systemic and serious CI and security problems at DOE [had] been well documented over at least a ten year period” and “few of the
recommendations in the past studies [had] been implemented.” The NACIPB made 25 recommendations to significantly restructure the DOE CI program; it also
proposed that a Presidential Decision Directive or Executive Order be handed down to effect these changes.
At an October 15 meeting, the Director of Central Intelligence and the FBI Director discussed with Secretary Pena and his Deputy Secretary the need to reform the
DOE CI program. The DCI and FBI Director sought to make clear there was an urgent need to act immediately, and “despite all the studies conducted, experience
over time [had] shown that DOE’s structure and culture make reform difficult, if not impossible, from within.” All agreed to develop an action plan that would serve
as the basis for a Presidential Decision Directive. Several senior officials involved felt that the necessary reforms would—without the mandate of a Presidential
directive—have little hope of overcoming the anticipated bureaucratic resistance, both at DOE headquarters and at the labs. There was a clear fear that, “if the
Secretary spoke, the bureaucracy wouldn’t listen; if the President spoke, the bureaucracy might at least listen.”
That winter, the NSC coordinated a draft PDD between and among the many agencies and departments involved. Serious disagreements arose over several issues,
particularly the creation of independent reporting lines to the Secretary for the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Offices. Also at issue was the subordination of the
CI officers at the labs. Much of the resistance stemmed simply from individuals interested in preserving their turf won in previous DOE bureaucratic battles. After
much bureaucratic maneuvering and even vicious in–fighting, these issues were finally resolved, or so it seemed; and on February 11, 1998, the President signed and
issued the directive as PDD-61.
The full PDD remains classified. An unclassified summary, which contains all significant provisions, is set forth in the unclassified annex. In our view, among the most
significant of the 13 initiatives directed by PDD-61 are:
The CI and foreign intelligence (FI) elements would be reconfigured into two independent offices and report directly to the Secretary of Energy;
The Director of the new Office of CI (OCI) would be a senior executive from the FBI and would have direct access to the Secretary of Energy, the
DCI and the Director of the FBI;
Existing DOE contracts with the labs would be amended to include CI program goals and objectives and performance measures to evaluate
compliance with these contractual obligations, and CI personnel assigned to the labs would have direct access to the lab directors and would
concurrently report to the Director, OCI;
The incoming Director, OCI would prepare a report for the Secretary of Energy ninety days after his arrival that would address progress on the
initiative, a strategic plan for achieving long-term goals, and recommendations on whether and to what extent other organizational changes may be
necessary to strengthen CI; and,
Within 120 days, the Secretary of Energy would advise the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on the actions taken and specific
remedies designed to implement this directive.
On April 1, 1998, a senior executive from the FBI assumed his duties as the Director of the OCI, and began his 90–day study. He completed and forwarded it to
the Secretary of Energy on July 1, the day after Secretary Pena resigned. The Acting Secretary led a review of the study and its recommendations. On August 18,
Secretary Richardson was sworn in. On November 13, he submitted the action plan required by the PDD to the National Security Advisor. Secretary Richardson
continued to develop an implementation plan. The completed implementation plan was delivered to Secretary Richardson on February 3, 1999, and issued to the
labs on March 4.
TIMELINESS OF PDD–61
Criticism has been raised that the PDD took too long to be issued and has taken too long to implement. Although the current National Security Advisor was briefed
on counterintelligence concerns by DOE officials in April of 1996, we are not convinced that the briefing provided a sufficient basis to require initiation of a broad
Presidential directive at that time. We are convinced, however, that the July 1997 briefing, which we are persuaded was much more comprehensive, was sufficient to
warrant aggressive White House action. We believe that while the resulting PDD was developed and issued within a customary amount of time, these issues had such
national security gravity that it should have been handled with more dispatch. That there were disagreements over various issues is not surprising; that the DOE
bureaucracy dug in its heels so deeply in resisting clearly needed reform is very disturbing. In fact, we believe that the NACIPB, created by PDD in 1994, was a
critical factor in ram–rodding the PDD through to signature. Before 1994, there was no real structure or effective process for handling these kinds of issues in a
methodical way. Had the new structure not been in place and working, we doubt if the PDD would have made it.
With regard to timeliness of implementation, we have far greater concern. It is not unreasonable to expect that senior DOE officials would require some time to
evaluate the new OCI Director’s 90–day study, and we are aware that Secretary Richardson did not assume his DOE duties until mid–August. However, we find
unacceptable the more than four months that elapsed before DOE advised the National Security Advisor on the actions taken and specific remedies developed to
implement the Presidential directive, particularly one so crucial.
More critically, we are disturbed by bureaucratic foot–dragging and even recalcitrance that ensued after issuance of the Presidential Decision Directive. Severe
disagreements erupted over several issues, including whether the CI program would apply to all of the labs, not just the weapons labs, and the extent to which
polygraph examinations would be used in the personnel security program. We understand that some DOE officials declined to assist in the implementation simply by
declaring that, “It won’t work.” The polygraph program was finally accepted into the DOE’s security reforms only after the National Security Advisor and the DCI
personally interceded. The fact that the Secretary’s implementation plan was not issued to the labs until more than a year after the PDD was issued tells us DOE is
still unconvinced of Presidential authority. We find worrisome the reports of repeated and recent resistance by Office of Management and Budget officials to
requests for funding to implement the counterintelligence reforms mandated by PDD-61. We find vexing the reports we heard of OMB budgeteers lecturing other
government officials on the “unimportance” of counterintelligence at DOE.
SECRETARY RICHARDSON’S INITIATIVES
Since November of 1998 and especially since April of this year, Secretary Richardson has taken commendable steps to address DOE’s security and
counterintelligence deficiencies. In November of last year, in the action plan required by PDD-61, Secretary Richardson detailed 31 actions to be taken to reform
DOE’s counterintelligence program. These actions addressed the structure of the counterintelligence program, selection and training of field counterintelligence
personnel, counterintelligence analysis, counterintelligence and security awareness, protections against potential “insider threats,” computer security, and relationships
with the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.
Though many matters addressed in the action plan would require further evaluation before specific actions would be taken, immediate steps included granting to the
Office of Counterintelligence (OCI) direct responsibility for programming and funding counterintelligence activities of all DOE field offices and laboratories; granting
the Director, OCI the sole authority to propose candidates to serve as the counterintelligence officers at the weapons labs; and instituting a policy for a polygraph
program for employees with access to sensitive information.
In April of 1999, in an effort to eliminate multiple reporting channels and improve lines of communications, direction and accountability, Secretary Richardson
ordered changes in the department’s management structure. In short, each of the 11 field offices reports to a Lead Program Secretarial Office (LPSO). The LPSO
has “overall line accountability for site-wide environment, safety and health, for safeguards and security and for the implementation of policy promulgated by
headquarters staff and support functions.” A newly established Field Management Council is to be charged with program integration.
In May of 1999, Secretary Richardson announced substantial restructuring of the security apparatus at DOE. Among these is the new Office of Security and
Emergency Operations, responsible for all safeguards and security policy, cyber–security, and emergency functions throughout DOE. It will report directly to the
Secretary and consist of the Office of the Chief Information Officer, and Office of Emergency Management and Response, and an Office of Security Affairs, which
will include the Office of Safeguards and Security, the Office of Nuclear and National Security Information, the Office of Foreign Visits and Assignments, and the
Office of Plutonium, Uranium, and Special Material Inventory.
Also announced was the creation of the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance. It also will report directly to the Secretary to provide
independent oversight for safeguards and security, special nuclear materials accountability, and other related areas.
To support additional cyber-security improvements, DOE will be asking Congress for an additional $50 million over the next two years. Improvements are to include
continual monitoring of DOE computers for unauthorized and improper use. New controls will also be placed on computers and workstations, removable media,
removable drives, and other devices that could be used to download files. In addition, warning “banners” are now mandatory on all computer systems to alert users
that these systems are subject to search and review at the government’s discretion. Cyber–security training is also to be improved.
Secretary Richardson further announced additional measures designed to strengthen DOE’s counterintelligence program. They include: a requirement that DOE
officials responsible for maintaining personnel security clearances be notified of any information that might affect the issuance or maintenance of such a clearance,
even when the information does not rise to the level of a criminal charge; and mandatory reporting by all DOE employees of any substantive contact with foreign
nationals from sensitive countries. DOE also plans to strengthen its Security Management Board; accelerate actions necessary to correct deficiencies in security
identified in the 1997/1998 Annual Report to the President on Safeguards and Security; expedite improvements in the physical security of DOE nuclear weapons
sites; and delay the automatic declassification of documents more than 25 years old.
In sum, as of mid-June of 1999, progress has been made in addressing counterintelligence and security. Of note, all of the PDD–61 requirements are reported to
have been substantially implemented. Other important steps also reportedly have been completed. Among these are the assignment of experienced
counterintelligence officers to the weapons labs.
PROSPECTS FOR REFORMS
Although we applaud Secretary Richardson’s initiative, we seriously doubt that his initiatives will achieve lasting success. Though certainly significant steps in the right
direction, Secretary Richardson’s initiatives have not yet solved the many problems. Significant objectives, all of which were identified in the DOE OCI study
completed nearly a year ago, have not yet been fully achieved. Among these unmet objectives are revising the DOE policy on foreign visits and establishing an
effective polygraph examination program for selected, high–risk programs. Moreover, the Richardson initiatives simply do not go far enough.
These moves have not yet accomplished some of the smallest fixes—despite huge levels of attention and Secretarial priority. Consider the following example: with all
the emphasis of late on computer security, including a weeks–long stand–down of the weapons labs computer systems directed by the Secretary, the stark fact
remains that, as of the date of this report, a nefarious employee can still download secret nuclear weapons information to a tape, put it in his or her pocket, and walk
out the door. Money cannot really be the issue. The annual DOE budget is already $18 billion. There must be some other reason.
Under the Richardson plan, even if the new “Security Czar” is given complete authority over the more than $800 million ostensibly allocated each year to security of
nuclear weapons-related functions in DOE, he will still have to cross borders into other people’s fiefdoms, causing certain turmoil and infighting. If he gets no direct
budget authority, he will be left with little more than policy guidance. Even then, as the head of a staff office, under the most recent Secretary Richardson
reorganization he has to get the approval of yet another fiefdom, the newly created Field Management Council, before he can issue policy guidance. Moreover, he is
unlikely to have much success in obtaining approval from that body when he is not even a member—and the majority of those who are members are the very
program managers that his policy guidance would affect.
TROUBLE AHEAD
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the PFIAB’s inquiry is the evidence that the lab bureaucracies—after months at the epicenter of an espionage scandal with
serious implications for U.S. foreign policy—are still resisting reforms. Equally disconcerting, other agencies have joined the security skeptics list. In the past few
weeks, officials from DOE and other agencies have reported to us:
There is a heightened attention to security at the most senior levels of DOE and the labs, but at the mid–level tiers of management there has been
lackluster response and “business as usual.”
Unclassified but sensitive computer networks at several weapons labs are still riddled with vulnerabilities.
Buildings that do not meet DOE security standards are still being used for open storage of weapons parts.
Foreign nationals—some from sensitive countries—residing outside a weapons lab have remote dial-up access to unclassified networks without any
monitoring by the lab.
In an area of a weapons lab frequented by foreign nationals, a safe containing restricted data was found unsecured. It had not been checked by guards
since August 1998. When confronted with the violation, a mid–level official is said to have implied that it was not an actual security lapse because the
lock had to be “jiggled” to open the safe door.
A weapons lab was instructed to monitor its outgoing email for possible security lapses. The lab took the minimal action necessary; it began monitoring
emails but did not monitor the files attached to emails.
When Secretary Richardson ordered the recent computer stand-down, there was great resistance, and when it came time to decide if the labs’
computers could be turned on again, a bevy of DOE officials fought to have final approval power.
BACK TO THE FUTURE
In 1976, federal officials conducted a study of the nation’s nuclear weapons laboratories and plants. In trying to devise a coherent and viable way of managing the
labs, they settled on three possible solutions: place the weapons labs under the Department of Defense, make them a free–standing agency, or leave them within the
Energy Research and Development Administration. Congress chose to leave the weapons labs within ERDA, the successor agency of the Atomic Energy
Commission.
Nearly a decade later, the oversight of the weapons labs was still of great concern. Senators Sam Nunn and John Warner led a push to place the weapons labs
under the auspices of the Department of Defense. However, the Reagan Administration staved off their effort by agreeing to put together a blue–ribbon panel to
study the issue. The panel studied the problem for six months and issued a report in July, 1985. Again, Congress and federal officials weighed whether the weapons
labs should be transferred to the Department of Defense or restructured to be given more autonomy.
The status quo prevailed. The weapons labs stayed within the Department of Energy.
As this report has detailed, problems in the managerial relationship between DOE and the weapons labs have persisted, perhaps even increased, over the past 14
years. Indeed, the discussion today sounds hauntingly familiar to the discussions in the 1980s and 1970s.
Today, however, there is a difference. The record of mismanagement of the weapons labs in matters of security and counterintelligence has become so long and so
compelling as to demand a rejection of the status quo. There can be no doubt that the current structure of the Department of Energy has failed to give the nation’s
weapons laboratories the level of care and attention they warrant. Thus, our panel is recommending deep and lasting structural change that will give the weapons
laboratories the accountability, clear lines of authority, and priority they deserve.
REORGANIZATION
What makes a government agency run well? There are a multitude of characteristics that arguably can make for an efficient and effective government agency or
department. This Panel holds no illusions about the completeness of its understanding nor the purity of its wisdom regarding government bureaucracies. Indeed, some
people would say that truly comprehending the inner workings of a federal department is the intellectual equivalent of grasping the enormity of the universe. Over the
course of many years, however, we, as members of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, have evaluated the performance of numerous federal
entities, from the Department of Defense to the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Some, we found, were in good order, others in pretty bad shape. In that
sense, we believe we do know a lot about what makes some agencies work and not work. Although somewhat subjective and by no means exhaustive, our list of
“good” things to look for includes several attributes.
LEADERSHIP
Certainly at the top, but also throughout the organization. The leaders and managers set the standards and expectations regarding performance and accountability.
They are the foundation upon which a successful organizational culture is built. If management sets, demonstrates and enforces high standards for performance and
accountability, there is a strong likelihood that the organization will follow. And, longevity is a key ingredient. For example, Daniel S. Goldin, Administrator of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), was named to his post in the spring of 1992. Goldin has won considerable acclaim for demanding nothing
but the best from his employees, and thereby turning around a bureaucracy that had become ossified and recalcitrant to higher authority, including the President. He
did not do it overnight, though. His “watch” is now seven years long and still going. By contrast, the average stay for an Energy Secretary has been about two and a
half years; a Deputy Secretary, less than two years; and an Under Secretary, less than 18 months.1
CLARITY OF MISSION
Employees must know who they are and why they are there. Mission statements may seem corny to some, but from our experience good ones work. NASA’s is
crisp, clear and bold: “NASA is an investment in America’s future. As explorers, pioneers and innovators, we boldly expand frontiers in air and space to inspire and
serve America, and to benefit the quality of life on Earth.” The Energy Department also declares itself a department of the future; it’s slogan is “Science, Security and
Energy: Powering the 21st Century.” However, we wonder if the DOE employees in the field really have a sense of purpose and direction. Those at the Oakland
Operations Office are challenged to, “serve the public by executing programs and performing DOE contract management.” At Albuquerque Operations Office, the
rallying cry is, “to contribute to the welfare of the nation by providing field-level federal management to assure effective, efficient, safe and secure accomplishment of
the Department’s national defense, environmental quality, science and technology, technology transfer and commercialization and national energy objectives.”2
DEDICATION TO EXCELLENCE
It is the responsibility of leadership to emphasize continuously and top-to-bottom the absolute importance of quality of performance. People truly dedicated to
excellence usually achieve it.
EMPHASIS ON CORE COMPETENCIES
Those agencies that constantly emphasize the business areas in which they must absolutely excel, usually do so. At NASA, we are told, rarely, if ever, does the
Administrator give a speech in which safety is not emphasized. DOE has appropriately emphasized excellence in the quality of its scientific and technical work, but
only recently has begun to emphasize security, and only in recent months has articulated the importance of counterintelligence. The panel was hard pressed to find
either words mentioned in speeches by most of Secretary Richardson’s predecessors.
MINIMAL POLITICAL PRESSURES
Blessed is the government manager whose operations fall into only a handful of Congressional districts and under the purview of only a couple of oversight
committees. It doesn't take a nuclear scientist to understand that the more Congressional districts and committees with which a federal agency must contend, the
more it is politically whip–sawed in its priorities and stuffed with pork. We suspect the Department of Energy probably holds some federal records: its multitudinous
and widely cast operations come under the scrutiny of no less than 18 Congressional committees and fund well-paying federal and contractor jobs in more than 50
congressional districts.
STREAMLINED FIELD OPERATIONS
In just about any endeavor, but especially in managing government contracts, simpler is better. Managing government contracts has become a major function in more
and more agencies and departments as they seek to cut costs. We know of a few good examples of agencies where this effort is both efficient and effective.
One is the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), a semi-autonomous Defense Department agency, which has long managed huge contracts with major industrial
firms that have built and help operate our nation's surveillance satellites. The NRO, however, came under heavy fire several years ago for budget irregularities, partly
as a result of tangled lines of bureaucratic authority. Today, after some substantial streamlining, multi-million dollar contracts are run out of program management
offices at NRO Headquarters on a line of accountability leading directly to the contracting company. Rather than maintaining large field offices, the NRO employs
only a handful of representatives in the field—typically only one or two people resident at their largest contractors. The rest is done from Washington. To manage
their largest contracts, no more than 15 contracting officers—from worker–level to management —are involved. Some are worth several billion dollars. Currently,
the NRO manages over 1,000 contracts worldwide, with a combined value numbering in the tens of billions of dollars. They manage these contracts using a staff of
approximately 250 contract officers.3
Though we acknowledge that there are differences between the missions of NRO’s satellite contractors and DOE’s nuclear weapons lab contractors, we are
stunned by the huge numbers of DOE employees involved in overseeing a weapons lab contract. For example, Sandia National Weapons Laboratory, a
contractor–operated facility in New Mexico, has several layers of Energy Department employees with whom it must deal: the Kirtland (Air Force Base) Area Office,
with about 55 “feds,” which is subordinate to the Albuquerque Field Office (AFO), which has a total complement of about 1,300 government workers. Albuquerque
also monitors contracts with Los Alamos National Lab (through a Los Alamos Area Office of some 70 people), and several other contractors throughout the
southern United States. Notably, Albuquerque is but one of 11 such DOE Field Offices, that boast a total field complement of about 6,000. Back at DOE
Headquarters, which has a total work force of close to 5,000, Sandia’s contracts are monitored, depending on the subject, by several Program Offices—including
Defense Programs (somewhat over 100 officials) and Environmental Management (somewhat over 200 officials).
We repeatedly heard from officials at various levels of DOE and the weapons labs how this convoluted and bloated management structure has constantly transmitted
confusing and often contradictory mandates to the labs. This is vividly illustrated by the labyrinthine organizational charts that one must decipher to trace lines of
authority.
RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN SECURITY
One senior CIA official told us that the NRO security system is the best in the government—a view echoed, we understand, in a forthcoming report by the
DCI/Defense Secretary Joint Security Commission. One can see why. At the NRO, security starts at the top. The chief of security provides policy guidance and
monitors implementation. However, from the Director on down, all line managers are responsible for implementation. If a security breach occurs, the Director and
appropriate line subordinates all are accountable. Similarly, NRO contractors are expected to meet fully NRO security standards and guidelines. Failure to meet
those guidelines could well result in forfeiture of performance award fees, at the least.
FULL OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION
To be effective, security must be more than a concept, it must be woven into every aspect of the agency’s business and the daily work of every employee. The NRO
integrates security more fully than most other federal agencies we have seen. Though it has separate line items for security and counterintelligence functions, most
security–related expenditures are integrated directly into the line items of every satellite program. Thus, rather than imposing security mandates as contract
“add-ons,” security officials work with the NRO managers to fold their requirements into a given program during the planning stages. In this structure, security
requirements are as much a part of an NRO satellite program as are solar cells and thrusters. And, the NRO security professionals, rather than treated as staff
functionaries, are accepted as true partners in the NRO mission.
A PREVAILING CONSCIOUSNESS
Making people aware is vital. The record clearly shows that DOE has had mixed results from its various security and counterintelligence indoctrination programs.
Briefings, town hall meetings and educational films are helpful, but they cannot take the place of a working environment in which security is just part of the daily
routine. Again at the NRO, when a management decision is made, security always gets a voice. A security official is present at every level of NRO decision making:
from the Office Director, to his Board of Directors, to the management teams of the smallest NRO program, security officials are part of the management process.
Moreover, “security” gets a vote equal to that of any program manager. From the record, we judge that security at DOE, until recently, only occasionally had a
voice; and when it did, many managers vociferously objected. Counterintelligence, on the other hand, was allowed little more than a whisper.
RESTRUCTURING
The panel is convinced that real and lasting security and counterintelligence reform at the weapons labs is simply unworkable within DOE’s current structure and
culture. To achieve the kind of protection that these sensitive labs must have, they and their functions must have their own autonomous operational structure free of all
the other obligations imposed by DOE management. We strongly believe that this cleaving can best be achieved by constituting a new government agency
that is far more mission–focused and bureaucratically streamlined than its antecedent, and devoted principally to nuclear weapons and national
security matters.
The agency can be constructed in one of two ways. It could remain an element of DOE but become semi-autonomous—by that we mean strictly segregated from
the rest of the department. This would be accomplished by having the agency director report only to the Secretary of Energy. The agency directorship also could be
“dual-hatted” as an Under Secretary, thereby investing it with extra bureaucratic clout both inside and outside the department.
We believe there are several good models for this course of action: the National Security Agency and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, both
elements of the Defense Department; and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, an agency of the Commerce Department. Alternatively, the
agency could be completely independent, with its administrator reporting directly to the President. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the
National Science Foundation are also good models.
Regardless of the mold in which this agency is cast, it must have staffing and support functions that are autonomous from the remaining operations at DOE. These
functions, which report directly to the Director, must include: an inspector general; a general counsel; a human resources staff; a comptroller; a senior official
responsible solely for security policy, and another responsible solely for counterintelligence policy. To protect its autonomy and avoid the diversion of funds to other
purposes, the agency budget must be a separate line item strictly segregated by Congress from other budget pressures—even if it remains nominally within the
current DOE structure. The agency also must have a separate employee career service. The panel recommends an “excepted service” model of employment, like
many of the intelligence community elements, which would facilitate accountability and higher performance levels by allowing management to reward, punish, hire,
and fire employees more easily.
To ensure its long–term success, this new agency must be established by statute. That statute, moreover, must clearly stipulate that nothing less than an act of
Congress can amend the agency’s mission, functions or affiliations. Clearly, Congress and the President must decide definitively which of these two solutions to
enact. The panel has no specific preference between them; we believe either can be made effective. Should Congress and the President conclude that retaining the
agency inside DOE is not workable, the “wholly-independent” approach should be enacted.
We emphasize that it is very important for the new structure to be organized to preserve and, if possible, enhance the ability of the national weapons labs to attract
and retain scientists of the highest caliber. Excellence in the caliber of the scientists and their research and development programs must be sustained if the weapons
labs are to fulfill their missions in the front line of U.S. national security. To meet this goal, continued but carefully controlled interaction with foreign visitors and
scientists from around the world as well as with researchers from DOE’s nondefense labs is essential for producing the best science. In the semi-autonomous model,
the Secretary would be responsible for managing and ensuring the effectiveness of agency relations with the nonweapons labs.
Whichever solution Congress enacts, we do feel strongly that the new agency never should be subordinated to the Defense Department. Defense already is
populated with a number of semi–autonomous agencies; we see no reason to add to that burden. Moreover, we believe the decision made long ago to house
America’s nuclear weapons research and development in a civilian government agency still makes sense. Specifically, we recommend that the Congress pass
and the President sign legislation that:
Creates a new, semi–autonomous Agency for Nuclear Stewardship (ANS), whose Director will report directly to the Secretary of Energy.
The Director should be dual–hatted as an Under Secretary of Energy. This new agency will oversee all nuclear weapons–related matters previously
housed in DOE, including Defense Programs and Nuclear Nonproliferation; it also will oversee all functions of the National Weapons labs. (If Congress
opts to create a totally independent agency, the Director should report directly to the President.)
Streamlines the ANS/Weapons Lab management structure by abolishing ties between the weapons labs and all DOE regional, field and
site offices, and all contractor intermediaries. The so–called “GOCO,” or “government owned, contractor operated,” concept of lab management
should be retained. GOCO has been very successful, particularly in providing employment conditions that attract scientists of the highest caliber, and
the federal government is strongly committed to maintaining that working relationship. Even if DOE opts to retain these field entities for other purposes,
the ANS should sever all association with them. All ANS/Weapons Lab communications and business should be handled by ANS Liaison Offices
established in each lab and manned with a small staff. (Our short review time did not permit us to explore fully this issue. We doubt that any amount of
time would be sufficient. Suffice it to say that we did learn enough about the costs and benefits of these myriad DOE field bureaucracies to persuade us
to recommend cutting all ties between them and the new agency.)
Mandates that the Director/ANS be appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate and, ideally, have an extensive background in
national security, organizational management, and appropriate technical fields. Admittedly, finding an individual with solid credentials in all three areas
may prove an elusive goal. However, meeting two out of those three criteria should be considered mandatory, provided that one of the criteria always
met is management experience. The Deputy Director should have a background in an area that compensates for areas in which the Director lacks
experience. The Director should serve for a minimum fixed term of 5 years, not coincident with quadrennial transitions of administrations, and be
subject to removal only by Presidential direction.
Stems the historical “revolving door” and management expertise problems at DOE by severely circumscribing the number of political
appointees assigned to ANS and requiring all ANS senior political appointees to have strong backgrounds in both national security (intelligence,
defense, or foreign policy) and management (corporate, government, or military).
Ensures effective administration of safeguards, security, and counterintelligence at all the weapons labs and plants by creating a
coherent security/CI structure within the new agency. We strongly recommend following the NRO’s model of security management. The senior
CI official at ANS—we recommend a Special Assistant to the Director for CI policy—should be mandated as a permanent FBI senior executive
service position.
Abolishes the Office of Energy Intelligence. A Special Assistant to the ANS Director for Intelligence Liaison should be created within the new
agency, with a staff of no more than 20. The Special Assistant should be responsible for managing relations with the intelligence community, briefing
ANS senior management on intelligence matters, and ensuring ANS intelligence requirements are met. This office should follow the Treasury
Department model. (The Secretary of Energy would not be precluded from establishing a similar special assistant to address the department’s
non-weapons–related intelligence coordination and briefing needs.)
Shifts the balance of analytic billets from the former Office of Energy Intelligence (about 40) to the DCI’s Nonproliferation Center to bolster intelligence
community technical expertise on nuclear matters. These billets should be permanently funded by ANS, but permanently assigned to the DCI Center.
Weapons lab employees and ANS civil servants should be temporarily assigned to these positions for two year tours.
A Semi-Autonomous or Wholly Independent Nuclear Weapons Stewardship Agency should have the following attributes:
The agency would be entirely separated from DOE, except in the semi-autonomous case, where the agency director—as a DOE Under Secretary—would report
directly to the Secretary.
The agency would have no other bureaucratic ties to DOE, other than R&D contracting, which would be managed by the agency Deputy Director. The weapons
labs would be encouraged nonetheless to foster strong scientific interactions with the other DOE research labs. In the case of a wholly independent agency, the
Director would be the chief executive officer.
In the case of a semi-autonomous agency, the Director would be dual-hatted as a DOE Under Secretary.
An independent oversight board would monitor performance and compliance to agency policies and guidelines, up and down the organizational structure.
Authority from the agency Director to the weapons labs would run directly through the Deputy Director, who also would be dual-hatted as the Defense Programs
Manager and, therefore, a manager of lab work.
The security chief, directly reporting to the agency Director, would promulgate all security policies and guidelines for the agency and the weapons labs, including
safeguards and cyber-security.
The counterintelligence chief, also directly attached to the agency Director, would promulgate all counterintelligence policies and guidelines for the agency and the
weapons labs. He/she also would manage the foreign visitors and assignments program.
As Defense Programs Manager for the weapons labs, the agency Deputy Director would be responsible for ensuring the integration of all security and
counterintelligence policies and guidelines into all weapons lab programs.
Security officers and counterintelligence officers would be attached to all line offices, with heavy representation in Defense Programs, where full integration would
occur. They also would be attached to all labs, in multiple numbers.
Security and counterintelligence officers would report to their appropriate line managers on a day-to-day basis, but also report respectively to the agency security
and counterintelligence chiefs on policy implementation issues. All policy implementation disputes would be referred back to the agency director for resolution.
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
There are a number of initiatives that must be undertaken immediately to start building a new agency culture and identity and restoring public confidence:
Establish a clear mission and clear standards of excellence. The agency’s mission, and that each subordinate unit, must be clearly articulated. Strong
security and counterintelligence in addition to scientific achievement must be core elements of the mission. Similarly, clear standards of excellence must
be established throughout the organization. Excellence must be the goal of scientists, engineers, technicians, and managers as well as security and
counterintelligence officials.
Establish a clear chain of accountability. There must be clear, simple, indelible lines of accountability from top to bottom. If a failure occurs, there must
be a straightforward means for determining accountability—at all levels. Seeking consensus and advice is important, but ultimately a decision must be
made by individuals, and those individuals should be held accountable.
Hold leaders accountable. Accountability must be enforced, particularly among the agency managers who will form the backbone of the new agency
and instill a new culture of excellence.
Reward achievement. Criteria should be clear and rewards substantial. Protection of nuclear secrets and expansion of scientific knowledge should be
among the most valued. Achievement must be judged on contribution to mission, not to program expansions or budget increases.
Punish failure ... with severity, if necessary. Penalties should be tough, but fair and proportional. Laxity in protecting nuclear secrets and other sensitive
information should be among the most severely punished.
Train and educate. Establish a formal educational and training system to develop a professional cadre of career managers and leaders. Security and
counterintelligence should be major parts of the core curriculum passed down to all lab personnel in regular briefings and training sessions.
Do not forget the primary mission. Preserve and strengthen those agency attributes—including cutting edge research in the most advanced scientific
fields—that will attract the finest talent in the nation. With respect to the weapons laboratories, continue to foster their unparalleled lead in intellectual
excellence. But never lose sight that protecting the nation by securing its nuclear stockpile and nuclear secrets—through good science and good
management—is Job Number One.
While maintaining its autonomy, the agency should nonetheless emphasize continued close scientific interaction with the DOE research labs not engaged
in weapons–related endeavors. In the semi–autonomous alternative, DOE should also be responsible for ensuring that good relations are maintained
between the non-weapons labs and the weapons labs.
SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACCOUNTABILITY
Accountability. The agency director should issue clear security accountability guidelines. The agency security chief must be accountable to the agency
director for security policy at the labs, and the lab directors must be accountable to the agency director for compliance. The same system and process
should be established to instill accountability among counterintelligence officials.
Independent Oversight. Attentive, independent oversight will be critical to ensuring high standards of security and counterintelligence performance at the
new agency. In that regard, we welcome Senator John Warner’s recent legislative initiative to create a small, dedicated panel to oversee security and
counterintelligence performance at the weapons labs. This oversight should include an annual certification process.
Joint Committee for Congressional Oversight of ANS/Labs. Congress should abolish its current oversight system for the national weapons labs. Just as
the profligate morass of DOE contractors and bureaucrats has frustrated the critical national interest of safeguarding our nuclear stockpile, so has the
current scheme of Congressional oversight with roughly 15 competing committees laying claim to some piece of the nuclear weapons mission.
ANS Inspector General. The President, Congress, and the director of the new agency should cooperatively, through executive order, legislation, and
agency directive, provide teeth to the authority of the new agency’s inspector general. For example, the inspector general, the independent oversight
body, and the agency director should all have to concur on the findings of the annual report to the President on safeguards and security at the weapons
labs.
EXTERNAL RELATIONS
The CIA and FBI should expand their “National Security Partnership” to include the new agency and the weapons labs. Reciprocal assignment
programs should be implemented to promote cross-fertilization of expertise and experience.
CIA and DIA should bolster their support for ANS needs. Both intelligence agencies should establish analytic accounts to support the specific
substantive and counterintelligence interests and needs of the new ANS and the weapons labs. These accounts, among other issues, should regularly
produce data on the nuclear–related collection efforts of all foreign governments and foreign intelligence services. This data should serve as the
foundation for regularized weapons lab counterintelligence briefs for the foreign visits/foreign visitors programs.
Improve national security and law enforcement cooperation, particularly with respect to counterintelligence case referrals and handling. The National
Security Council should take the lead in establishing clear Executive Branch guidelines and procedures for resolving disputes between agencies over law
enforcement and national security concerns. A government–wide process needs to be established by which competing interests can be adjudicated by
officials who are properly informed of all relevant facts and circumstances, but who also are sufficiently senior to make decisions stick.
Ensure a government–wide review of legal tools to address the current foreign intelligence threat. The National Security Council should conduct a
review to ensure that sufficient legal authority and techniques are available and appropriate in light of the evolution of a very sophisticated threat and the
ongoing revolution in information systems.
PERSONNEL SECURITY
An effective personnel security program. The agency director should immediately undertake a total revamping of the “Q” clearance program and look
to the security elements in the intelligence community for advice and support. This review should result in a complete rewrite of existing guidance and
standards for the issuing, revoking and suspending of security clearances. Special attention should be paid to establishing a clear—and relatively
low—threshold for suspending clearances for cause, including pending criminal investigations. The review also should significantly strengthen the
background investigation process by restructuring contracts to create incentives for thoroughness. We strongly advocate abolishing the prevalent
method of paying investigators “by the case.” Strict “need–to–have” regulations should be issued for regular reviews of all contract employees
clearance requirements. Those without a continuing need should have their clearances withdrawn. The National Security Council should review and
resolve issues on a government–wide basis that permit a person who is under FBI investigation for suspected espionage to obtain a new or renewed
clearance; existing standards for clearance renewal also should be reviewed with an eye toward tightening up.
A professional administrative inquiry process. Promulgate new agency guidelines and standards for security–related administrative inquiries to ensure
that proper security/counterintelligence procedures and methods are employed. Very high professional qualification standards should be established and
strictly maintained for all security personnel involved in administrative inquiries.
PHYSICAL/TECHNICAL/CYBERSECURITY
Comprehensive weapons lab cyber–security program. Under the sponsorship and specific guidance of the agency Director, the weapons labs should
institute a broad and detailed program to protect all computer workstations, networks, links and related systems from all forms of potential
compromise. This program, which should be reviewed by and coordinated with appropriate offices within the U.S. intelligence community, must include
standard network monitoring tools and uniform configuration management practices. All lab computers and networks must be constantly monitored and
inspected for possible compromise, preferably by an agency–sponsored, independent auditing body. A “best practices” review should be conducted
yearly by the appropriate agency security authority.
Comprehensive classified document control system. Document controls for the most sensitive data of the weapons labs should be reinstituted by the
agency Director. The program should be constantly monitored by a centralized agency authority to ensure compliance.
A comprehensive classification review. The new agency, in coordination with the intelligence community, should promulgate new, concise, and precise
classification guidance to define and ensure awareness of information and technologies that require protection. This guidance should clear up the
widespread confusion over what is export–controlled information; what information, when joined with other data, becomes classified; and the
differences between similarly named and seemingly boundless categories such as “unclassified controlled nuclear information” and “sensitive but
unclassified nuclear information.”
BUSINESS ISSUES
Make security an integral part of doing business. Security compliance must be a major requirement in every agency contract with the weapons labs.
Rather than a detailed list of tasks, the contract should make clear the security and counterintelligence standards by which the lab will be held
accountable. It is the responsibility of the lab to develop the means to achieve those objectives. If a lab fails to conform to these standards and
requirements, the agency should withhold performance award fees.
Review the process for lab management contracts. If the agency director has reason to open the bidding for lab management contracts, we strongly
recommend an intensive market research effort. Such an effort would help ensure that legitimate and competent bidders, with strong records for
productive research and development, participate in the competition.
Weapons labs foreign visitors program. This productive program should continue, but both the agency and the weapons labs, in concert, must ensure
that secrets are protected. This means precise policy standards promulgated by the agency to ensure: the integrity of the secure areas and control over
all foreign visitors and assignees; a clear demarcation between secure and open areas at the labs; strong enforcement of restrictions against sensitive
foreign visitors and assignees having access to secure facilities; and sensible but firm guidelines for weapons lab employees’ contacts with foreign
visitors from sensitive countries. Exceptions should be made by the agency director on a case–by–case basis. Clear, detailed standards should be
enforced to determine whether foreign visits and appointments receive approval. The burden of proof should be placed on the employees who propose
to host visitors from sensitive countries. Visits should be monitored by the labs and audited by an independent office. The bottom line: treat foreign
visitors and assignees with the utmost courtesy, but assume they may well be collecting information for other governments.
Foreign travel notification. The agency should institute a program whereby all agency and weapons lab employees in designated sensitive positions must
make written notification of official and personal foreign travel well before departure. The agency must keep close records of these notifications and
also ensure that effective counterintelligence briefings are provided to all such travelers. Unless formally granted an exception, scientists for weapons
labs should travel in pairs on official visits to sensitive countries.
Counterintelligence. The FBI should explore the possibility of expanding foreign counterintelligence resources in its field offices nearby the weapons
labs. The panel offers additional thoughts for improving the Department’s CI efforts in the Classified Appendix to this report.
ENDNOTES
CHAPTER: ROOT CAUSES
1 The Department of Energy National Weapons Labs and Plants discussed in this report are: Lawrence Livermore National Lab, California; Los Alamos National
Lab, New Mexico; Sandia National Lab, New Mexico; PANTEX Plant, Texas; Kansas City Plant, Missouri; Oak Ridge (Y-12) Plant, Tennessee.
2 Boyer, Paul. By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985, p.
138.
3 National Science Foundation, “Science and Engineering Indicators,” 1996.
4 National Science Foundation, “Data Brief,” Vol. 1996, No. 9, August 19, 1999.
5 Classified report.
6 Classified DOE Report.
7 DOE, “Annual Report to Congress, 1978,” April 1979.
8 U.S. Nuclear Command and Control System Support Staff, “Assessment Report: Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons-Related Security Oversight Process,”
March 1998.
CHAPTER: RECURRING VULNERABILITIES
1 U.S. Nuclear Command and Control System Support Staff, “Assessment Report: Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons-Related Security Oversight Process,”
March 1998.
2 Classified DOE Report.
3 Classified DOE Report.
4 Classified DOE Report.
5 Classified DOE Report.
6 DOE, Office of Counterintelligence, “The Foreign Intelligence Threat to Department of Energy Personnel, Facilities and Research, Summary Report,” August
1990.
7 Classified U.S. Government report.
8 GAO/RCED-97-229, “Department of Energy: DOE Needs to Improve Controls Over Foreign Visitors to Weapons Laboratories,” September 25, 1997.
9 Hewlett, Richard G. and Francis Duncan, “Atomic Shield: A History of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,” May 1969.
10 Classified DOE report.
11 DOE, “Office of Safeguards and Security, Report to the Secretary: Status of Safeguards and Security,” February 1993.
12 Classified FBI document.
13 Classified U.S. Government report.
14 Classified DOE report.
15 DOE, “Office of Safeguards and Security, Status of Safeguards and Security, Fiscal Year 1993,” January 1994 (U).
16 DOE/IG-385, “Special Audit Report on the Department of Energy’s Arms and Military-Type Equipment,” February 1, 1996.
17 Classified DOE report.
18 DOE, “Annual Report to the President on the Status of Safeguards and Security at Domestic Nuclear Weapons Facilities,” September 1996.
19 GAO/RCED-91-12, “Nuclear Safety: Potential Security Weaknesses at Los Alamos and Other DOE Facilities,” October 1990 (U) and GAO/RCED-92-39,
“Nuclear Security: Safeguards and Security Weaknesses at DOE’s Weapons Facilities,” December 13, 1991.
20 GAO/RCED-90-122, “Nuclear Security: DOE Oversight of Livermore’s Property Management System is Inadequate,” April 18, 1990.
21 GAO/”Key Factors Underlying Security Problems at DOE Facilities,” (Statement of Victor S. Rezendes, Director, Energy, Resources and Science Issues,
Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, GAO, in testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on
Commerce, House of Representatives), April 20, 1999.
22 GAO/”Key Factors Underlying Security Problems at DOE Facilities,” (Statement of Victor S. Rezendes, Director, Energy, Resources and Science Issues,
Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, GAO, in testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on
Commerce, House of Representatives), April 20, 1999.
23 Classified DOE report.
24 Hewlett, Richard G. and Francis Duncan, “Atomic Shield, A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission,” May 1969.
25 GAO/RCED-89-34, “Nuclear Security: DOE Actions to Improve the Personnel Clearance Program,” November 9, 1988.
26 DOE/IG/WR-O-90-02, “Nevada Operations Office Oversight of Management and Operating Contractor Security Clearances,” March 1990.
27 Classified DOE report.
28 DOE/IG/WR-B-91-08, “Review of Contractor’s Personnel Security Clearances at DOE Field Office, Albuquerque,” September 1991.
29 DOE, “Office of Safeguards and Security, Report to the Secretary: Status of Safeguards and Security,” February 1993.
30 DOE, “Office of Safeguards and Security, Status of Safeguards and Security, Fiscal Year 1995,” January 1996.
31 Classified U.S. Government report.
32 Classified DOE report.
33 GAO/RCED-92-39, “Nuclear Security: Safeguards and Security Weaknesses at DOE Weapons Facilities,” December 13, 1991.
34 Classified DOE report.
35 Classified DOE report.
36 DOE, “Office of Safeguards and Security, Status of Safeguards and Security, Fiscal Year 1993,” January 1994 (U).
37 DOE, “Office of Safeguards and Security, Status of Safeguards and Security, Fiscal Year 1994,” January 1995 (U).
38 Classified DOE report.
39 Classified DOE report.
40 Classified DOE report.
41 Classified DOE report.
42 Classified DOE report.
43 New York Times, “Abstract,” August 5, 1977.
44 DOE, “Plutonium: The First 50 Years. United States Plutonium Production, Acquisition, and Utilization from 1944 Through 1994.
45 GAO/RCED-92-39, “Nuclear Security: Safeguards and Security Weaknesses at DOE’s Weapons Facilities,” December 13, 1991.
46 GAO/RCED/AIMD-95-5, “Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. International Nuclear Materials Tracking Capabilities are Limited,” December 27, 1994.
47 GAO/AIMD-95-165, “Department of Energy: Poor Management of Nuclear Materials Tracking Capabilities Are Limited,” August 3, 1995.
48 DOE, “Office of Safeguards and Security, Status of Safeguards and Security, Fiscal Year 1995,” January 1996.
49 U.S. Nuclear Command and Control System Support Staff, “Assessment Report: Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons-Related Security Oversight
Process,” March 1998.
50 GAO/RCED-89-31, “Major Weaknesses in Foreign Visitor Controls at Weapons Laboratories,” October 11, 1988.
51 Classified U.S. Goverment report.
52 GAO/RCED-97-229, “Department of Energy: DOE Needs to Improve Controls Over Foreign Visitors to Weapons Laboratories,” September 25, 1997.
53 Classified DOE report.
54 GAO/RCED-97-229, “Department of Energy: DOE Needs to Improve Controls Over Foreign Visitors to Weapons Laboratories,” September 25, 1997
55 GAO/RCED-97-229, “Department of Energy: DOE Needs to Improve Controls Over Foreign Visitors to Weapons Laboratories,” September 25, 1997.
56 DOE, “Response to the Cox Committee Report: The Benefits of Department of Energy International Scientific and Technical Exchange Programs,” April 1999.
57 GAO/RCED-99-19, “Department of Energy: Problems in DOE’s Foreign Visitors Program Persist,” October 6, 1998.
CHAPTER: ASSESSMENTS
1 In April 1997, the FBI Director met with Secretary Pena, who had taken office in March, to deliver a highly critical FBI assessment of DOE’s counterintelligence
program. In June, DOE officials briefed the Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls. In July, the FBI
Director and the Director of Central Intelligence expressed serious concern that DOE had not moved to implement the recommendations in the FBI report.
2 The National Counterintelligence Policy Board (NACIPB) was created by a 1994 Presidential Decision Directive to serve as the National Security Council’s
primary mechanism to develop an effective national counterintelligence program. Current core NACIPB members include senior representatives from the Director of
Central Intelligence /Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of
Justice, the military departments’ CI organizations, the National Security Council, and, as of 1997, the Department of Energy and NSA.
CHAPTER: REORGANIZATION
1 DOE, “Department of Energy First Tier Organizations, Terms of Office,” undated.
2 DOE, Field Fact Book, May 1998.
3 Unclassified organizational data provided by National Reconnaissance Office.
[End]
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@HWA
63.0 Terrorists Use the Net
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 18th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Anonymous
Since everyone else does it terrorists do to. Terrorists
are using the net as a means of communication,
collaboration, and information dissemination. Sharing
technology and spreading information to followers via
the internet has become a necessary way of doing
business. Web sites are new weapons terrorists are
adding to their armory. A good quote from this article,
"We cannot just make a law that will stop them from
using it."
Computer Currents
http://www.currents.net/newstoday/99/06/15/news13.html
Daily News
Terrorism Via The Net
By Erwin Lemuel G Oliva, Metropolitan Computer Times
June 15, 1999
Almost every sector in society has exploited the Internet.
Unfortunately, not everyone has good intentions. Terrorists now
use the Internet as means of communication and collaboration,
said Mike Coldrick, a bomb technician and anti-terrorism expert
from Scotland Yard during the recent ASEAN Defense
Technology Exchange forum in Manila.
"Modern terrorists travel by jet plane, communicate to followers
by satellite telephone, and recruit and spread messages via the
Internet," Coldrick states in a paper he presented during the
forum.
Technology has changed the face of terrorist organizations.
Coldrick noted, saying that there is growing evidence that
terrorists are currently using the latest means of
communication, such as the Internet, to disseminate terrorist
literature and doctrine.
In the same way, terrorist groups also use the Internet to
transfer terrorist technology to other groups all over the world.
"Lately, the Colombian revolutionary group, FARC, have
produced stand off weapons and heavy mortars to a design very
similar to those produced by the Provisional Irish Republican
Army. No doubt this technology was passed on by
PIRA-trained Basques (separatist group from Spain). Or did the
Colombian group find it on the Internet?" asked Coldrick.
Most often terrorist groups are able to create improvised
explosive devices and other weaponry using locally available
materials. In some instances, they buy them from international
black markets. The latter, however, entails a lot of risk, said
Coldrick.
Coldrick laments that despite the advances in technology,
terrorist groups' activities are not generally monitored due to
legal issues such as privacy. "We cannot just make a law that
will stop them from using it," he said.
"It is important for people to exchange information about the
activities of terrorists," he added. The International Association
of Bomb Technicians and Investigators and the World
Explosives Ordinance Disposal (EOD) Foundation, of which
Coldrick is president, actively exchange e-mail and hold
discussion groups over the Net.
"In 41 years of my practice, I'll still find new things on the
Internet," he remarked.Daily News
Terrorism Via The Net
By Erwin Lemuel G Oliva, Metropolitan Computer Times
June 15, 1999
Almost every sector in society has exploited the Internet.
Unfortunately, not everyone has good intentions. Terrorists now
use the Internet as means of communication and collaboration,
said Mike Coldrick, a bomb technician and anti-terrorism expert
from Scotland Yard during the recent ASEAN Defense
Technology Exchange forum in Manila.
"Modern terrorists travel by jet plane, communicate to followers
by satellite telephone, and recruit and spread messages via the
Internet," Coldrick states in a paper he presented during the
forum.
Technology has changed the face of terrorist organizations.
Coldrick noted, saying that there is growing evidence that
terrorists are currently using the latest means of
communication, such as the Internet, to disseminate terrorist
literature and doctrine.
In the same way, terrorist groups also use the Internet to
transfer terrorist technology to other groups all over the world.
"Lately, the Colombian revolutionary group, FARC, have
produced stand off weapons and heavy mortars to a design very
similar to those produced by the Provisional Irish Republican
Army. No doubt this technology was passed on by
PIRA-trained Basques (separatist group from Spain). Or did the
Colombian group find it on the Internet?" asked Coldrick.
Most often terrorist groups are able to create improvised
explosive devices and other weaponry using locally available
materials. In some instances, they buy them from international
black markets. The latter, however, entails a lot of risk, said
Coldrick.
Coldrick laments that despite the advances in technology,
terrorist groups' activities are not generally monitored due to
legal issues such as privacy. "We cannot just make a law that
will stop them from using it," he said.
"It is important for people to exchange information about the
activities of terrorists," he added. The International Association
of Bomb Technicians and Investigators and the World
Explosives Ordinance Disposal (EOD) Foundation, of which
Coldrick is president, actively exchange e-mail and hold
discussion groups over the Net.
"In 41 years of my practice, I'll still find new things on the
Internet," he remarked.
@HWA
64.0 Beat the CIA at their own game? - crypto sculpture cracking
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 18th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
CIA Crypto Sculpture
contributed by lamer
There is an encoded sculpture in the Langley courtyard,
and now there is a public challenge to see if someone in
the general public can crack the code before the CIA
(of course, they have had a 10 year head start).
ABC News
http://www.abcnews.go.com/onair/WorldNewsTonight/wnt9990615_ciacode.html
By John Martin
ABCNEWS.com
L A N G L E Y, Va., June 15 — Behind the Central
Intelligence Agency’s headquarters, there’s a
secret message waiting to be decoded.
To the delight of its creator, artist Jim
Sanborn of Washington, the message
remains a mystery to the agency and the
hundreds of employees who relax in the
courtyard where his sculpture stands. “I
don’t know that it will ever be totally
figured out,” says Sanborn.
Only William Webster, CIA director
at the time the sculpture was erected, was
given the decoded text, and he locked it
in the office safe when he left the agency in 1991.
A Break in the Case
But finally, after all these years, there’s been a break. An
analyst at the agency has deciphered part of the message.
In fact, he’s deciphered two parts of the message.
The CIA public affairs office is quick to point out that
each employee works to unravel the puzzle on his own
time. Presumably, the agency’s computers, or those of the
code-breaking National Security Agency, could unlock the
message in a matter of hours or days.
David Stein, a 38-year-old CIA physicist, working at
home nights and weekends for about 400 hours, has
deciphered all but 97 of the letters.
This is part of what he deciphered: “They used the
earth’s magnetic field. The information was gathered and
transmitted underground to an unknown location.”
What location? If you know the code, the coordinates
are there.
“Thirty-eight degrees, 57 minutes, 6.5 seconds, north.
77 degrees, 8 minutes, 44 minutes west. ID’ed by rows,”
reads Stein. That is the approximate location of the
sculpture.
We showed retired CIA cryptographer Ed Scheidt
Stein’s work. Scheidt says Stein is on the right track. And
he should know — Scheidt is the one who taught the artist
how to encode his message.
As to the section Stein hasn’t been able to solve,
Scheidt says, “That’s still a secret.”
And that’s how the sculptor wants it. “I think it’s
important that every piece of artwork holds one’s attention
for as long as possible,” says Sanborn.
Still, after nine years, the veil has been pulled back
slightly. But the mystery continues, and the CIA says it still
wants the message deciphered, if only to show it enjoys the
challenge.
Your Turn
We invite you to try cracking the code. You can see the full
code at the bottom of this page. Mull it over and then post
your guesses on the message board above or use the board
to discuss things with fellow cryptographers. And then we
will see whether one of our readers can accomplish what
the CIA has not in nearly a decade.
Need a Hint?
We have posted a partial transcript with an interview Stein
to help you. Each day we will post a portion of what Stein
has already deciphered. Look for it at the bottom of the
yellow box.
The Full Code
Left Side
EMUFPHZLRFAXYUSDJKZLDKRNSHGNFIVJ
YQTQUXQBQVYUVLLTREVJYQTMKYRDMFD
VFPJUDEEHZWETZYVGWHKKQETGFQJNCE
GGWHKK?DQMCPFQZDQMMIAGPFXHQRLG
TIMVMZJANQLVKQEDAGDVFRPJUNGEUNA
QZGZLECGYUXUEENJTBJLBQCRTBJDFHRR
YIZETKZEMVDUFKSJHKFWHKUWQLSZFTI
HHDDDUVH?DWKBFUFPWNTDFIYCUQZERE
EVLDKFEZMOQQJLTTUGSYQPFEUNLAVIDX
FLGGTEZ?FKZBSFDQVGOGIPUFXHHDRKF
FHQNTGPUAECNUVPDJMQCLQUMUNEDFQ
ELZZVRRGKFFVOEEXBDMVPNFQXEZLGRE
DNQFMPNZGLFLPMRJQYALMGNUVPDXVKP
DQUMEBEDMHDAFMJGZNUPLGEWJLLAETG
ENDYAHROHNLSRHEOCPTEOIBIDYSHNAIA
CHTNREYULDSLLSLLNOHSNOSMRWXMNE
TPRNGATIHNRARPESLNNELEBLPIIACAE
WMTWNDITEENRAHCTENEUDRETNHAEOE
TFOLSEDTIWENHAEIOYTEYQHEENCTAYCR
EIFTBRSPAMHHEWENATAMATEGYEERLB
TEEFOASFIOTUETUAEOTOARMAEERTNRTI
BSEDDNIAAHTTMSTEWPIEROAGRIEWFEB
AECTDDHILCEIHSITEGOEAOSDDRYDLORIT
RKLMLEHAGTDHARDPNEOHMGFMFEUHE
ECDMRIPFEIMEHNLSSTTRTVDOHW?OBKR
UOXOGHULBSOLIFBBWFLRVQQPRNGKSSO
TWTQSJQSSEKZZWATJKLUDIAWINFBNYP
VTTMZFPKWGDKZXTJCDIGKUHUAUEKCAR
Right side
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCD
AKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYP
BRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPT
CYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTO
DPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOS
ETOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSA
FOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSAB
GSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABC
HABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCD
IBCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDE
JCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEF
KDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFG
LEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGH
MFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHI
NGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJ
OHIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJL
PIJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLM
QJLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMN
RLMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQ
SMNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQU
TNQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUV
UQUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVW
VUVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWX
WVWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZ
XWXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZK
YXZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKR
ZZKRYPTOSABCDEFGHIJLMNQUVWXZKRY
H I N T O F T H E D A Y
“Kryptos” Completed Plaintext. Top Half.
BETWEEN SUBTLE SHADING AND THE ABSENCE OF
LIGHT LIES THE NUANCE OF ILLUSION. THEY USED
THE EARTH’S MAGNETIC FIELD. THE INFORMATION
WAS GATHERED AND TRANSMITTED UNDERGROUND
TO AN UNKNOWN LOCATION.
DOES LANGLEY KNOW ABOUT THIS? THEY SHOULD
ITS BURIED OUT THERE SOMEWHERE. ONLY WW.
THIS WAS HIS LAST MESSAGE.
THIRTY-EIGHT DEGREES FIFTY-SEVEN MINUTES SIX
POINT FIVE SECONDS NORTH SEVENTY-SEVEN
DEGREES EIGHT MINUTES FORTY-FOUR SECONDS
WEST ID BY ROWS.
(Bottom Half) SLOWLY DESPARATLY SLOWLY THE
REMAINS OF PASSAGE DEBRIS THAT ENCUMBERED
THE LOWER PART OF THE DOORWAY WAS REMOVED
WITH TREMBLING HANDS I MADE A TINY BREACH IN
THE UPPER LEFT HAND CORNER AND THEN
WIDENING THE HOLE A LITTLE I INSERTED THE
CANDLE AND PEERED IN THE HOT AIR ESCAPING
FROM THE CHANBER CAUSED THE FLAME TO
FLICKER BUT PRESENTLY DETAILS OF THE ROOM
WITHIN EMERGED FROM THE MIST. CAN YOU SEE
ANYTHINGQ?
@HWA
65.0 Pirates of Silicon Valley
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 18th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
Pirates of Silicon Valley
contributed by Silicosis
'Pirates of Silicon Valley' airs on TNT this Sunday at
8pm. The show is supposed to detail the history of
Apple & Microsoft. While this info is going to be
plastered everywhere else, it may be worth watching (if
you have nothing better to do, after all, they are old
school hackers.
TNT
http://tnt.turner.com/movies/tntoriginals/pirates/
If you missed this show its available on the web via
the newsgroups, not that I condone such activity - Ed ;)
@HWA
66.0 .mil hacker cartoon
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 18th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
Cartoon
contributed by carole
Here is a rather funny carton, found in a rather
interestingly funny place.
www.nswc.navy.mil
http://www.nswc.navy.mil/ISSEC/Gif/cartoons/hacked.gif
** This url is of course, dead now. Anyone have a copy of
the gif?, i'll check PacketStorm too...
@HWA
67.0 If Software Breaks Who is Liable? .
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 21st 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Weld Pond
Companies that manufacture toasters, cars, and other
products are liable for defects in their goods but not
software companies. According to the license
agreements you agree to when installing software the
manufacture is not liable for anything. Software is often
shipped with humongous problems that the
manufacturer knew about yet there is no accountability.
Boston Globe
http://www.globe.com/dailyglobe2/171/focus/You_lose_+.shtml
COMMERCE
You lose!
Cars and toasters are expected to work. But bad software is a
norm, and the industry wants to keep it that way
By Charles Palson, 06/20/99
he engine in your new car self-destructs after a five-minute drive. The
dealer later tells you the manufacturer knowingly produced the defect,
but you have to pay for a new engine anyway. That's because the
automakers convinced Congress that consumer protection laws would drive
up car prices beyond the reach of the average buyer, so the laws were
changed to exempt the companies.
Sound like B-grade fiction? Unfortunately, the answer is: not for the
American software industry. Their intention is clearly stated in the licensing
agreement displayed on your monitor when you install new software.
Clicking OK means you agree that the manufacturer bears no responsibility
for defects.
Did you find features that don't work as advertised? Truth-in-advertising
laws don't apply. Did the program erase your hard drive? So what. Did the
manufacturer have prior knowledge of 95 percent of all the defects
beforehand, the industry average? Irrelevant. You might be able to return the
product, but your time, whatever it is worth, is lost. It's the law.
But not according to some courts, which have recently declared these
licenses illegal because they contradict provisions in the Uniform Commercial
Code, the grandfather of all consumer-protection laws. The software
industry, seeing where this liability could lead, now wants to exclude itself
from the minimal consumer protections offered under the code. Its
argument? Perfect or error-free software would be either impossible or too
expensive to produce.
''Perfect'' was carefully chosen for its emotional effect. After all, everyone
knows that achieving perfection is beyond any mortal. But it's a false
argument. The Uniform Commercial Code doesn't mention anything about
perfection; it states in essence that a product should be fit for ordinary use
and conform to printed claims. If other American industries have managed to
conform to the code, why should software be any different?
Several reputable specialists this writer interviewed don't think it should be.
One of these, Ken Johnson, who is director of Minnesota's Rochester
Technology Center, a division of D.H. Andrews Inc., and who is a former
IBM software executive, is sure that software companies can produce
top-quality products.
Johnson should know. He helped manage a now legendary project that
produced the IBM AS400 computer. A huge effort at the time, the
developers delivered on schedule, and any significant defects were fixed in a
timely manner. And the price was reasonable. Actually, counting both direct
and indirect costs, the AS400 still costs significantly less than comparable
products from other companies, and it delivers more reliability.
The lesson is that, contrary to what industry spokesmen claim, high quality at
reasonable prices is indeed possible.
With a few notable exceptions, however, the industry as a whole chooses to
continue producing software riddled with defects that often make a mockery
of extravagant advertising claims.
Microsoft, for example, shows every intention of continuing the practice of
publicizing features that don't necessarily work. Not one word on the
well-known issue can be found in company president Steve Ballmer's recent
lengthy announcement that quality will take center stage. When this writer
questioned spokewoman Marla Polenz on the issue, she couldn't find anyone
to talk about it.
Perhaps nothing more eloquently illustrates the problems in Microsoft than
the fact that it cannot readily use its own flagship business product, NT
Server, for some mission-critical applications, such as shipping, because it is
too unreliable. According to several people close to IBM and Microsoft, the
latter uses AS400s when reliability really counts. Gartner Group studies
tracking computer reliability say that average downtime for NT Servers is
more than a half-hour per day, compared with a fraction of a second for the
AS400. That's a lot of lost revenue in a year.
But it should be emphasized that this is not just a Microsoft problem. Cem
Kaner, lawyer, former software engineer, and nationally known spokesman
on software quality, stresses that the great majority of companies knowingly
issue software with substantial defects. He, along with many other observers,
estimates that software manufacturers already know 95 percent of all the
bugs when they put their programs on the market.
Why the quality gap between IBM and so many other companies?
According to Kaner, the answer in principle is simple: Product quality
sometimes takes a back seat to getting products out the door for immediate
profit. The whole story, however, is more complex. The problem starts at
the beginning of a project when managers invariably underestimate the
development time requirements by a wide margin.
When the projected completion date arrives, pressure builds from anxious
marketing and financial departments that have made commitments based on
the promised date. Often, the product is finally released under pressure
despite defects.
The nature of the problem is well known in the industry. Roger Sherman,
former Microsoft director of testing, acknowledged, for example, that bad
schedules are responsible for most quality problems.
How has IBM largely found a resolution? According to Johnson, the
operative word is experience. Lots of it. Key development personnel at
IBM have carefully worked in different capacities on many successful
projects. These people have acquired through experience the knowledge it
takes to make useful time estimates. They know it is a little more expensive
to take such necessary measures to produce the first product version, but
they also know that, in the long run, it is less expensive because the
considerable costs associated with defects drop dramatically. ''The AS400
development team created and still adheres to meticulous quality practices,''
says Johnson.
A shift to more reliable software will not be easy. In any industry described
by observers as freewheeling, young and brash, the word ''meticulous'' might
as well be Sanskrit. Computer science departments don't teach its practical
meaning, and most software developers lack even the awareness that
quality, accurate scheduling, and reasonable cost are not mutually
contradictory.
But the point remains: Optimal software quality is doable, and any
protestations to the contrary are, well, whining.
Without even the currently minimal penalties under the Uniform Commercial
Code, the industry would have even less incentive to reform itself. Indeed,
some observers, such as Mark Paulk, professor at the computer science
department of Carnegie Mellon University, believe that the code should have
stricter provisions to increase the penalties for poor software quality. If the
industry felt the pain currently only felt by consumers, the pain would be a
positive impetus for change.
This story ran on page E01 of the Boston Globe on 06/20/99.
© Copyright 1999 Globe Newspaper Company.
@HWA
68.0 Trinux Release 0.61
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 21st 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by mdfranz
Besides upgrading to glibc2 and Linux kernel 2.2.x,
Trinux 0.61 now offers remote package loading via
wget, updated versions of many of the tools you know
and love (such as nmap and ntop) and new additions
like hping, cgichk, mns, and SAINT (well, at least the
scanner's underneath, who needs the sorry Web/CGI
interface). Just like before, all on 2 floppies and without
disturbing the other operating systems on your PC. The
standard kernel now provides support for the most
common Ethernet cards and with more reliable DHCP
support, booting Trinux from your school/office PC has
never been easier.
Trinux
http://www.trinux.org
69.0 Australia Looks to Increase Local Police Powers
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 21st 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Code Kid
The Electronic Transactions Bill, expected to be
introduced in the Australian Parliament in the spring
session, will give local police departments more
authority when investigating computer crimes. Many
computer crimes involve computer trespass and criminal
damage neither of which has extra-territorial provisions.
This new bill will give police powers to investigate crimes
even when they originate outside their normal
jurisdictions.
The Age
http://www.theage.com.au/daily/990620/news/news11.html
Police may go after interstate
hackers
By DAVID ADAMS
The State Government is considering giving police greater
powers to investigate computer hackers operating from
interstate.
Because hacking normally involves offences of computer
trespass and criminal damage - neither of which has
extra-territorial provisions - police have limited powers to
pursue hackers who attack Victorian companies from
interstate.
Under the Draft Electronic Commerce Framework Bill,
released for public comment in December, it was
proposed that the new offences of unlawful access to
data in a computer and of damaging data in a computer
be introduced into the Victorian Crimes Act 1958.
The draft bill also provided for police in Victoria to
investigate people interstate committing the new offences
provided there was a substantial link to Victoria. The
period of public consultation ended in February. The bill,
since renamed the Electronic Transactions Bill, is
expected to be introduced in Parliament in the spring
session.
A spokesman for the Minister for Information and
Multimedia, Mr Alan Stockdale, said that he could not
disclose what was in the bill until it was presented in
Parliament. But he said there had been considerable
consultation.
The head of the Victoria Police computer crime
investigation squad, Detective Senior Sergeant David
Caldwell, said that it was less common for hackers to
operate across state borders than inside their own state.
He said that most hacking incidents in Victoria were
motivated by curiosity rather than malice but organised
gangs of hackers and individuals were known to
deliberately target companies. Reasons included revenge
or notoriety.
In one case last year, a Glen Waverley man known by
the name of ``Number Crunch'' claimed to have broken
into the computer systems of 1300 companies in all
Australian capital cities in a two-week hacking spree that
caused $130,000 damage.
Each time the man entered a company's computer
system, he left behind a message informing it of its victim
number and asking it to report the invasion to one of two
telephone numbers, those of Melbourne television
Channels 9 and 7.
Detective Senior Sergeant Caldwell said that hacking had
been identified as one of the greatest security threats
facing companies, but some companies still appeared to
have a ``false sense of security''.
Last year, a joint Victoria Police and Deloitte Touche
Tohmatsu survey found that 11per cent of companies
failed to have any security policy in place when
connecting to the Internet.
In the poll of about 90 of Australia's largest companies,
one-third said their computer systems had been attacked
in the previous 12 months. Of those, 58per cent were
attacked from an external source.
Sixty-four per cent of companies said that hacking was
the greatest security concern in the future.
@HWA
70.0 Aussie Gov Downloads Porn
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 21st 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Weld Pond
The Australian Protective Service, similar in function to
the US Secret Service has found that six of its members
downloaded pornography over the internet while on the
job. The Australian Defense Department is conducting
an investigation.
32 Bits Online
http://www.32bitsonline.com/news.php3?news=news/199906/nb199906175&page=1
Australian Govt Security Officers Caught Downloading Porn
Officers in the Australian Protective Service, the Federal Government's protective security agency, are being investigated
after a "routine" sweep found they had downloaded pornography from the Internet while on duty.
The Australian Defence Department is conducting the inquiry into the use of Defence Department
computers in its Canberra headquarters to download pornographic images by six officers, according to
the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC).
A spokesman told the ABC that the incidents were not considered a serious breach of security but an
investigation would ensue, with all APS officers banned from using the department's Internet links while
it is conducted.
The APS is responsible for the protection of Parliament House in Canberra, the residences of the
Prime Minister and the Governor-General, foreign diplomatic missions, airport security and defense
establishments around Australia.
The use of government computers to access pornography on the Internet was highlighted recently by an
adult Website operator. The site owner publicized the Internet domain names of a number of Australian
government agencies, including the Defence Department, that regularly accessed the adult site in
protest at Australian Internet legislation that requires ISPs to block and filter access to material on the
Internet (Newsbytes, May 28, 1999).
@HWA
71.0 Software Glitch or Security Breach
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 21st 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Weld Pond
When all else fails claim a 'hacker' did it. After some
customers received discounts of as much as 85%,
Microworkz faxed at least one customer claiming that
their security had been breached. Later when contacted
by a reporter they denied it and claimed it was due to a
software problem.
ZD Net
http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2279360,00.html?chkpt=zdnnstop
72.0 Viruses Cost Companies Big Dough
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 21st 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by nvirB
In the first two quarters of 1999 viruses have costs US
businesses 7.6 billion in lost revenue. Computer
Economics of Carlsbad, California has completed a study
that says the amount can be attributed to computer
downtime and the expense of dealing with the virus
infestations.
Wired
http://www.wired.com/news/news/technology/story/20297.html
Fox Market Wire
http://foxmarketwire.com/061999/virus.sml
Computer Economics, Inc.
http://www.computereconomics.com/
Wired;
Viruses Cost Big Bucks
Wired News Report
12:20 p.m. 18.Jun.99.PDT
Businesses worldwide have lost a total of
US$7.6 billion in the first two quarters of
1999 at the hands of Melissa, the
Explore.Zip worm and other viruses, a
new study finds.
Computer Economics of Carlsbad,
California said the costs resulted from lost
productivity due to computer downtime,
and the expense of dealing with virus
attacks.
The study also predicted that the
frequency of the attacks will continue at
the current rate, and that systems
failures could be more severe.
Computer Economics polled 185 large
companies and totaled their combined
losses.
Michael Erbschloe, vice president of
research for Computer Economics, said
that companies must make an investment
in security to prevent further damage
from viruses.
"We've surveyed people in IT
organizations for the last 12 years,"
Erbschloe said. "We're constantly getting
the response that computer security is
underfunded."
-=-
Fox Market Wire;
Computer Virus Costs to Business Surge
11.09 a.m. ET (1509 GMT) June 19, 1999
NEW YORK — Computer virus and "worm" attacks on information systems
have caused businesses to lose a total of $7.6 billion in the first half of 1999 as a
result of disabled computers, a research firm said Friday
The cost of viruses and worms — computer bugs spread by e-mail that can
cause system shutdowns — was about five times larger in the first six months of
1999 than businesses suffered during all of last year, said Computer Economics
Inc.
The most recent study was based on 185 companies representing 900,000
international users, while the 1998 survey used slightly different methodology,
researcher Michael Erbschloe said.
"The numbers probably came out low," he said. "It is a conservative number in
that not everyone tracks cost, and most companies tend to undercount and
underreport."
He said the $7.6 billion figure represented lost productivity and repair costs
reported by the company. The 1998 figure of about $1.5 billion also included
"intrusions" to corporate systems, in addition to general virus attacks.
Erbschloe said this year's high profile attacks by ExploreZip worm, which erased
computer files and caused the shutdown of some corporate e-mail systems, and
the Melissa virus, which spread quickly but did not destroy data, would only
draw more attacks.
"Hackers don't like to be outdone," he said. "And most companies are
underfunding their security efforts."
-=-
@HWA
73.0 B4B0 Issue 8 Released.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 21st 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by tip
The latest and greatest issue of B4B0 has been
released. Articles discuss issues on system/network
security, humor, as well as dementia. Their primary
focus has always been the liberation of normalcy, and
hopefully the redline youth of the world will turn the
new trend in the gospel sound.
B4B0
http://www.b4b0.org
@HWA
74.0 f41th Issue 7
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 21st 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by D4RKCYDE
D4RKCYDE have released f41th issue 7, the 3rd
installment to the magazine. This issue contains even
more than before, with in-depth articles such as '5ESS
Compact Digital Exchanges' and 'Chronus ICMP Packet
Timestamps' with much, much more.
f41th
http://darkcyde.system7.org
75.0 DOD Considers New Network
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 22nd 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by dis-crete
In an effort to defend against frequent cyber attacks,
the Pentagon is considering building a new computer
network to handle e-commerce and public web pages,
cutting off existing connections to the Internet. This
follows an increase in the rate of successful attacks on
the Non-Classified Internet Protocol Router Network
(NIPRNET). While a separate network sounds like a good
idea in theory the practicalities of completely separating
NIPRNET from the Internet will not be easy.
Federal Computer Week
http://www.fcw.com/pubs/fcw/1999/0621/fcw-newsnetwork-6-21-99.html
JUNE 21, 1999
Cyberattacks spur talk of 3rd DOD network
New network would support e-commerce and public access
to DOD Web sites
BY BOB BREWIN (antenna@fcw.com)<
AND DANIEL VERTON (dan_verton@fcw.com)
As part of a strategy to defend its unclassified networks against relentless
cyberattacks, the Pentagon may establish a new network to handle electronic
commerce and other interactions with the public while cutting off all other
existing connections to the Internet.
The proposal follows an increase in the rate of cyberattacks -- many stemming
from the Kosovo conflict -- on the Non-Classified Internet Protocol Router
Network (NIPRNET), through which the department transmits unclassified
information, including some tactical data, via the Internet.
Marv Langston, deputy assistant secretary of Defense for command, control,
communications and intelligence (C3I), said top DOD officials have begun
debating whether to disconnect NIPRNET from the Internet and create another
network, a so-called third layer, which would provide Internet links between
DOD and e-commerce partners and provide the public with access to military
Web pages.
The proposed strategy, under debate by DOD officials, would leave the
department with three layers of networks: the Secret Internet Protocol Router
Network, for classified information; NIPRNET, which would become a virtual
private network for internal DOD communications; and the new network,
through which the department would communicate with its business partners
and the public.
John Hamre, deputy secretary of Defense, framed the issues behind the policy
debate in stark terms last week, calling the short air campaign in Yugoslavia
against Serbia "the first cyberwar," citing Serb attacks against NATO's public
World Wide Web pages.
"We were under a cyberattack in our operations against Serbia," Hamre said at
last week's GovTechNet International Conference and Exhibition. DOD is
vulnerable to such attacks because the department "routinely operates in
commercial cyberspace" using NIPRNET, he said.
Lt. Gen. William Campbell, the Army's director for C3I, called the current
NIPRNET policy "close to madness" because it is used to actively support
military operations.
Campbell, who would like to see DOD set up the third-layer network, said the
Pentagon should not compromise the security of NIPRNET to support
e-commerce and interactions with the public. "The [e-commerce] tail should not
wag the C3I dog," Campbell said.
Tim Bass, president and chief executive officer of the security consulting firm
The Silk Road Group Ltd., said the third layer is a very wise plan.
"Denial-of-service attacks against [Internet Protocol] networks are a real threat,
and there is no disagreement that IP is highly vulnerable," Bass said.
"Furthermore, nonclassified IP access to the Internet is now a mission-critical
requirement."
Rick Forno, a security officer for Network Solutions Inc. and a former senior
security analyst at the House of Representatives' Information Resources
Security Office, also said DOD's plan is plausible. "All public-access networks
should be on a completely compartmented environment from anything [classified
"For Official Use Only"] or higher, including day-to-day routine local-area
networks," he said. If properly carried out, the policy "will be a great solution,"
Forno said.
However, the proposed strategy is not without some obstacles, DOD officials
said.
Langston, who also serves as DOD's deputy chief information officer, which
gives him a key role in the network security policy debate, said, "It is difficult to
unplug [DOD] from the Internet."
Establishing a third layer would, in essence, set up another U.S., if not global,
DOD network, which would be expensive, Langston said.
Langston advocates protecting NIPRNET by copying a Navy initiative to
secure networks with an array of technology, including intrusion-detection
systems, firewalls and encryption technology.
The Navy has developed its "defense in-depth" strategy as part of an effort to
build a secure Navywide intranet. Langston believes the strategy obviates the
need to pull the Internet plug except under the most extreme circumstances.
"The only reason to pull off the Internet is a massive cyberattack," Langston
said.
Rear Adm. John Gauss, commander of the Space and Naval Warfare Systems
Command, supports an ongoing NIPRNET redesign, which would involve the
Defense Information Systems Agency upgrading the network's security
measures. "What DISA's doing will protect DOD computing and still give us a
viable means of communicating with industry," Gauss said.
Lt. Gen. William Donahue, director of communications and information for the
Air Force, agreed that disconnecting NIPRNET from the Interent is not a viable
option. "We're not going to disconnect from the Internet because we depend on
it for too much," he said. But, he added, "You have to balance the need to
connect with the need to protect."
Although a decision has not yet been made about the third network, Donahue
envisions DOD reaching a stage where it initially will shut down all connections
between NIPRNET and the Internet, closing all "back door" connections, and
then reconnect DOD with a smaller number of open connections.
"There will probably be a finite number of connections to the Internet, and they
will be protected," Donahue said. When that occurs, DOD still will need "to be
serious, dedicated, dogged and persistent in protecting our network nodes," he
said.
But Campbell will continue to push to cut off DOD from the Internet. "If you
are going to be a pioneer...you cannot be faint of heart."
@HWA
76.0 NCIS Calls For National Computer Crime Squad
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 22nd 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Code Kid
The UK National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) has
called for the creation of a national cyber force in
England to fight the increasing amount of online crime.
While the Metro police in London do have a computer
crime unit there is no national organization.
BBC
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_375000/375156.stm
Sci/Tech
Cyber criminals feel the heat
By Internet Correspondent Chris Nuttall
A national cyberforce of computer specialists is needed
to combat a rising tide of online crime, according to a
major report by the UK National Criminal Intelligence
Service (NCIS).
Project Trawler, a three-year study of Internet crime,
foresees a struggle between criminals and those trying to
prevent illegal activities over the mastery of Net technology
and information.
It says crimes currently being committed include
paedophilia, pornography, hacking, hate sites, fraud and
software piracy. Criminals' use of the Net for secure
communications is an emerging problem.
Interception powers being eroded
The director general of NCIS, John Abbott, told a news
conference:
"I believe that serious
consideration should be given
to the establishment of a
national investigative
computer crime unit to
combat the growing number
of computer crimes being
carried out in the UK and to
identify and target emerging
threats.
"Furthermore, any such unit
should be intelligence-led,
separating out the minor
offenders from those with
both the motivation and capability
to commit serious crimes."
On the day the Home Office released a consultation
paper on the review of the Interception of
Communications Act, the report says existing
capabilities to lawfully intercept communications and
search seized computers will be eroded by the Internet.
"Potentially this would seriously damage law
enforcement's ability to fight serious and organised
crime," it says.
Home Secretary to bolster interception
The Home Secretary, Jack Straw, said he was
determined his proposals would "maintain interception
as the most powerful weapon in the armoury against
crime."
"It often provides the vital intelligence or the crucial piece
of the jigsaw in solving such crimes with on average, one
in two interception warrants resulting in an arrest", he
said.
"But in recent years their capability has come under
threat - sophisticated criminals and terrorists have been
quick to exploit a revolutionised communications
industry and dated legislation on interception."
The proposals, detailed on the Home Office Website,
include creating a single legal framework to regulate
interception of all networks both public and private,
wireless telegraphy and interception of mail.
Encryption expertise needed
Regarding Project Trawler's recommendations, the
Metropolitan Police in London has a computer crime
unit, but there is no such national organisation.
MPs of the Trade and Industry Select Committee said
last month there was a case for such a body in order to
combat criminals using encryption to organise their
illegal activities over the Internet.
NCIS says a national unit would investigate the most
serious offences, develop Internet expertise and support
local forces encountering sophisticated cybercrimes.
Call for international co-operation
Given the global reach of the Net, the report emphasises
that international co-operation is also vital. This includes
combined law enforcement operations, extra-territorial
jurisdiction and consistent extradition of criminals.
It points out that last year's Operation Cathedral had
demonstrated the effectiveness of co-ordinated
international action by law enforcement against
paedophile rings. This involves both exchanging
information at the preliminary stage and preventing
paedophiles tipping off other ring members when arrests
and seizures are made.
The creation of a central library of known paedophilic
images at an international level would both aid the
search for victims and help to determine the nature of
offences, it says.
Cyber complaints on the rise
NCIS suggests that filed complaints of cyber crimes
have risen from 12,000 in 1997 to more than 40,000 in
1998.
But, in an apparent reference to media coverage of the
Internet, it says it does not assess the risks or scale of
criminal activity on the Internet to be as extensive as
sometime portrayed.
The report's author , David Hart, says there is a need for
preventative steps now to avoid having to deal with a
bigger problem later:
"If the rewards are great enough and the risks low
enough then undoubtedly established criminals will
migrate to the new territory of the Internet.
"But, at the moment, even if they had
the motivation, it's not evident that
they have the capability to commit
serious computer crimes. They could
recruit or coerce people who do have
the capabilities but there are associated risks with that."
Future threats
NCIS says the 1990 Computer Misuse Act allows for
penalties of up to five years in jail and unlimited fines.
In future, it says, offences inspired by political motives,
hacking for information with financial value and "work
rage" assaults on systems will feature more.
The approach of the year 2000 is likely to spur some
program writers to create viruses triggered by the
01/01/2000 date.
Project Trawler will be available on the NCIS Website in
an unclassified version. The full report with extensive
statistics will be available to to law enforcement
agencies and government departments.
Report welcomed by cyber rights group
"The conclusions of the report and a multi-layered
approach is welcome for dealing with cybercrimes rather
than heavy-handed government regulation," said Yaman
Akdeniz, director of Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties
(UK), reacting to Project Trawler.
" However, all these initiatives within the layers proposed
should take into account the rights and liberties of
Internet users."
He said the concerns expressed about the ability to
intercept communications revealed law enforcement
bodies were still worried about the use of cryptography
for criminal purposes.
"Overall the publication of the report is welcome and
most of the future problems may be avoided and
prevented by the use and development of better security
tools. Therefore the use and development of encryption
tools should be encouraged rather than controlled for the
prevention of cyber-crimes"
@HWA
77.0 !Hispahack Found Not Guilty
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 22nd 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by LeCreme
The trial against !Hispahack member Jfs finished on June
2nd. The Spanish judge considered not guilty the only
!Hispahack member that was accused of breaking into a
university computer. This was the first case of
unauthorized computer intrusion ever judged in Spain.
!Hispahack
http://hispahack.ccc.de/en/index.htm
78.0 asahi.com Defaced
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 22nd 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by YingYang
One of the major news sites in Japan, Asahi Shimbun
Publishing Co.'s "asahi.com" was defaced in the last few
days. The most interesting thing in this article is the
claim that the news site has suffered several cyber
intrusions in the past but that this was the first one to
cause damage.
Asia Biz Tech
http://www.nikkeibp.asiabiztech.com/wcs/leaf?CID=onair/asabt/moren/74419
Asahi Shimbun's News Site Suffers Illegal Access
June 22, 1999 (TOKYO) -- Asahi Shimbun Publishing Co.'s news site "asahi.com" was accessed
illegally and could not display the home page in a standard way for a few minutes on June 20.
According to Asahi Shimbun, the problem occurred because an outside person gained illegal
access to one of the company's several mirror servers.
Within about 10 minutes,
the mirror server was separated off, and a switch was made to the other servers.
An investigation is focusing on the detailed circumstances and cause of the incident. From
June 20 to the morning of June 21, the company reinforced its surveillance setup. A full-
fledged investigation was set to start June 21, according to the company.
Asahi Shimbun's www.asahi.com has been subjected to illegal access a few times, but the
previous cases ended without causing any substantive damage. This was the first time that
the content was actually written over.
As for illegal access to a newspaper company's
news site and rewriting of the top page, another incident occurred recently in Japan. Mainichi
Newspapers Co., Ltd.'s www.mainichi.co.jp, Mainichi INTERACTIVE suffered such a case on
June 12.
(BizTech News Dept.)
@HWA
79.0 NSTAC Releases Reports
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 22nd 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by lamer
The National Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee has released several new reports detailing
various aspects of federal computer security and
infrastructure.
NSTAC
http://www.ncs.gov/nstac/NSTACReports.html
@HWA
80.0 FBI This Week
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 22nd 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
FBI This Week
contributed by ne0h
"FBI, This Week" is the name of the radio program
broadcast to over 3,200 ABC Radio Network affiliates.
This weeks episode is all about International Computer
Crime. If you miss the broadcast on your local station a
real player version is available.
FBI This Week
http://www.fbi.gov/pressrm/radio/fbiweek.htm
@HWA
81.0 Cartoon Hackers?? (From HNN rumours section)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 22nd 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by delchi
WB Scraps 'Real Hackers' Cartoon
Rumor has it that Warner Brothers and Mattel have
scrapped an idea for a new Saturday morning cartoon
with a tie in toy line called "Real Hackers". The defunct
storyline was to portray a group of real life hackers in
cartoon form, reformed and fighting for good. Amongst
the hackers to be represented were 'phiber optik',
'bernie s', 'death veggie', 'emmanuel goldstein' and 'weld
pond' as cyber warriors as they fought criminals bent on
destroying the internet. It is unknown why Warner
Brothers and Mattel scrapped this idea or if it even
existed in the first place but in this hot pre Christmas
marketplace, one can only wonder how long it will be
before this ground breaking idea starts making money
for somebody.
@HWA
82.0 Nuke Labs Stand Down
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 23rd 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Dr. Mudge
Yesterday was one of two stand down day at the
national weapons labs (Los Alamos, Sandia, LLNL, etc),
ordered by Energy Secretary Bill Richardson. This means
that due to the pressure and publicity from the
Cox/PFIAB reports no normal work was allowed at the
labs. Only emergency and operational tasks were to be
continued - 16 hours of training courses, web tests,
discussion groups, etc. over a two day period take
everything elses place. The training dealt with review of
existing security efforts, everything from operational to
computer security is being discussed, dissected, and
hopefully digested. While this may be an excellent way
to educate employees one can only hope that network
security monitoring and analysis is considered essential
daily activity.
Albuquerque Journal
http://www.abqjournal.com/news/1secrets06-21.htm
Future of Nuclear Weapons Program
in Dispute
By Jim Abrams
The Associated Press
WASHINGTON -- The head of a presidential panel on nuclear
weapons security, backed by congressional Republicans, says
security problems within the Department of Energy can't be
fixed without creating a new semi-independent agency to
oversee nuclear arms programs But Energy Secretary Bill
Richardson said he is successfully confronting the security lapses
revealed in investigations of suspected Chinese spying at
weapons laboratories, and that no new agency is needed.
"We are ready to have a beefed-up security entity within
the Department of Energy that is stronger," Richardson said on
"Fox News Sunday." "What I don't want is a new agency that is
autonomous that does not report to me."
But former Sen. Warren Rudman, R-N.H., who chaired a
panel of the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board that
issued a highly critical report of the DOE's counterintelligence
efforts last week, said the department has failed to carry out
two key security measures that President Clinton ordered 16
months ago.
It has yet to fully implement polygraph tests for scientists at
the labs and tighter security checks for foreign visitors, Rudman
said on NBC's "Meet the Press." "The attitude of people within
that department, in that bureaucracy, is astounding," he added.
The Washington Post reported today that the federal
government has begun administering polygraphs on the first of
5,000 nuclear weapons scientists and other sensitive employees
at DOE.
It could take four years to complete an initial round of
examinations on the federal workers and private contractors
working with highly classified nuclear secrets, said Edward J.
Curran, head of Energy's counterintelligence office.
So far, only that office's staff has been given the tests, he said.
Richardson told the Post some employees and civil liberties
groups are likely to protest the polygraphs and "I fully expect
lawsuits."
Richardson said there were still problems to resolve but "we
have had dramatic improvements." He said he ordered a
two-day stand-down at all the nuclear labs to test security
measures, and that he plans to dismiss some people responsible
for security lapses in about three weeks.
Richardson last week also named retired Air Force Gen.
Eugene Habiger, the former commander of all U.S. strategic
nuclear forces, to head security operations at DOE.
The president of the University of California, Richard C.
Atkinson, has ordered a review of security at the three nuclear
laboratories managed by the university to make sure national
security is not being compromised.
The FBI has investigated allegations that a former employee
of Los Alamos National Laboratory was a spy for China. The
university also manages Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.
Atkinson has asked his Council on National Laboratories to
examine whether newly tightened measures are being
implemented and whether additional measures are needed. He
also wants to compare the university's security to the protocol
used by Lockheed Martin, which manages Sandia National
Laboratories in Albuquerque.
Rudman, meanwhile, is expected to receive a good reception
Tuesday when he testifies to Congress on his panel's
recommendation that the weapons program become
semi-autonomous, reporting only to the energy secretary.
"I agree with the Rudman report," said Sen. Richard Shelby,
R-Ala., chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. "We've
said all along that the labs are not safe today. They're not safe
tomorrow."
Richardson, he said, is trying to "seal the leaks at the labs.
He's trying to bring accountability to the labs. But I believe it's
going to take statutory change to do it. I don't believe ultimately
he can do it just by himself."
Shelby said Republican Sens. Frank Murkowski of Alaska, Jon
Kyl of Arizona and Pete Domenici of New Mexico would try to
attach language on such a separation of powers to an
intelligence spending bill coming before the Senate soon.
@HWA
83.0 X-Force Down Under is Hiring
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 23rd 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by solvant
Need a job? Live in Australia? X-Force, part of ISS, is
recruiting Australian security experts for their three
month old Australian office. We sure hope they do
thorough background checks, wouldn't want them hiring
any evil hackers by mistake. A quote from the article by
Cris Rouland of ISS "I don't go out and recruit hackers
per se; I look for very strong software engineers with a
deep understanding of security and strong knowledge of
the computer underground." If that isn't a hacker I don't
know what is.
Fairfax IT
http://www.it.fairfax.com.au/software/19990621/A56795-1999Jun21.html
Australians hack into the X-Force
By DAVID BRAUE AN international anti-hacker organisation,
X-Force, is recruiting Australian security experts for an
Australian brigade.
X-Force is operated by the security software company
Internet Security Systems (ISS), which opened its
Australian office three months ago.
X-Force director Chris Rouland, in Brisbane last week
to speak at a conference on computer security incident
handling and response, said recruits for X-Force were
"very difficult to find".
"I don't go out and recruit hackers per se; I look for very
strong software engineers with a deep understanding
of security and strong knowledge of the computer
underground."
The Australian X-Force will join counterparts in London
and Atlanta in keeping tabs on the underground
community of hackers who attack government and
corporate computer networks.
Australian recruits will work while their overseas
counterparts sleep, allowing a 24-hour security
research organisation with global response capabilities.
The 50-strong X-Force continually folds, spindles and
mutilates commercial software to identify weaknesses
that might be taken advantage of by hackers.
Among its accomplishments was being the first to
decipher the insidious Back Orifice trojan horse virus
and produce a fix for the problem. "That was a good
exercise for us, a chance to stretch our legs," laughs
Rouland, about the application considered to be one of
the most dangerous hacker attacks of the decade.
Reports suggest the team's efforts are paying off: the
analyst firm Yankee Group recently reported ISS as
having 30 per cent of the $US315 million ($485 million)
adaptive security market, while the No 2 firm, Axent
Technologies, had 19 per cent.
Many of the team's innovations - including
proof-of-concept projects that are developed by a
special team known as Protoworx - end up as additions
to ISS's commercial suite of intrusion detection
software.
Recent X-Force work has produced the likes of the
Attack Tracker (which allows intrusion detection
systems to trace and identify incoming intruders);
Casper (a Linux server that offers itself as a tempting
target for hackers while collecting data on their break-in
attempts); and the new Total Surveillance Architecture.
@HWA
84.0 More Canadian RedBoxing from HackCanada
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 23rd 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by RenderMan
Need a RedBox in Canada? Got a Diamond Rio for your
MP3s? One more reason for the authorities to hate MP3s
and the device. HackCanada has released a text file on
how to use your Diamond RIO as a RedBox.
HackCanada
http://www.hackcanada.com/canadian/phreaking/riobox.txt
85.0 SecureMac is Now Open
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 23rd 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by MacUser
SecureMac.com has opened their doors this week to a
new site devoted to Macintosh Security. Learn more
about the security that exists for the mac, and how to
make your system more secure. Learn just how weak or
strong the security is on certain products as well. This
site covers encryption, security, virus, and much more.
This site is run by the same person who runs Freaks
Macintosh Archives a site devoted to macintosh hacking
and security.
SecureMac.com
http://www.securemac.com
Freaks Macintosh Archive
http://freaky.staticusers.net
@HWA
86.0 Microsoft Demands Privacy
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 23rd 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Sangfroid
Following in IBMs footsteps Microsoft will now demand a
privacy statement be present on all web sites that it
buys advertising from. Why have the two largest
internet advertisers taken this stance? The FTC is about
to make its recommendations to congress about
whether tough new federal privacy laws should be
enacted. Of course this means that HNN will have to
post something about how you have no privacy and
that we log everything, but then so does every other
web site. It should be a fun page to write. Look for it in
the next few days.
Nando Times
http://www.techserver.com/story/body/0,1634,62850-99839-710835-0,00.html
Microsoft to require privacy statement before advertising on Web sites
Copyright © 1999 Nando Media
Copyright © 1999 Associated Press
By TED BRIDIS
WASHINGTON (June 22, 1999 11:21 p.m. EDT http://www.nandotimes.com) - Microsoft Corp., the largest advertiser on the Internet, has
decided it will not buy ads next year on Web sites that fail to publish adequate privacy promises to consumers. The announcement
comes less than three months after a similar decision by IBM, the Web's second-largest advertiser.
The actions by the two companies come as the Federal Trade Commission prepares its recommendations to Congress on whether tough new federal
privacy laws are needed to protect consumers online.
The Microsoft announcement to be made Wednesday was expected at a computer conference in New York and will take effect after the end of the year.
Microsoft said it spent about $30 million last year on Web ads - but that's still a small portion of the $2 billion spent last year on Web advertising,
according to the Internet Advertising Bureau.
Microsoft, which has lobbied with other industry groups against privacy laws legislation, earlier this year began offering a free digital tool kit that promises
to allow consumers to use next-generation software to restrict what personal details Web sites collect about them.
Consumers typically must manually find a company's online privacy statement, if one exists, and read through legalese to determine what personal
information a Web site might be harvesting, such as their name, e-mail address or even favorite authors or clothing sizes.
Last month, an industry-financed study showed businesses have made dramatic improvements since last year in warning people how companies use
personal information collected about them.
Nearly two-thirds of commercial Internet sites displayed at least some warning that businesses were collecting personal details from visitors, such as
names, postal and e-mail addresses, and even shopping tastes, the study found. But less than 10 percent of those sites had what experts consider
comprehensive privacy policies.
A similar study last summer by the FTC found only 14 percent of sites warned how companies used private information they collected about customers.
@HWA
87.0 Pentium III has 46 Bugs
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 23rd 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Kanuchsa
The Pentium III bug list has been posted by Intel in PDF
format, lists 46 bugs or "erratums" as Intel likes to call
them, not much ahead for fixes for them hardware wise
mainly because Intel is calling them minor. One of them
is a FPU error which appears to have no plans to be
fixed in the future.
The UK Register
http://www.theregister.co.uk/990617-000007.html
PDF Doc listing 'erratums' not bugs
ftp://download.Intel.nl/design/pentiumiii/specupdt/24445304.pdf
88.0 'War' Against FBI Continues
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 24th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by dis-crete
F0rpaxe has struck again and this time defaced the web
site of the Naval Training Systems Center with some
serious rhetoric leveled against the FBI. DigiAlmighty
defaced the Naval Surface Warfare Center which is
slightly ironic as the Dahlgren division of NSWC helped
develop the Co-operative Intrusion Detection Evaluation
and Response program commonly referred to as the
'hacker tracker'. Additionally the web site for NASA's
Earth Observing System Data and Information System
has been defaced by the Keebler Elves. HNN has mirrors
of all three sites available. (Mirrors provided by
attrition.)
Federal Computer Week
http://www.fcw.com/pubs/fcw/1999/0621/web-navyhack-6-23-99.html
HNN Cracked Pages Archive
http://www.hackernews.com/archive/crackarch.html
JUNE 23, 1999 . . . 7:52 EDT
Hacker groups target Navy sites
BY BOB BREWIN (antenna@fcw.com)
AND DIANE FRANK (diane_frank@fcw.com)
In the wake of attacks on the FBI World Wide Web
sites earlier this month, hacker groups have now
turned their attention to the Navy, including the Web
site of a Navy organization that helped develop
sophisticated hacker-tracker software.
Last week a hacker defaced the Web site
(www.nswc.navy.mil) of the Naval Surface Warfare
Center's Dahlgren, Va. division with a mostly obscene
message that read in part, "FEDS: You will never stop
my FLOW. Nice try, though. Killing my hotmail
account and all that. HAHHAHA." The Dahlgren
division of NSWC helped develop the Co-operative
Intrusion Detection Evaluation and Response program
(www.nswc.navy.mil/ISSEC/CID/), which uses
automated tools to track and analyze hacker attacks.
Another hacker -- who, based on the postings on the defaced Navy Web sites,
may be engaged in hacker duel with the Dahlgren attacker -- hit the Web site of
the Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division (www.ntsc.navy.mil),
Orlando, Fla.
This hacker, who affiliated himself with the group f0rpaxe, said on the defaced
Navy page, "We own the Naval Air Warfare Center Systems Training Division.
FBI spokesman said we were only doing some gov and mil servers [but] we
rooted Naval Air Warfare Training Center....We had been exploring entire
servers until today."
Navy spokesmen have not returned calls from FCW asking for comment on the
Web attacks.
89.0 Singapore Officials Arrest Two
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 24th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Dioxin
Two individuals have been arrested for violations of the
Computer Misuse Act for their involvement in the recent
web defacements of www.tcs.gov.sg and
www.mediacity.com.sg (Television Corporation of
Singapore). Apparently, they had forgotten to spoof
their addresses before they committed the dirty act.
They face a maximum of a S$10,000 fine and up to
three years in jail. Speculation is that they used the
new malformed .htr request bug in IIS to gain entry to
the servers.
The Straits Times
http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg/cyb/cyb1_0624.html
(Link not found June 25th - Ed)
90.0 GSA Looking for IDS
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 24th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by erewhon
The General Services Administration is looking for
vendors to set up and manage intrusion detection
systems for civilian agency networks to monitor for
cyber intrusions. The GSA plan calls for information
gathered by the system to be sent to a central facility
in Washington DC for analysis.
Federal Computer Week
http://fcw.com/pubs/fcw/1999/0621/web-gsa-6-23-99.html
JUNE 23, 1999 . . . 11:10 EDT
GSA seeks tools, services to monitor government
nets
BY DIANE FRANK (diane_frank@fcw.com)
The General Services Administration is seeking vendors qualified to set up and
manage hardware and software to monitor civilian agency networks for security
breaches, the agency announced today.
The project, being managed by the GSA Federal Technology Service's Office of
Information Security, aims to build a full intrusion-detection system that will
enable agencies to identify and collect information on external attacks on federal
information technology resources, according to a notice published in Commerce
Business Daily. The program initially will focus on identifying external attacks
on agency systems.
Under GSA's plan, information collected by the system will be transmitted
almost immediately to a central analysis facility in the Washington, D.C., area.
@HWA
91.0 Theres Money in them thar videos! (DEFCON WEBCAST)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 24th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
DefCon Live WebCast
contributed by Shanners
Unable to make it to Las Vegas this year? HNC Network,
an HNN Affiliate, will be conducting a live webcast from
the show floor. They will cover Hacker Jeopardy, Hacker
Death Match, as well as numerous live interviews with
speakers and attendees, and some recorded material.
There will also be prizes given away through the
webcast like Free/OpenBSD, RH 5.2 and Hackers Secrets
5. They are charging $29.95 for the three day
broadcast.
Live Defcon Webcast
http://www.hack-net.com/defcon
(I dunno, you make your own decisions on this one ... - Ed)
92.0 Kasparov Defaced?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 24th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by macwizard
Well, something has been going on with the World vs.
Kasparov Chess Match. Microsoft says it was technical
difficulties due to server overload. We have a received a
few emails saying that the site was indeed broken into.
It is claimed that the password to the site was sniffed
and that is how entry was gained. Unfortunately we are
unable to confirm neither the MS position or the emails.
BBC
http://news2.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid%5F376000/376147.stm
Sci/Tech
Kasparov's chess pieces
disappear
Kasparov will have 24 hours per move
As the world's chess fans gathered on the Internet to pit
their wits against champion Garry Kasparov, unorthodox
rooks, knights, bishops and queens began appearing
and disappearing on the board.
Billed as the greatest Internet chess challenge ever, the chance
to log on and compete against the world's greatest player attracted
over two million hits in the first few hours.
But the Microsoft Gaming Zone Web
site hosting the tournament was not up to the challenge.
As Bob Sullivan, technology reporter with MSNBC News
watched, things began to go wrong, before a single move
had been played.
"Chess pieces were landing all over the board," Mr
Sullivan reported.
According to MSNBC, the problems were due to server
overload - a technical hitch rather than a hacker spoiling
the site on purpose.
"It is certainly an embarrassment for the company," said
Mr Sullivan.
First move
After Mr Kasparov's opening move (Pawn to E-4) in New
York on Monday, he travelled to Washington, DC, where
users guided by four young chess experts initiated the
"Sicilian Defence", moving pawn to C-5.
The World Team's first move was chosen by 41% of
those voting.
Kasparov declined to make another move in order to
maintain the "suspense," said Audrey Waters, the
chess champion's spokeswoman. He has 24 hours to
respond.
Deep Blue challenge
Mr Kasparov is widely regarded as the greatest chess
player ever. He has been particularly strong over the last
few months with three convincing tournament victories in
a row.
In 1996 and 1997, he played two six-game matches against the Deep
Blue computer, winning the first and losing the second.
Millions of Net users are believed to have followed those games.
It was the first time a computer had defeated a reigning
world champion in a match played under classical chess
rules. The chances of the world beating Mr Kasparov
seem lower.
@HWA
93.0 Russ Cooper Interview
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 24th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Space Rogue
MSNBC has an excellent interview with Russ Cooper, the
NTBugTraq administrator. If you subscribe to
NTBugTraq, or even if you don't, you should read this.
MSNBC
http://www.msnbc.com/news/283054.asp
Surgeon general
of the Web?
NTBugTraq’s Russ Cooper
serves as independent authority
on bugs, viruses,
security issues
By Bob Sullivan
MSNBC
June 23 — The eruption of a new computer virus
often leads to massive confusion. Besieged system
administrators and confused users need hard
information about what the danger is and what to
do, but it’s elusive. Adding to the confusion,
anti-virus software companies issue
superlative-laden press releases, perhaps
exaggerating the real threat. Meanwhile, software
vendors like Microsoft often downplay the threats
to prevent bad PR. In the middle of this maelstrom
is Russ Cooper.
WHO’S RUSS COOPER? He’s the owner and
administrator of perhaps the most popular security mailing list
on the Internet, NTBugTraq — a sort of emergency
broadcast system for computer network administrators.
When any security hole is found, it’s posted to this list,
sometimes even before Microsoft or anti-virus companies
know about it. (Microsoft is a partner in MSNBC.)
In fact, it’s a pelt of honor to be the first to send Cooper
a bug, and posters do so sometimes to attract the attention of
future employers.
As the human filter for NTBugTraq’s 25,000 very
devoted members, Cooper serves as a kind of referee for
groups arguing about the authenticity and severity of
computer crises, but he has his sights set on a loftier goal. He
views himself as the surgeon general of the Internet. He
grand plans include launching an Internet security “portal”
Web site called Securityadvice.com in the fall.
WITHOUT THE MARKETING SPIN
“I just want to try and be a consistent voice to the
masses for these types of issues,” Cooper said.
“Trying to give the facts in a way people can understand
that doesn’t overemphasize the threat. ... I don’t try and
downplay things, but I’m not trying to get a stock increase out
of [announcements]. I want people to be informed of the
facts without the marketing spin.”
His bare-bones, straightforward style came through on
April 23, just before the Windows CIH/Chernobyl virus hit.
While anti-virus companies and media outlets were warning
of potential data devastation that never materialized in the
United States, Cooper sent this note to his list: “The CIH
virus might cause problems on Monday, April 26th, for some
of you. Do a virus scan before 4/26/99. Check with your
anti-virus vendor is you don’t know what it is, or see;
http://www.antivirus.com/vinfo/alerts.htm for more info. ‘nuff
said here.”
Securityadvice will be a commercial site, and Cooper
says his bankers have raised $2 million. But for now, he
administers NTBugTraq and its companion Web site out of
the goodness of his heart (the Web site does take in about
$7,000 to $8,000 in advertising a month, enough to pay for a
secretary and cover expenses).
COOPER’S GIRLFRIEND
Cooper’s heart shone through six weeks ago when the
39-year-old divorced man decided he was tired of living alone
and took out a half-page personal ad in the local Lindsay,
Ontario, newspaper, headlined, “Meg Ryan, where are you?”
“I own my own business working on the Internet,
became internationally recognized in my field, and moved to
Lindsay to enjoy an idealistic lifestyle of working from
home,” he wrote in the ad.
Days later, a bus driver who read the ad set him up, and
he has spent his weekends with Kathy ever since.
But his weekdays, and weeknights, are devoted to the
list. Cooper now spends 12 to 14 hours Monday through
Friday in front of a computer screen. That includes the
computer screen that hovers over his bed, hospital tray style.
A COMPUTER IN HIS BOAT?
“I can sit in bed and type and read away. I can do a
quick check when I get up in the morning. ... I haven’t
figured out how to get one in my boat yet,” Cooper joked. “In
this role I have to be real responsive timewise.”
Included in this labor of love are hours of free consulting
Cooper offers to the 25,000 list members who send notes
with possible “exploits.” He edits every note that comes in,
removing redundant e-mails, posting only verifiable
information. As often as not, a flaw sent to the list is caused
by human error, not a computer bug, and Cooper offer free
help desk-like advice to fix the problem. That keeps traffic on
the list down to a trickle of about 10 messages or so per day
— but all of them laser-focused.
“People have told me in the past that they read every
message I send and are prepared to react to every message I
send,” Cooper said.
THE IMPRESSIVE AUDIENCE
Among those ready to react to every Cooper message:
Jason Garms, the lead product manager for Windows NT
security at Microsoft, who’s a list member. Even though
Cooper’s list is devoted to publicly flogging (some might say
embarrassing) Microsoft by revealing flaws in Windows NT,
Garms says he has a good, personal working relationship with
Cooper. They correspond by e-mail as often as once a week.
“We don’t always see eye to eye with Russ,” said
Garms, who has worked with Cooper since NTBugTraq
went online in 1997 and isn’t crazy about times the list has
posted exploits before Microsoft has had the time to fix the
problem. After all, hackers monitor the list, too. “But we’ve
had a good working relationship,” Garms said. “Russ provides
an important service.... The reality is, an independent forum
is always going to be useful.”
Anti-virus vendors also sit poised to act on every
Cooper-NTBugTraq note — even Network Associates,
which Cooper has frequently criticized for exaggerating
security threats.
“It forces companies to keep on their toes,” said Dan
Takata, spokesman for Data Fellows Inc., another security
company. “He can’t always make everyone happy. He has
gotten flamed by top anti-virus people, but I think he’s doing a
valuable service.”
PROVING GROUNDS
Living in between software vendors and security firms
might sound like precarious work, but Cooper’s eclectic
background serves as solid preparation. He spent most of
1984-1990 running banking networks in Liberia, Africa. He
didn’t return to Canada until he was forced out during the
Liberian Revolution. He then took a job at the University of
Toronto trying to make Novell’s Netware, Oracle software,
an IBM mainframe and Windows 3.1 all work together.
During this time, he honed the fine art of pestering software
vendors by telephone, forcing them to support their products.
“I follow instructions, and when it doesn’t work, I tell
them I’m going to sue,” he said. “Asking questions is a skill.
Asking questions of a vendor is an art.”
AVOIDING RELIGIOUS WARS
Later he went to work for Tandem Computers and
subsequently held various networking jobs implementing
Microsoft software. As the Internet explosion unfolded, he
monitored mailing lists that continually slammed Windows NT
security. But in many cases, posters were making religious
statements such as “switch to Linux” more than they were
engaging in a scientific debate over what NT could or
couldn’t do. So in 1997, he filled that gap with NTBugTraq.
And thus began Cooper’s odd role as a constant public
flogger of NT’s flaws — and perhaps NT’s most public
independent supporter.
“I’m just trying to get rid of some of the religious
arguments going on,” Cooper said. “There are people bashing
NT because they didn’t know what it could do. I wanted to
get intelligent security people to tell me the real issues with
NT.”
The list now acts as a filtering service both for Microsoft
and for NT users. Instead of hundreds of e-mails from
hundreds of administrators landing at Microsoft headquarters
in Redmond, Wash., Cooper offers this promise: “You post to
NT BugTraq, and I’ll follow up with Microsoft. ... They
know if something’s coming from me, it has had a bit more
work done on it.”
SECURITYADVICE.COM
The list doesn’t just cover Windows NT administration
issues — it touches anything that might impact a computer
professional running a Windows-based network. That made
NTBugTraq a solid place for information on the most recent
security/virus crises, such as Melissa and ExploreZip.
But now he plans to expand that expertise, to all security
issues facing all Internet users.
“We’ll have two communities — one being the experts
and the other being the Mom and Pop side,” Cooper said.
He’ll then work to convince normal Internet users about the
importance of security issues. Regular contributors will
include Vin McClellan, an expert in cryptography, and Robert
Abbott, sometimes known as the father of Internet security.
Abbott was also the technical advisor for the cybercrime cult
movie “Sneakers.” And of course, information will be
available in e-mail format.
Cooper and his Securityadvice.com concept have their
detractors. He’s been criticized as a self-promoter, and his
for-profit security site idea flies in the face of computer
“purists” such as Linux coders who believe such information
should be free; or that only a non-profit organization can
really offer a “Good Housekeeping seal” for security
information.
“I’m not worried about commercializing my credibility,”
Cooper said. ”[Someone] said I am doing all this for
self-promotion. Maybe that’s true. But I’d like to think that
what I’m promoting is helping people.”
@HWA
94.0 Thanks-CGI Defaced With Its Own Script
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 24th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Code Kid
"The Coolest CGI Magician On The Net", has been
defaced with one of its own tricks. Thanks-CGI has
been a recent victim of poor security. If you have
purchased scripts from this service in the past you may
want to double check them to be sure you are not
vulnerable as well.
7am News
http://7am.com/cgi-bin/twires.cgi?1000_t99062202.htm
Hacked Site Alleges Media Conspiracy
Updated 7:35 am PDT, 24 June 1999
By Bruce Simpson
Although repaired and back online within just a few short hours, the
Thanks-CGI website appears to have been hit a second time by the
"Hackers In Paradise" group.
This time the group appear happy to have simply changed the scrolling
javascript banner at the bottom of the page to read "HiP Welcomes you to
THANKS-CGI.... We're trying to make your site more secure for the
world!"
The operator of the website has told 7am.com that they are currently testing
for holes in their CGI scripts. They have suggested that the security hole
may not be the fault of their scripts -- rather that it could have been a
"misconfiguration between cgi script and the server."
7am.com discovered the hack while researching another story on CGI
resources and contacted the site's operator by email immediately the
problem was noticed. However, the operator of the Thanks-CGI site has
suggested that because "the arrival of your e-mail was paced so closely with
the occurence [sic] of the hackage ... we have strong reason to believe
there might be a relationship between 7am.com and the hacker who hacked
our site."
7am.com denies the allegations.
Original Report
To plagiarize and modify just a little: "As ye shall live by the Net, so shall ye
die by the Net" -- at least that's the message "Hackers in Paradise" appear
to be trying to impart on the operator of the Thanks-CGI site.
Billing itself as "The Coolest CGI Magician On The Net", the Thanks-CGI
site appears to have been left with a large amount of egg on its face after
"Hackers in Paradise" seemingly exploited a security hole in one of the
scripts and hacked the site's front page.
"Yep another site selling cgi scripts with major security problems. CGI
programmers need to spend a little time testing the security aspect of
thier [sic] scripts before trying to make money with them" is the
embarrassing message that greeted visitors to the hacked site.
7am.com has attempted to contact the operators of the Thanks-CGI site for
comment but as yet they have not replied to our email.
In the meantime, those who have purchased scripts from the site may well
be advised to get a guarantee that the same hole which allowed hackers into
the thanks-CGI site is not present in the software they purchased.
@HWA
95.0 ToorCon Date Changes
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 24th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by skalore
The date of ToorCon has changed to September
3rd-4th, 1999. There will be no San Diego 2600 Meeting
due to ToorCon falling on that date. The expo has also
moved to the Price Center in The University of
California, San Diego.
HNN Cons Page
http://www.hackernews.com/cons/cons.html
96.0 Gov Vulnerable Due to Lack of Training
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 25th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Fedb0y
The Technology Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Science heard expert testimony on Thursday claiming
that computer security training is desperately needed.
The experts stressed that most federal employees do
not take computer security seriously and that this is
one reason for the numerous successful attacks on
federal systems. Another reason that was given was the
low salaries for properly trained security personnel.
When good people are found or developed in house they
are usually lured away by the private sector.
San Jose Mercury News
http://www.sjmercury.com/breaking/docs/055607.htm
ABC News
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/tech/DailyNews/hackers_govt990624.html
USA Today
http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/ctf465.htm
APB Online
http://www.apbonline.com/911/1999/06/24/hack0624_01.html
MSNBC
http://www.msnbc.com/news/283837.asp
US House Committee on Science
http://www.house.gov/science/welcome.htm
Congress May Ask for Regular Security Reports
At the above hearing Rep. Connie Morella (R-Md.)
mentioned that federal agencies should report the
status of their computer security to Congress on a
regular basis. She plans to include the requirement in
her revisement of the Computer Security Act of 1987.
All three witnesses at the hearing agreed this was a
good idea.
Federal Computer Week
http://www.fcw.com:80/pubs/fcw/1999/0621/web-security-6-24-99.html
Additional Government Sites Defaced
While hearings where being held additional government
sites where being defaced. This time it was Monmouth
Army Base and the Argonne National Labs library.
(mirrors provided by attrition)
HNN Cracked Pages Archive
http://www.hackernews.com/archive/crackarch.html
San Jose Mercury News;
Posted at 10:44 a.m. PDT Thursday, June 24, 1999
Government vulnerable to
hackers, experts warn
WASHINGTON (AP) -- Government web sites and computer
networks are increasingly vulnerable to ``cyber attacks'' because they
lack trained personnel and don't follow security plans, federal officials
warned a congressional committee today.
Few people have adequate training to defend government websites, and
those who do seldom work in government for long, three panelists told
the House Science Committee's subcommittee on technology.
The security agencies ``train people at government expense and the
private sector waves a bigger paycheck and takes them away,'' said
Keith Rhodes, technical director with the General Accounting Ooffice.
In addition, government security experts often find their advice isn't
followed, said Raymond Kammer, director of the National Institutes for
Standards and Technology, which recommends security measures for
federal computers.
``It is imperative that federal agencies implement vigorous security
programs,'' Rhodes said.
Hacker attacks like the recent defacing of the Senate web site are well
documented, but information about attempts to access sensitive
intelligence information is ``very sketchy,'' said Michael Jacobs, a
deputy director of the National Security Agency.
Hackers are often nearly impossible to trace unless they boast of their
actions.
In the most common type of attack, hackers overwhelm web sites with
a flood of requests for information, causing the site to slow or shut
down. Hackers can also redirect visitors to a fake web site that
appears to be the official site, as happened earlier this month to the
Senate site.
``We are clearly seeing an escalation in both the destructive nature and
aggressive pace of these and other attacks,'' Jacobs said.
-=-
ABC;
Gov’t Server Hacker Warning
Expert Panel Says Web Sites Are Vulnerable
By David Ho
The Associated Press
W A S H I N G T O N, June 24 — Government web
sites and computer networks are increasingly
vulnerable to “cyber attacks” because they lack
trained personnel and don’t follow security
plans, federal officials warned a congressional
committee today.
Few people have adequate training to defend
government websites, and those who do seldom work in
government for long, three panelists told the House Science
Committee’s subcommittee on technology.
The security agencies “train people at government
expense and the private sector waves a bigger paycheck
and takes them away,” said Keith Rhodes, technical
director with the General Accounting Ooffice.
No One Follows Advice
In addition, government security experts often find their
advice isn’t followed, said Raymond Kammer, director of
the National Institutes for Standards and Technology, which
recommends security measures for federal computers.
“It is imperative that federal agencies implement
vigorous security programs,” Rhodes said.
Hacker attacks like the recent defacing of the Senate
web site are well documented, but information about
attempts to access sensitive intelligence information is
“very sketchy,” said Michael Jacobs, a deputy director of
the National Security Agency.
No Crowing, No Leads
Hackers are often nearly impossible to trace unless they
boast of their actions.
In the most common type of attack, hackers overwhelm
web sites with a flood of requests for information, causing
the site to slow or shut down. Hackers can also redirect
visitors to a fake web site that appears to be the official
site, as happened earlier this month to the Senate site.
“We are clearly seeing an escalation in both the
destructive nature and aggressive pace of these and other
attacks,” Jacobs said.
-=-
Federal Computer Weekly;
House member suggests regular network security
reports
BY DIANE FRANK (diane_frank@fcw.com)
Federal agencies may soon be required to submit regular reports to Congress
on the security status of their networks, much as they now report their Year
2000 compliance.
At a House Technology Subcommittee meeting today covering reasons why
federal World Wide Web sites and systems are vulnerable to cyberattacks, Rep.
Connie Morella (R-Md.) said that in her revision of the Computer Security Act
of 1987 she plans to include a requirement for agencies to report to Congress
regularly the steps they are taking to secure their sites and systems.
All three witnesses at the hearing supported Morella's suggestion as a way to
spur agencies to move beyond planning security measures and into implementing
them. Testifying at the hearing were Keith Rhodes, director of the Office of
Computer and Information Technology Assessment at the Accounting and
Information Management Division of the General Accounting Office; Michael
Jacobs, deputy director of information systems security at the National Security
Agency; and National Institutes of Standards and Technology director Ray
Kammer.
"Security needs to stop being an afterthought," Rhodes said. "The value of
reporting would be in a standardization of agencies' ability to report," he said.
If agencies know the questions Congress will ask, they will better understand
the fundamental IT implementation steps they must take, he said.
Many agencies in the national security community already submit such reports
and have found it helpful to undergo regular security assessments, Jacobs said.
Rhodes, Jacobs and Kammer also suggested that the new computer security bill
require federal agencies to use security expertise developed by NIST and NSA
instead of "recommending" such steps, as the current act does.
@HWA
97.0 Teeside University Offers Degree in Warez
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 25th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by Warez Dude
The University of Teesside will soon offer a four year
degree in warez. Courses will obviously include
programing but also the history of warez, good game
design and other topics to prepare graduates for entry
into the booming computer game industry.
BBC
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/education/newsid_377000/377341.stm
Teesside University
http://www.tees.ac.uk/
BBC;
Education
Compulsory games for
students
The courses will prepare students for a career in the games industry
A university computer department is taking down notices
saying that it is forbidden to play games - and replacing
them with new signs saying that it is going to become
compulsory.
The University of Teesside is introducing a degree
course in designing computer games, which will mean
four years of playing and building games and writing
essays on such subjects as the history of computer
games.
For serious addicts of screen games, there is a course
unit dedicated to the appreciation of games, which will
involve comparing the relative merits of the latest
releases and classics such as Sonic the Hedgehog and
Super Mario.
Expanding market
The course tutor, Matthew Holton, says that the new
qualification, which will have links with games
companies, will provide graduates for the expanding jobs
market in the computer games industry.
"The course has been compiled with a great deal of
input from experts in the games industry so graduates
from these degrees may have no problem walking into
jobs," he said.
"People don't realise how large the computer games
industry has become - or that some of the best games are
developed in Britain."
The course has been
designed as practical training for a career in designing
computer games, with students spending their time
learning about how to make games and considering
which approaches produce the best results.
Serious endeavour
Mr Holton, who expects the course to attract serious
games enthusiasts, says that assessing students'
efforts will not be problematic.
"There are plenty of academic criteria that can be
applied to such a course, such as assessing the quality
of art work, lighting, animation, interaction and the user
interface."
The university is offering two degree courses for
computer games - one in the creative design for games
and the other in computer programming.
But even though the courses are dealing with games, a
university spokesman emphasised that these were not
"Mickey Mouse" subjects, but were serious vocational
courses serving a growing sector of the economy.
@HWA
98.0 FREE DefCon WebCasts
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 25th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by angus
Yesterday HNN mentioned that HNC Network would be
providing a webcast of DefCon for $29.95. These sites
will also be broadcasting live audio and video streams of
selected speakers, interviews and video live from the
show floor. These feeds are FREE to the public.
Pirate Radio UK
http://www.pirate-radio.co.uk
Hacksec
http://www.hacksec.org
99.0 Old Modem Flaw Still Haunts Users
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
June 25th 1999
From HNN http://www.hackernews.com/
contributed by pbradely
Hayes, the old modem manufacturer, may not live any
longer but its legacy lives on. Hayes originally had the
patent on the escape sequence "+ + + ATH" (without
the spaces) It would appear that many modems
manufacturers are still not paying the royalties for TIES
(Time Independent Escape Sequence). As discovered
years ago this escape sequence will force many modems
to go offline or into command mode forcing a reboot. An
excellent DoS attack. MacInTouch has an interesting
new report on this OS independent problem. If you find
that you are susceptible to this ancient flaw you can
try changing the value of the S2 register to something
greater than 127. (Consult your modem manual on how
to do this.)
Macintouch Report
http://www.macintouch.com/modemsecurity.html
BugTraq Archive Sept 1998
http://geek-girl.com/bugtraq/1998_3/0916.html
Macintouch;
Modem Guard Mode/Security Defect
1.Problem Description
2.Workarounds
3.Background Info
Important note:
The incredible modem defect described below makes it impossible for many people to even view
certain character sequences without triggering the bug.
As a result we have been forced to change the modem command strings in all the examples below,
inserting spaces between the plus signs. The actual command strings have no spaces or quotes.
Problem Description
Date: Sun, 20 Jun 1999 15:01:47 -0400
From: "Mohammad A. Haque"
Subject: Global Village modem exploit?
Apparently there seems to be a problem with Global Village modems where you can cause it to execute modem commands remotely. If you
send a computer an AT command in a packet that another remote machine responds to (i.e. ctcp, ping, icmp) the modem on that machine
doe sthat command.
For example, while on irc if I sent the commad /ctcp SomeOne ping + + +ATH0, SomeOne's machine would respond to the ping and as
a result his/her modem would hang up right after that. It just doesn't stop there. Imagine sending out /ctcp SomeOne ping + + + +
ATH0ATADT911.
Is this a known problem with Global Village modems?
Mohammad A. Haque
Subject: new denial of service attack?
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 1999
From: [MacInTouch reader]
Hi there!
I was playing around this weekend and found what appears to be a denial of service attack which works with dreadful effectiveness on
iMacs and pretty much any other Mac with certain Global Village modems. It was essentially pointed out to me by a couple of kid phreakers,
and at first I dismissed it until I watched them repeatedly knock a couple of iMac and other GV users off the net.
Hopefully, you guys know all about this stuff, and there was a bug fix released that neither I nor my guinea pig tester could find. But just in
case you don't...
Modem? Yes, this attack seems to exploit a firmware issue. Apparently, the Global Village modem in the iMac as well as a few other
external modems are susceptible. I don't have the resources to test different modems, but I suspect that the problem is going to be found in
every GV with the same chipset.
Symptom: Immediate hangup/disconnection upon receiving the signal.
Technical description of the setup:
Modems have two modes- command mode, where they will process commands issued to them, and connect mode, where they simply pass
data. When you dial another modem and a connection is made, the modem switches to connect mode by default. When you wish to hang up,
a signal is sent which forces the modem into command mode so that it can interpret commands, and then processes the hangup command as
issued from the computer.
The process for switching a modem from connect mode to command mode is simple- there must be silence on the connection for a specified
amount of time, followed by the + (plus) symbol repeated 3 times (+ + +) followed by an equal silent pause. The pause is known as "Guard
Time," to ensure that your modem doesn't accidentally hang up whenever it encounters the string "+ + +" in regular communications.
Additionally, most modems can only accept the command mode string when it comes from the DTE (serial side) of the connection rather
than the remote side.
Although I've yet to confirm it, it would appear that the affected modems have their guard time duration value set to zero- meaning that the
string should throw their modems into command mode without any silence on the line before or after the switch string.
The exploit:
In simplest terms, if I can send something to a computer connected by one of these modems which will be repeated back byte for byte,
there's a fair chance that the command mode string (+ + +) will not be broken up by the characters encapsulating it within a packet (if on a
PPP connection) I don't fully understand PPP encapsulation, I would think that that alone would be enough to protect against this sort of
attack... but I've seen that it isn't.
Add it up:
If I had a super carefully constructed ICMP message, maybe a web page with a hidden form, or a malformed client to client protocol
message in an IRC session which contains '+ + +ATH0,' and some software protocol in your mac bounces it back to me.... and I can have
your Mac send + + +ATH0 to its modem... the ATH0 is of course the Hayes AT command to hang up immediately. I won't even address
the possibility that such a request could be used to totally alter the modem's configuration in its onboard NVRAM, which would wreak further
havoc.
Defense?
My first reaction would be to check the value of whatever is in the S12 register of the modem. This can be checked by feeding "AT&V" into
zterm or another terminal emulator when the modem is in command mode.
I haven't been able to find a tester who's got an affected modem *and* a working knowledge of Zterm or any other terminal emulator, so I'm
really hung up on this one- no pun intended. I am expecting to find the value set to 0.
Changing this value should eliminate the problem- it will introduce guard time to the string that the modem expects to receive. Because of the
nature of PPP encapsulation, the modem would never receive the command-mode string until it was legitimately sent from the PPP driver
itself at the end of the session.
In english, adding something like, "S12=50" to your modem init string should fix it. I can't remember what the default guard time is supposed
to be, and I've switched to a DSL connection- no modems handy.
One possible side effect of this fix is that if the guard time is set too high, the modem will ignore legitimate hangup requests from the PPP
program.
... So far I've just seen some kids using this attack on IRC servers... they broadcast it across entire channels and see who drops off. ...
From: flowerpt
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 1999 10:15:02 -0400
Subject: "modem security flaw"
This isn't a new problem. When I was working tech support back in '94 a few modem manufacturers were doing this, what they called TIES
(Time Independent Escape Sequence). They basically skipped the guard time.
Back then, it was to avoid paying royalties to Hayes, who long ago realized the guard time was essential for reliable communications. I
suppose they have a patent on it.
Some jolly folks on usenet had "do you need a new modem? + + +ATH" in their .sig. When people used terminal connections...
I don't remember the exact figure, but when we calculated the odds of it occuring randomly, it was about once per gigabyte. At the time, that
seemed huge. Now, it seems likely to occur to a good number of people each day.
Hopefully, this is all just a bad INIT string.
-Bill
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 1999 09:10:10 -0600
Subject: Modem Security Problem...
From: "Darron Froese"
Ric,
This is nothing new at all. Many modems on many different computers (on many different operating systems) are at risk here. Some estimate
10%-20% while others estimate it's closer to 30%-50%.
Take a look at the bugtraq archives for more detailed info:
1998_3/0916.html
You can follow the thread from there...
--
Darron
Subject: TIES modems and the escape sequence guard time
Date: Mon, 21 Jun 1999 11:16:29 -0400
From: Bill Coleman AA4LR
... Hayes, did, indeed, have a patent on this technology, and they strigently defended it. Since the demise of Hayes, it is unclear who now
owns this patent.
As for the occurance of this problem, when I was at Hayes and the TIES modems surfaced, Hayes initiated a protracted search for
documents which ended in + + +ATH
[back]
[home]
[copyright ]
[software]
@HWA
117.0 denial of service attack against NT PDC from Win95 workstation
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Date: Fri, 4 Jun 1999 14:01:01 -0700
Reply-To: Carl Byington